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Inhaltliche Zusammenführung 
1 Introduction 
The New Institutional Economics has established itself as widely accepted extension to the 
standard neoclassical paradigm. Here, institutions are defined as commonly known rules that 
structure recurring interaction situations and the corresponding sanctioning mechanism. For-
mal institutions describe rules with a sanction mechanism that is organized by the state. In-
formal institutions describe rules with a sanction mechanism that is not organized by the state 
but by other societal members. Most studies providing empirical evidence that “institutions 
matter” focus solely on formal institutions. This is in stark contrast to the theoretical acknowl-
edgement that human decisions are shaped by both formal and informal institutions.  
This dissertation brings together five contributions in the empirical analysis of informal insti-
tutions. The first contribution provides a conceptual framework for the measurement of in-
formal institutions. The second and third contribution analyze the impact of informal institu-
tions on economic outcomes. The fourth contribution is concerned with the trade-off between 
formal and informal contract enforcement, while the fifth contribution is concerned with the 
effect of individual level religiosity on acceptance of corruption.  
2 How to measure informal institutions 
The aim of this work is to provide a methodological basis for the empirical study of informal 
institutions. Concerning the pragmatic measurement of informal institutions, it is argued that 
(1) a clear conceptual definition of an informal institution is essential to ensure validity, espe-
cially given that informal institutions are usually not codified. (2) In general, the measurement 
of factual behavior should be preferred if feasible. The observed behavior should provide 
enough variation to enable causal inference. (3) Because subjective measures are often faced 
with the problem of reverse causality in the measurement process, it is argued that objective 
measurement is generally to be preferred. If this is not feasible, the methodology used in the 
analysis of the data has to account for this problem. (4) In order to ensure reliability, transpar-
ency in the measurement process is required.  
Given these proposals, some existing measures for informal institutions are critically sur-
veyed. Objective measures include proximate measures and experimental measures. The ad-
ii 
 
vantage of proximate measures – like newspaper readership, the number of non-governmental 
organizations in a country or information on which religion is dominant in a region – is that it 
avoids the Heisenberg problem, namely that mere measurement of a phenomenon affects said 
phenomenon. However, there are concerns with regard to the validity of such measures. Ex-
perimental measurement of informal institutions – like the trust or public goods game – seems 
to be very well suited at first glance: It measures factually observed behavior and the use of 
randomization ensures causal inference. However, generalization beyond the (typically small-
group) framing of the experiment and the sample used is usually not possible. In addition, 
analysis of institutional change is inherently difficult in the experimental methodology.  
Subjective measurements of informal institutions include representative survey projects like 
the World Values Survey and non-representative survey measures, which are subjective ex-
pert assessments concerning some social aspect, like the state of civil society. The biggest ca-
veat with these measures stems from the fact that subjective measures do not directly measure 
factual behavior. Potential advantages include measurement over rather long periods of time 
and exploratory use of numerous items of a survey. Furthermore, representative survey data 
are inherently well-suited for multi-level analysis, which would explicitly account for the 
basic notion that enforcement of institutions can occur at different levels of societal aggrega-
tion. A third category of subjective measures is represented by historical narratives. Here, his-
torical records are utilized in order to arrive at qualitative assessments of the impact of an in-
formal institution, usually focusing on times when centralized state enforcement of contracts 
was not yet available. Although these measures can prove valuable as the only feasible source 
for measurement in the very long-run, it is argued that this approach is characterized by sev-
eral problems, all rooted in the subjectivity of qualitative historical interpretation.  
The general conclusion to this work is that none of the surveyed approaches to measuring in-
formal institutions is first-best: Each is characterized by advantages as well as disadvantages. 
The implication for empirical work is that objective and subjective measures of informal insti-
tutions should be seen as complements, rather than substitutes in assessing the impact of in-
formal institutions. 
3 Values, norms and the rule of law in long-run economic development 
There is some consensus in the literature that institutions can account fundamentally for long-
run differences in economic development. However, the most influential works in this line 
neglect the role of informal institutions (like values and norms) in the development process. 
The aim of this work is to assess (in an exploratory manner) whether and how values and 
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norms impact long-run development. It is conjectured that (1) rule of law and social capital 
are fundamental determinants of economic development, (2) values and norms prevalent in a 
society influence the effectiveness of rule of law and social capital and (3) values and norms 
could directly impact development outcomes.  
Because there is no general theory as to which values and norms are relevant here, a list of 
values and norms that could potentially be significant is considered. (1) Individual responsi-
bility and choice: If actors follow the norm that it is the individual that is responsible for deci-
sion making and achieving goals, this should not only lead to actors striving to be better of 
economically, it should also increase the chance of establishing a functioning system of pri-
vate property rights. (2) Inequality acceptance: Competition is inherently associated with ine-
qualities, as there will be many enterprises that fail. If actors accept legally attained inequali-
ties in economic outcomes, this should facilitate development through competition. However, 
this norm could also lead to a weakening of the rule of law, as institutions that promote equal 
treatment are not favored. (3) Individuals are not militantly averse against the unknown: If ac-
tors follow this norm, this should be associated with more innovative behavior and tinkering, 
both with regard to technology and political institutions, which would then be associated with 
economic and political development. (4) Unequal treatment: When societal values and norms 
support unequal treatment according to arbitrary lines such as men/women, believers/infidels, 
it is more likely that there are distortions in the allocation of human capital. (5) Hierarchy ac-
ceptance: When actors accept without question instructions given to them within a hierarchy, 
it is expected that the operation of firms – which are inherently hierarchical organizations – 
should be easier due to lower organizational costs. On the other hand, too strong an ac-
ceptance of hierarchies might weaken democratic institutions. (6) Future orientation: The 
more actors follow norms that support caring for future outcomes, the more likely they will 
save and invest optimally. 
In order to test for the impact of these values and norms on economic development, repre-
sentative survey data from the World Values Survey (and as a control non-representative sur-
vey data from the GLOBE project) are employed. For each of the proposed value dimensions, 
items that might be suitable are identified in the survey and combined using factor analysis. 
The dependent variable is per capita income. The estimation approach, three stage least 
squares, allows to explicitly endogenize rule of law and social capital. With the exception of 
Inequality acceptance, none of the value dimensions is found to have a direct impact on eco-
nomic development. Without exception, all value dimensions are found to have an indirect 
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impact via rule of law and social capital. This indirect effect is not always positive: Inequality 
acceptance and Hierarchy acceptance are found to negatively affect the effectiveness of so-
cial capital. These results confirm the theoretical conjecture that the effectiveness of formal 
institutions in a country is constrained by its existing informal institutions. 
4 Informal institutions and bilateral trade 
International trade involves transaction between actors of two distinct sets of institutions, both 
formal and informal. Nevertheless, most of the literature concentrates on a pure gravitational 
model to explain the extent of trade between countries: The larger the respective market sizes 
and the lower the geographic distance, the higher bilateral trade is expected to be. The aim of 
this work is to extend the pure gravity approach with indicators of formal and informal institu-
tions to assess their respective role in facilitating or impeding cross-border trade. The general 
conjecture regarding formal institutions is that the stronger institutions of contract enforce-
ment are, the higher should bilateral trade be. 
Again, several informal institutions are identified that might play a role. (1) Uncertainty 
avoidance: The more potential trading partners from two countries are characterized by uncer-
tainty avoidance, the less likely it is that they will venture in to cross-border transactions, 
which are inherently more uncertain than domestic transactions. (2) Universalism: If potential 
trading partners in two countries follow the rule that everyone should be treated equally, re-
gardless of group affiliation, it is more likely that they will consider cross-border trade, i.e. 
trade with a foreign person. (3) Patriotism: If potential trading partners from two countries 
follow the rule that domestic goods and services should be preferred, it is less likely that 
cross-border transactions will be realized. For all of these informal institutions, interactions 
are also expected with the effect of contract enforcement.   
In order to test these conjectures, representative survey data from the World Values Survey 
are utilized. As above, for each of the informal institution, suitable items from the survey are 
aggregated using factor analysis. The dependent variable is the volume of exports from coun-
try i to country j. Exporting country uncertainty avoidance is positively, but not significantly 
associated with trade. Importing country uncertainty avoidance is negatively and significantly 
associated with trade. This effect is stronger the better contract enforcement is. A possible ex-
planation is that, in the presence of both high uncertainty avoidance and strong contract en-
forcement, cross-border trade is replaced by domestic trade. The effect of exporting country 
universalism is significantly positive only for very high values of universalism. Importing 
country universalism is associated with a very small negative and insignificant effect on trade. 
v 
 
There is some evidence that universalism and formal contract enforcement are substitutive, as 
the effect of exporter universalism on trade is strictly positive (negative) and significant for 
low (high) values of contract enforcement quality. For both importing and exporting country 
patriotism, higher levels are significantly associated with less trade. The effect of importer 
patriotism is stronger for higher levels of importer contract enforcement quality. Again, this 
could be interpreted as a replacement of cross-border trade by domestic trade when patriotism 
is high and contract enforcement is strong.  
The broad conclusion from this work is that informal institutions do matter for bilateral trade. 
A possible policy implication is that, when bilateral trade is hampered by patriotism or uncer-
tainty avoidance, the use of trade intermediaries might be useful.  
5 Does arbitration blossom when state courts are bad? 
While the previous work concentrated on the uncertainties involved in contract enforcement 
across borders, here, the relationship between formal and informal contract enforcement with-
in a given country is considered. In particular, the trade-off between state dispute resolution 
(SDR, formal) and non-state dispute resolution (informal) is analyzed.  
From a simple cost-benefit perspective, non-SDR will be preferred over SDR if the expected 
utility associated with it is higher. For a given quality of non-SDR, it is conjectured that the 
higher the (perceived) quality of SDR, the less frequently non-SDR will be used. A second 
conjecture is that, the higher the degree of procedural formalism, the more likely non-SDR 
will be used, as the use of SDR becomes more cumbersome. The third conjecture is that, the 
more international conventions that facilitate arbitration have been ratified, the more likely 
non-SDR will be used. 
For the testing of these hypotheses, firm-level survey data taken from the World Bank World 
Business Environment Survey are used. To proxy for the use of non-SDR, a binary variable 
that indicates whether a firm has settled any payment disputes out of court is constructed. For 
the quality of SDR, two variables are employed. One is subjective and contains the firm’s 
perceived confidence in the judicial system. The other is a (quasi) objective variable taken 
from the Lex Mundi project and provides information on the estimated number of days it takes 
in a country to collect on a bounced check. Estimation is implemented using pooled Probit re-
gression. The results suggest that both indicators of SDR quality are positively associated 
with the probability of using non-SDR. This implies that the relationship between SDR and 
non-SDR is complementary rather than substitutive: Firms evidently turn to non-SDR not to 
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escape bad SDR, but rather to fill gaps in their dispute resolution portfolio. The second hy-
pothesis is tested using a dummy variable for common law, as common law countries are 
characterized by less procedural formalism than civil law countries. However, the hypothesis 
is rejected as the probability of using non-SDR is actually higher in common law countries. 
Concerning the third hypothesis, there is no evidence that firms’ use of non-SDR is influenced 
by conventions ratified. The main conclusion is that non-SDR and SDR seem to be comple-
ments rather than substitutes. These results thus imply that support of non-SDR as response to 
lacking quality of SDR is not a feasible policy option.   
6 Religious loyalty and acceptance of corruption 
In this work, the impact of a specific informal institution – religiosity – on another informal 
institution – acceptance of corruption – is analyzed. Religiosity describes the degree to which 
religious values and norms are binding at the individual level, while acceptance of corruption 
describes the degree to which individual values and norms support corruption. It is conjec-
tured that, as religious values and norms typically oppose corruption, religiosity should be 
negatively associated with acceptance of corruption. Furthermore, it is conjectured that indi-
vidual acceptance of corruption should be positively affected by either aggregated, country 
level acceptance of corruption or country level perceived corruption.  
These conjectures are tested using subjective representative survey data from the World Val-
ues Survey. As opposed to the aggregate analysis in the previous works, here, individual level 
variation is exploited. Acceptance of corruption is measured using an item that asks whether 
accepting bribes in the course of one’s duties is justified. Religiosity is measured as common 
factor of four distinct items. Estimation is implemented with Probit. The results indicate a 
significantly negative marginal effect of religiosity on acceptance of corruption for values of 
religiosity above the 30-percentile. This implies that, for religiosity to actually have the con-
jectured negative effect on acceptance of corruption, some threshold level of religiosity is re-
quired. This result does not differ systematically between individuals of different religious 
denominations. The estimated effect of religiosity on acceptance of corruption is rather small 
in magnitude. A possible explanation for this is that religiosity might actually lead to more 
acceptance of corruption through the promotion of intra-group trust, a transmission channel 
not accounted for here. In line with the second hypothesis, a 1% higher country level ac-
ceptance is significantly associated with a 1.4% higher individual level acceptance of corrup-
tion. 
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Abstract: 
Although the relevance of informal institutions for economic outcomes has been acknowl-
edged theoretically, the empirical work is lacking behind. We propose that the impact of ei-
ther formal or informal institutions can usually not be assessed independent of the other. We 
argue that pragmatic measurement of informal institutions requires (1) clear definitions, (2) 
measurement of observed behavior, (3) acknowledgement of potential reverse causality in the 
measurement process and (4) transparency. We survey different objective and subjective 
measure of informal institutions and conclude that each approach is characterized by strengths 
and weaknesses. The general recommendation is then to utilize objective and subjective 
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Key words: Institutions, Measurement, Formal vs. Informal Institutions. 
JEL classification: B41, C81/82, H11, K00, O17, O43, O57. 
                                                 
*  Prof. Dr. Stefan Voigt, Institute of Law & Economics, University of Hamburg, Rothenbaumchaussee 
36, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany. Telephone: +49-40- 42838 ****, Telefax: +49-40-42839 ****, e-mail: 
voigt@wiwi.uni-hamburg.de. The authors thank participants of the MAGKS Forschungskolloquium 
and, in particular, Anne van Aaken, Nora El-Bialy, Phil Keefer, Marcus Kurtz, Katharina Pistor, Janina 
Satzer, Katharina Stepping, and Kim Eun-Young for helpful comments. 
2 
 
“It is difficult to measure informal constraints […].”(Aron 2000) 
“[…] it is much easier to describe and be precise about the formal rules that societies devise 
than to describe and be precise about the informal ways by which human beings have struc-
tured human interaction. But although they defy, for the most part, neat specification and it is 
extremely difficult to develop unambiguous tests of their significance, they are important.” 
(North 1990) 
1 Introduction 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) has been a huge success. Its representatives are unit-
ed in the assumption that institutions determine – or at least substantially influence – econom-
ic outcomes. Although under attack from a number of directions1, the NIE has had a huge im-
pact on the way economics is carried out. In a way, we are all institutional economists now: 
“The battle to persuade the economics profession that institutions matter was won many years 
ago.” (Binmore 2010) 
Measurement of institutions – and as an implication the empirical testing of institutional theo-
ry – has been lagging behind the success of the more theoretical insights. This gap appears to 
be particularly severe regarding the measurement of informal institutions. This is noteworthy 
as many institutional economists argue that the informal institutions shared by large propor-
tions of a society have decisive influence on their choice of more formal institutions. In gen-
eral, informal institutions – as opposed to formal institutions – are assumed to be more stable 
over time, less amenable to intentional modification and could even be conceived of as the 
most fundamental layer of institutions in a society’s institutional system2. 
Testing any assertion with regard to informal institutions presupposes that measures of infor-
mal institutions are available. Here, we set out to provide a survey of various approaches that 
provide measurable information on informal institutions. By evaluating the advantages and 
disadvantages of these various approaches to measure informal institutions, we try to extract 
some more general lessons concerning measurability of institutions. This work complements 
an earlier contribution on the chances and pitfalls of measuring institutions more generally 
(Voigt 2009a) and the rule of law specifically (Voigt 2009b). There, it was concluded general-
                                                 
1 Some argue that it is really “geography” that determines all the rest (McArthur and Sachs 2001; Sachs 
2003), others that representatives of the NIE have really been measuring policies rather than institutions 
(Henry and Miller 2008; Glaeser et al. 2004). 
2 Oliver Williamson refers to this as “embeddedness” (2000). 
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ly that “measures of institutions should be precise, objective, and take into account de jure as 
well as de facto elements.” (2009b, p. 23). With regard to the rule of law, it was argued that 
the use of aggregated indicators is associated with a significant loss in information as far as 
the effects of specific institutions are concerned (Voigt 2009b). 
We will begin with introducing the main theoretical assumptions and implications for meas-
urement that are behind these conclusions and assess the extent to which they apply when 
considering informal institutions in particular. Building on Voigt (2009a), we will then derive 
a few criteria for pragmatic measurement of informal institutions and survey existing 
measures based on these criteria. In the last section, we provide conclusions for empirical re-
search on informal institutions.  
2 The crucial importance of informal institutions: the main theoretical 
arguments 
2.1 A definition of informal institutions 
“What is it about informal constraints that gives them such a pervasive influence upon the 
long-run character of economies?” (North 1991) 
In this section, we will pick up on the main theoretical arguments and implications for the 
measurement of institutions in general form Voigt (2009a). We will simultaneously work out 
differences when we are concerned with the measurement of informal institutions in particu-
lar.  
Before we show some of the main arguments why informal institutions matter, we have to de-
fine institutions in general and more specifically the difference between formal and informal 
institutions. We define institutions as commonly known rules (endowed with a sanction 
mechanism) used to structure recurrent interactions. This definition allows for differences be-
tween formal and informal institutions, while also differentiating between rules and their en-
forcement (Ostrom 1986). North delineates formal and informal along the lines of the rule it-
self, while we propose a distinction with regard to who sanctions non-compliant behavior 
(Kiwit and Voigt 1995): If enforcement of a rule is organized by the state, the institution is 
formal (or external). This most obviously encompasses legal institutions. If rule-breaking is 
sanctioned by other members of society, be they organized or not, the institution is informal 
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(or internal)3. This includes moral values, social norms, traditions and the like. In line with 
this, Elster (1989) defines social norms as “the propensity to feel shame and to anticipate 
sanction by others at the thought of behaving in a certain, forbidden way. This propensity be-
comes a social norm when and to the extent that it is shared with other people”. 
Thus far, we have established that informal institutions (1) are commonly known rules that 
provide structure to recurring interaction situations, (2) are usually not codified and (3) are not 
enforced by the state. We will now shortly present analogies to related concepts.  
One concept that is very close but usually treated separately is social capital, which includes 
civic participation, trust, density of social networks and more (Fidrmuc and Gerxhani 2008). 
Interestingly, one can see social capital as a type of informal institutions (Casson et al. 2010) 
or informal institutions as a type of social capital (Ostrom and Ahn 2009), while some simply 
equate the two concepts (Stiglitz 2000). This conceptual difference seems mainly rooted in 
the focus of the respective research, so that for our purpose, it will suffice to see social capital 
as a type of informal institution. If – following Ostrom & Ahn (2009) and Putnam (1993, 
1995) – social capital describes the capacity of a social group to solve collective action prob-
lems, we can simply refer to social capital as those informal institutions that are geared to-
wards tackling collective action problems. In particular the dimension trust or trustworthiness 
seems relevant here. Although trust is for the most part treated as a concept apart form but 
highly related to institutions (Mollering 2006), one could interpret trust as an institution, the 
rule being e.g. that members of one’s own group can be trusted to fulfill contracts even in the 
presence of potential hold-up. Naturally, sanctioning in case of non-compliance (i.e. breach of 
trust/contract) is realized through the relevant social group (Dixit 2009). Trust can also be ap-
plied to imply a more aggregate level institution beyond the boundaries of a particular social 
group. We would then refer to generalized (or vertical) trust (Ostrom and Ahn 2009)4. Further 
related concepts include fairness (Binmore 2008) and altruism (Simon 1993). 
Another related concept (and one that is sometimes hard to distinguish from institutions in 
general) is that of governance. In the context of the theory of the firm, governance mainly de-
                                                 
3 A more fine-grained taxonomy of different types of informal institutions is proposed in Kiwit & Voigt 
(1995). This study also provides one of the first attempts in the social science literature at a taxonomy 
regarding the interplay between informal and formal institutions, which is later picked up by Lauth 
(2000) and Helmke & Levitsky (2004). 
4 A related dimension of social capital which is however harder to map into an institutional interpretation 
is that of horizontal networks and their density. A network per se or its density is hard to interpret as a 
rule instead of simply a characteristic of a social group. 
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scribes contractual mechanisms that help overcome firms commitment problems in business 
relationships with specific investments (Williamson 1979). A broader definition encompasses 
all legal and social institutions that govern economic activity (Dixit 2009). With both defini-
tions, informal institutions can play a role. Even though Williamson is mainly concerned with 
contractual solutions to commitment problems, such as vertical integration, thus matters relat-
ed to formal institutions, there is also scope for informal mechanisms, e.g. hostages as an in-
formal commitment device (Werner and Keren 1993; Williamson 1983). In a more develop-
ment-oriented context, rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCA) have been interpret-
ed as informal commitment device (Gugerty 2007). As can be seen with the essay of Dixit 
(2009), when we define governance very broadly, it becomes nearly indistinguishable from 
the term institution. The more important contribution of his work is that informal institutions 
are not necessarily always associated with positive effects. Some informal institutions can 
straight out have negative effects, while others might be used to solve some collective action 
problem but turn out to have negative effects when they outlive their original purpose, such as 
the Mafia. More generally speaking, informal institutions can help actors settle on a Nash 
equilibrium, but this Nash equilibrium is not necessarily socially optimal. 
We can see that the concepts of social capital and governance are largely compatible with our 
notion of informal institution. Alas, this does not mean that there is a general consensus on 
what informal institutions are. A look at the literature reveals that there is quite the variety of 
conceptual works on informal institutions, often providing their own taxonomy of institu-
tions5. Instead of arguing that our definition is in some way superior to others, we will simply 
take this variety as given and point to differences when they appear relevant with respect to 
measurement. 
2.2 Assumptions and implications 
Let us now turn to more substantial theoretical arguments and what they imply for the meas-
urement of informal institutions. In Voigt (2009a), it was argued that the effect of an institu-
tion can be ascribed to both its substantial content and its factual implementation. This implies 
that any measure of institutions should distinguish between de jure and de facto institutions, 
as otherwise there is no way to separate the effect of the rule and the effect of its enforcement. 
How relevant is this implication for the measurement of informal institutions in particular? 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Helmke & Levitsky (2004), Greif (2008b), Dequech (2006), Stacey & Rittberger (2003), Raiser 
(1997), Scott (2001), Boettke et al. (2008), Davis (2006), Nee (1998), Binmore (2010). 
6 
 
Remember that by definition, it is nigh impossible to distinguish de jure and de facto concern-
ing informal institutions: A rule that is (1) not codified and (2) enforced by societal members 
is inherently a de facto institution, but because it is not codified, it is at the same time de jure. 
However, our definition of informal institutions allows for informal rules to be codified, they 
are just not enforced by the state. Think for example of biblical norms, procedural rules of 
private courts of arbitration or simply the constitution of a local bowling association. Logical-
ly, a divergence of de jure and de facto informal institutions is possible in such instances. 
However, such a divergence cannot represent an equilibrium outcome, as a continued disso-
nance between a social group’s rules and their implementation would ultimately lead to an ad-
justment in either the rule itself or the enforcement until de jure and de facto institutions are 
indistinguishable. This in turn brings us to the conclusion that, even when it might not be pos-
sible to measure de facto and de jure informal institutions separately, the researcher should try 
to measure informal institutions over a sufficiently long period of time that controls for the 
possibility of measurement out of equilibrium (Implication 1).  
Another proposed assumption is that, in order to capture the constraining effect of any institu-
tion, its factual implementation has to be explicitly accounted for, as it represents the main 
way in which a rule actually constrains behavior. This implies that measures of institutions 
should take actual behavior into account (Implication 2). Naturally this implication is equally 
applicable when considering “only” informal institution, especially given that most of the 
time, the rule is not codified. 
The next assumption is particularly relevant here: In most situations, more than one single in-
stitution is likely relevant for actual behavior; informal institutions can undermine or 
strengthen the effect of formal institutions. This implies that when analyzing the effect of an 
institution on some behavior, one should consider all institutions relevant for this behavior 
(separately, not in aggregate), be they formal or informal (Implication 3). What is more, one 
needs to control for the possibility that one of the relevant informal institutions is complemen-
tary or conflicting with another relevant formal institution (Kiwit and Voigt 1995).  
The final assumption is that informal institutions are, for the most part, constant in the short 
term. The prevailing standpoint is that informal institutions change very slowly (Williamson 
2000; Roland 2004). Furthermore, because the state is not involved in the enforcement of in-
formal institutions, the state usually has no leverage to change the substantial content of in-
formal rules (though it obviously has incentives to do so). If informal institutions are indeed 
in the short run stable and exempt from intentional modification and crucial for the factual 
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implementation of formal institutions, then the set of existing informal institutions provides 
natural bounds to the potential effectiveness of newly installed formal institutions. A new 
formal institution that is in some way conflicting with existing informal institutions will be 
hampered in its effectiveness by this very conflictary relationship. One of the most prominent 
examples is the failure of the (text of the) U.S. constitution to achieve political and economic 
stability in Latin American states (North et al. 2000). 
The assertion that informal institutions are constant in the short run and thus not subject to po-
litical influence could be taken to imply that we need not worry about measuring specific in-
formal institutions as opposed to bundles of institutions. This has been one of the main cri-
tiques of existing rule of law indicators (Voigt 2009b). After all, there is no scope for specific 
policy recommendations anyway. For two reasons, we nevertheless prefer the measurement of 
specific institutions over bundled measurement.  
(1) Whether or not informal institutions are indeed stable in the short run is ultimately an em-
pirical question. In order to answer it, we do need measures of informal institutions that are 
specific and available for several points in time. Because informal institutions are inherently 
less formalized and codified than formal institutions, measurement over long periods of time 
is disproportionately more difficult in this context. While Inglehart (2008) indeed finds that, 
since 1970 values have changed significantly, this evidence cannot tell us anything about long 
run changes in informal institutions, in particular whether these observed changes are also 
significant in the long run.  
(2) Even if we can establish short run stability as stylized fact, different informal institutions 
can impact economic outcomes in very diverse ways, both directly and indirectly (Park and 
Voigt 2008). If we do not measure informal institutions in a differentiated manner, there is no 
way for us to account for these effects. 
Tentatively, we could conclude from this section that measuring informal institutions is not 
strictly harder than measuring formal institutions. On the one hand, it might be easier as the 
distinction between content and enforcement, thus between de jure and de facto, is less rele-
vant with informal institutions. On the other hand, valid measurement of informal institutions 
requires measurements over rather long periods of time. 
3 Pragmatic proposals to measure informal institutions 
In this section, we will pick up on the proposals in Voigt (2009a) concerning the pragmatic 
measurement of institutions with special reference to informal institutions.  
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(1) Before we can measure specific institutions, we need a clear conceptual definition of what 
institution we are interested in. Logically, this is a necessary condition to ensure that we are 
indeed measuring the impact of a specific institution on some outcome. In particular, the con-
ceptual definition (which feeds into the operationalization and ultimately the measurement) 
needs to address the following questions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004): What is the relevant 
group that is constrained by the institution? How is non-compliant behavior sanctioned? A 
clear definition also includes details on what exactly constitutes compliant and non-compliant 
behavior: When does the observed behavior constitute a violation of a rule? Do we need to 
distinguish different degrees of non-compliance? On a more concrete note, sometimes, the 
concept that we are interested in cannot be narrowed down to a single, specific institution, but 
rather represents some broader notion. This is particularly relevant in the analysis of informal 
institutions, where institutions are much harder to narrow down conceptually due to the gen-
eral lack of codification. If this is the case, factor analysis can be a powerful tool to extract in-
formation of several measures into one substantiated latent variable6.  
(2) If feasible, the measurement of factually observable behavior should be preferred. For the 
sake of causal inference, this must include behavior both in case of compliance and in case of 
non-compliance. Measurement at only one point in time is suboptimal, even if we 
acknowledge informal institutions to be stable in the short run: Because the effect of informal 
institutions potentially works both directly and indirectly through formal institutions, the peri-
od of measurement should be long enough to include variation in the relevant formal institu-
tions. Otherwise, no inference concerning the impact of informal institutions via formal insti-
tutions is possible.  
(3) We should ensure that potential reverse causality from y to x does not influence the meas-
urement of x. Voigt (2009a) argues that this problem can be avoided by relying on objective, 
rather than subjective data, as this would ensure that the measurement is not contaminated by 
subjective evaluations of the respondent that are related to y. Where objective measurement is 
not feasible, the empirical method applied to the data needs to somehow account for reverse 
causalities. 
(4) Objectivity implies reliability: Repetition of the measurement by others should yield the 
same data. One crucial requirement for this is transparency, i.e. the complete disclosure of the 
measurement process to the scientific public. This is all the more important in the context of 
informal institutions as measurement here potentially involves more subjective parts. 
                                                 
6 See Leschke (2000) for an application in constitutional economics.  
9 
 
To sum up, measures of informal institutions should (1) be based on a clear-cut conceptual 
definition, (2) measure actually observed behavior, (3) account for reverse causality e.g. by 
objectivity and (4) be transparent. 
4 A survey of approaches to measuring informal institutions 
Equipped with a set of criteria, we now proceed to survey different attempts at measuring in-
formal institutions. Note that the study of informal institutions is by far not restricted to eco-
nomics, nor is it restricted to studies that explicitly mention the term informal institution. Nat-
urally, we cannot claim to have surveyed all of the relevant literature in all social sciences, 
especially since many of the studies that we survey do not mention the term informal institu-
tions explicitly. As such, the studies we discuss here represent a (hopefully representative) 
sample of the relevant population. 
Let us first review objective data sources, as we have argued that, conceptually, objective data 
should be preferred over subjective data. Objective measurement of informal institutions usu-
ally means looking for proximate objective causes or consequences of informal institutions. 
As a prime example, Putnam (1993, 1995) measures different aspects of social capital partly 
using objective scales like newspaper readership, referenda turnout and density of sports 
clubs. On a more aggregate level, Paxton (2002) uses the number of international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) in a country as proximate measurement for the strength 
of civil society. These numbers, dating back to 1910, can be found in the International Year-
book of Organizations provided by the Union of International Associations. 
Though these measurements are objective, the question remains as to how validly they meas-
ure specific aspects of an informal institution. Surely, differences in newspaper readership be-
tween social groups do not solely reflect differences in informal institutions. Given this uncer-
tainty, the use of factor analysis is recommended in order to clarify whether these measure-
ments indeed share a common latent concept that is the informal institution. If we take these 
worries about validity as given, how do these measure fare with the respect to the criteria that 
we set up above? (1) Bjørnskov (2006) argues that, although Putnam provides a clear defini-
tion of social capital, the meshing of trust, norms and networks into one unitary concept of 
social capital is too much of an aggregation. (2) On the one hand, these measures are based on 
some factual behavior, which is good. However, because we are dealing with proximate 
measures of institutions, the behavior that influences the measurement might or might not be 
actually related to the institution. (3) The work of Putnam has been criticized for not dealing 
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with the issue of reverse causality in his measurements (Sobel 2002). This shows that objec-
tivity by itself is not a sure fire way to avoid these problems. (4) Transparency and thus repli-
cability is given, as we would expect that measurement by someone else would lead to very 
similar results.  
Another approach to objectively measure informal institutions through proximate variables 
comes from the economics of religion literature. Religious norms, though more strongly codi-
fied than other informal institutions, are mostly not enforced by the state, so that we can count 
them as informal institutions. Lewer & Van den Berg (2007) incorporate religion dummy var-
iables into a gravity equation of bilateral trade flows. These dummies – created using infor-
mation from the CIA Factbook – indicate whether one of the major world religions is domi-
nant in one of the trading countries, thus indirectly measuring the strength of the respective 
religion’s trade-related norms. This approach is not only interesting for its emphasis on reli-
gious norms, but also for its unit of analysis, the country-dyad. However, the question of va-
lidity has to be raised again: An indicator variable for a dominant religion does not allow in-
ference as to which specific norm of that religion facilitates or hinders trade, nor can it ac-
count for situations in which different norms of the same religion have opposing effects on the 
outcome variable.  
Despite these potential misgivings regarding validity, measurement through objective proxi-
mate variables is characterized by one big advantage: It avoids the Heisenberg problem, 
namely that mere observation of something might significantly disturb that something 
(Hofstede 1980). This is because proximate measures are measures that are already existing 
and not carried out with the purpose of measuring something specific.  
Another way to obtain objective measures of informal institutions is experiments (Jakiela 
2011). The great advantage of the experimental approach in general is that randomized con-
trolled trials are very well suited to enable causal inference (Nichols 2007). This is because, 
for sufficiently large sample sizes, the only systematic difference between two individuals, 
one from the control group, one from the treatment group, is the treatment. Any difference in 
the outcome variable that we observe can then be causally attributed to the treatment (Angrist 
and Pischke 2010). Many of the common experiments in this context (dictator, ultimatum, 
trust, public goods game) measure the extent of cooperative behavior, thus allowing for some 
inference regarding fairness norms (Jakiela 2011). 
With regard to the above postulated criteria, experiments fare quite well: (1) A clear concep-
tual definition of the institutions involved is almost a given in all design-based studies. (2) 
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Furthermore, by their very nature, experiments measure institutions via factually observed be-
havior, which is not the case (or much less so) for all other measures we examine. (3) For suf-
ficiently large samples, randomization will ensure that reverse causality does not affect the 
measurement. (4) Transparency (and reliability) is also given: Documentation of design and 
implementation is usually very extensive in the experimental literature.  
Nevertheless, the experimental approach is also characterized by a few problems. One prob-
lem of pure laboratory experiments is that the very exact set of institutions laid out by the ex-
perimenter is in stark contrast to the reality of social relations (Levitt and List 2007). This im-
plies that in the context of informal institutions, field experiments are probably more appro-
priate than lab experiments. For instance, Barr & Genicot (2008) analyze the institution of 
risk pooling. Another example is the study of Goldberg (2010), which analyzes the role of so-
cial norms that support informal insurance networks in the trade-off between consumption 
and saving. In Jakiela & Ozier (2011), the effect of sharing norms on income hiding is ana-
lyzed. 
But there is another problem that is hard to tackle even with the use of field experiments: The 
experimenter imposes his consciously chosen experimental design on the subjects. This in-
cludes which informal institutions are present, typically in the treatment group. Though such a 
design allows comparing situations with the institution and without the institution, it cannot 
account for the fact that informal institutions actually evolve over long periods of time. Note 
that this problem persists even (1) when the experimental design endogenizes the institution in 
question or (2) measurement is repeated over long periods of time, as the experimenter still 
defines the parameters within which an informal institution might be adopted or not. In this 
regard, the approach of RCTs might actually be too narrow. 
There is another reliability problem which, though not inherent to the experimental approach, 
appears in the implementation of experiments: Experiments in this context are exclusively 
framed to reflect small-group situations. Any inference drawn from this small-group framing 
cannot be simply transferred to societal institutions, which are inherently large-group (Rose 
2011). This feeds directly into our next point: Carrying out large scale experiments in multiple 
cultural contexts, i.e. in many different countries, is very expensive. Though the same argu-
ment might apply to all other methods for measuring informal institutions, it is especially true 
for experiments. 
Let us now turn to subjective data sources. For several reasons, data produced from repre-
sentative survey projects are the most widely used measures of informal institutions. Firstly, 
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the survey approach allows the researcher to ask the respondent about a wide range of values, 
norms, beliefs and preferences. Second, the survey approach is the most feasible approach to 
cross-cultural data collection and thus most widely available for a large sample of countries. 
This leads into a third advantage: Survey data that is available across countries allows for the 
simultaneous analysis of disaggregated level variation and aggregate level variation in infor-
mal institutions. This is especially neat as our taxonomy of institutions implies that the sanc-
tioning of non-compliant behavior does not always occur at the same level of aggregation. 
Contrary to the measures discussed so far, survey data are inherently subjective, as the ques-
tions usually ask the respondent to provide a subjective evaluation of some statement or situa-
tion. Note that even within a survey, we can have differing degrees of subjectivity. For in-
stance, asking the subject how often she attends church (Glaeser and Sacerdote 2008) will 
produce a more objective measure than asking the subject how important God is in her life 
(Gouda and Park 2011). 
The most widely used data in this context is certainly the World Values Survey (WVS), which 
has since 1981 measured in five waves items regarding social trust, civil society and a host of 
other social, religious and ethical issues for representative samples of up to 90 countries. Oth-
er commonly used representative surveys include the Hofstede data (Hofstede 1980, 1997), 
the GLOBE study (House et al. 2004) and the Gallup World Poll. One of the most commonly 
used single survey variables is based on the WVS question “Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. 
Among the earliest works in economics to employ the trust variable is Knack & Keefer 
(1997), who use the country average of people replying “most people can be trusted”. Alter-
natively, one can focus on respondent level variation in this binary variable, such as in Guiso, 
Sapienza & Zingales (2009).  
Another way to employ survey methodology is to conduct non-representative surveys. These 
usually include subjective assessments of informal institutions by some form of expert. For 
instance, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), more well known for its subjective 
ratings of formal institutional quality of countries, also produces ratings that can allow for in-
ference with regard to informal institutions. For instance, the item Civil Disorder assesses the 
risk of mass protests, the item Ethnic Tensions measures the degree of tensions that can be at-
tributed to ethnic division, an according item Religious Tension. Another interesting project is 
the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) which collects assessments of the state of civil socie-
ty (by civil society organizations and stakeholders) along four dimensions (structure, envi-
ronment, values, impact) in 50 countries around the world (Heinrich 2007). Other survey pro-
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jects assess – inter alia – informal barriers to conducting business. For instance, the World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES), which covers 10,000 firms in 80 countries (Batra et 
al. 2003), includes companies’ perceptions of informal constraints to their business.  
How do survey based measurements of informal institutions fare with respect to the criteria 
that we proposed above? (1) Clarity of definitions might be an issue here. In particular sur-
veys that are rather open and exploratory (like the WVS) naturally do not measure values and 
norms with some specific theory in mind. However, as the concept of an informal institution 
can usually not be pinpointed to one question anyway, factor analysis is a feasible solution, in 
particular given the great number of items available in representative surveys. For instance, 
Bertrand & Schoar (2006) use five family-related WVS questions to compute an index for the 
strength of family ties. Mishler & Rose (2001) use several questions from the New Democra-
cies Barometer (Rose and Haerpfer 1996) to compute two indices for trust in public organiza-
tions: one for trust in state-based organizations, such as parliament or the military; one for 
trust in civil, non-state-based organization, such as the press or electronic media. Unfortunate-
ly, this practice can also be overdone: Several studies (e.g. Klasing (2011), Tabellini (2010), 
Williamson & Kerekes (2008)) aggregate single variables in order to arrive at so-called “cul-
ture” variables. The resulting compound variables are then over-aggregated and unable to 
provide any information about the effect of specific informal institutions (Voigt 2009b).  
(2) By their very nature, surveys do not measure factually observed behavior, but rather 
statements about behavior and normative assessments. For the trust item, it has been argued 
that there is some divergence between survey responses and experimental trust when both 
survey and experiment are combined in one study (Glaeser et al. 2000), though this result is 
disputed (Baran et al. 2010). One potentially mitigating factor, at least for some surveys, is 
that survey data from the WVS or ICRG provide measurements for multiple points in time. 
(3) Reverse causality in the measurement process is likely to be a problem with survey-based 
measurement. The critique of Voigt (2009a), namely that subjective evaluations of a country’s 
institutional quality by experts is inherently biased by the experts’ knowledge (or beliefs) with 
regard to the outcome of that country, also applies here. Even if we wanted to tackle this dur-
ing measurement, consider this: Because survey based data are usually rather exploratory, 
they can potentially be applied to a great number of research topics and thus outcome varia-
bles. Thus, for measurement that precludes reverse causality, we would have to account for all 
possible applications and outcome variables, which is clearly not feasible. The pragmatic so-
lution is then to account for reverse causality in the actual analysis of the data.  
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(4) Transparency very much depends on the specific measure. For instance, transparency – 
and thus replicability – is high with most representative survey, because they usually provide 
the raw items to the researcher, as well as the questionnaire that was used for the responses. 
For surveys that use experts’ subjective evaluations, transparency is more likely to be a prob-
lem, as the original items that go into the rating are usually not provided. This is the case for 
ICRG and CIVIKUS measures. 
Another issue beyond these criteria appears noteworthy in the use of survey data on informal 
institutions: Survey measures are inherently micro-level in that they provide information at 
very disaggregated levels. Many secondary studies, in particular in economics, tend to use on-
ly aggregated information from these surveys like country averages for specific items. Such a 
procedure wastes valuable information, especially with regard to informal institutions, where 
enforcement not only occurs at the societal level, but also at the individual or group level. 
However, an explicit acknowledgement of the disaggregated levels requires (1) specific theo-
ries and hypotheses regarding the individual or group level and (2) the interaction of these 
disaggregated transmission channels with the aggregate transmission channels. However, this 
is not always feasible.   
Finally, let us mention another category of subjective measurement7 of informal institutions: 
historical narratives. This strand of literature uses historical records to find informal institu-
tional arrangements that enabled transactions without working formal institutions in medieval 
times (see Greif (1998) for an overview). Greif (1993) describes the so-called coalition as an 
informal institution (more likely a set of institutions) that governed agency relations between 
Maghribi traders. Milgrom et al. (1990) describe the role of the Lex Mercatoria or Law Mer-
chant in enforcing contracts between merchants of different regions using private judges. 
What about the criteria that we postulated above? (1) Clear definitions are usually given in 
this line of research. This is not surprising, given the very exploratory nature of historical in-
stitutional research. (2) On the one hand, one could argue that, yes, historical analysis is based 
on factually observed behavior. On the other hand, we have to consider that all historical rec-
ords represent subjective interpretations of reality through the eyes of the respective historian, 
which is then again subjectively interpreted by the researcher. For instance, Edwards & 
Ogilvie (2008) offer a completely opposite interpretation of the Maghribi traders’ records. (3) 
Reverse causality in measurement is probably the most serious problems of historical meas-
                                                 
7 Naturally, “measurement” here does not imply quantitative, but rather qualitative measures. On the use 
of quantitative historical measures, see Greif (1997). 
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urements. This is very closely related to the problems of silent evidence and confirmation bias 
described in Taleb (2011). For instance, we will have a very hard time finding historical rec-
ords describing social groups that were characterized by some informal institution like the co-
alition or the Law Merchant, but did not achieve cooperation. However, this kind of variation 
in the independent variable is strictly required to achieve causal inference with respect to the 
impact of an informal institution (King et al. 1994). (4) Although transparency is usually giv-
en with historical studies, the debate about the correct interpretation of the Maghribi traders’ 
history in Edwards & Ogilvie (2008) and Greif (2008a)  shows that replicability is not auto-
matically implied. 
In spite of these shortcomings and a lack of generalizability beyond the analyzed case, the use 
of historical records is the only way to provide measures of informal institutions in the very 
long run. 
5 Conclusions 
The broad conclusion that we can draw from our survey is that no single approach to measur-
ing informal institutions is first-best. Proximate measures avoid the Heisenberg problem but 
might run into validity problems. Prima facie, experimental measures fulfill all our require-
ments for pragmatic measurement. However, beyond the mere effect of an informal institu-
tion, experiments have a hard time capturing institutional change. What is more, generaliza-
tion beyond the framed situation is usually not possible. This is exacerbated by the fact that 
most existing experimental approaches use small-group situations, the results of which cannot 
logically be transferred to societal, i.e. large-group situations. Representative surveys are par-
ticularly well-equipped to measure informal institutions across cultures and over time. How-
ever, these measures, along with non-representative surveys suffer from various problems, 
most of which are rooted in their subjective nature of measurement. Potentially, representative 
surveys allow for the simultaneous analysis of micro-level and macro-level effects of informal 
institutions. Qualitative historical measures of informal institutions suffer all the more from 
problems of subjectivity, but might be the only to measure informal institutions in the very 
long run.    
As we can see, the measures we discuss are all characterized by strengths and weaknesses. 
This implies that objective and subjective measures should not be seen as substitutes, but ra-
ther as complements in the empirical study of informal institutions. Especially given the wide 
availability of representative survey measures such as the WVS, it would be a waste of infor-
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mation not to use the societal and micro-level information conveyed by them. These analyses 
should then be complemented by more objective measures, such as proximate and experi-
mental measures in order to counter-act any potential biases stemming from subjective meas-
urement. In the best of worlds, one would thus combine (1) large field experiments that use 
RCTs with (2) surveys of the subjects, (3) other objective proximate measures concerning the 
social groups studied and (4) historical records regarding the social context of the group stud-
ied. Much more so than for the case of formal institutions, the analysis of informal institutions 
brings together scholars of different disciplines, both within economics and beyond (political 
science, sociology, psychology and many more). This is potentially associated with great 
complementarities and advances, but also requires that scholars of different disciplines are 
able to find some common ground (Ostrom 2007; Svendsen and Svendsen 2009). Given the 
costs of large-scale, cross-cultural experiments and surveys, we agree with Voigt (2009a) that 
large international organizations are best suited for the collection and dissemination of such 
data. 
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“If a society is to maximize general prosperity and it can choose its own moral beliefs, what 
kinds of moral beliefs would it choose?” (Rose 2011) 
1 Introduction 
The question that David Rose poses is at the core of our research. Just a couple of decades 
ago, most economists took pride in not resorting to factors like culture or institutions when 
trying to explain economic growth. This has dramatically changed. Rodrik et al. (2004) for in-
stance claim that “institutions rule” and argue that institutions dominate alternative explana-
tions for long-run economic performance such as geography or economic integration. With 
regard to constitutions (often interpreted as the most basic layer of formal institutions), 
Persson and Tabellini (2003) show that a number of constitutional rules (e.g. referring to the 
voting system) have far-reaching consequences on various economic variables, including total 
factor productivity. 
Representatives of related research programs have made similar claims: Putnam (1993) claims 
that the degree of civil society is an important long-run determinant for a number of outcome 
variables. Social capital researchers usually claim that the level of trust as well as the degree 
to which citizens participate in voluntary associations are important determinants of economic 
development. 
These developments are important for understanding the causes of the wealth and poverty of 
nations. Yet, we need to dig deeper into these causes. After all, institutions are not exogenous-
ly given but rather the outcome of (collective) choice. We thus need to explain why some so-
cieties choose welfare-enhancing institutions, whereas others seem to be stuck with inefficient 
ones. In this paper, we argue that the values and norms held by substantial parts of a society’s 
members are an important determinant of its institutions. We further conjecture that values 
and norms exert both a direct and an indirect effect on economic development: the direct ef-
fect materializes e.g. because values and norms also contain the work ethic which, if trans-
formed into behavior, should have direct consequences on economic development. The indi-
rect effect is conjectured to work via the relevant institutions: If institutions are important for 
economic development and institutions are influenced by the values and norms, then this is a 
more indirect channel through which values and norms can display their impact. Using a sys-
tem of simultaneous equations, we find evidence that values and norms indirectly affect per 
capita income via rule of law and social capital, but mostly not directly.  
The paper is organized as follows: the next section contains our theoretical conjectures. Sec-
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tion three serves to discuss possibilities to put the theoretical conjectures to an empirical test. 
Section four presents the estimation approach – as well as the data – used. Section five is a 
discussion of the results and in section six some open questions are shortly mentioned. 
2 Theory 
It is the aim of this paper to go beyond the current wisdom of institutional economics. The 
New Institutional Economics has been a huge success and we simply assume that “institutions 
matter”. Although there is lots of evidence in favor of this assumption, it is by no means uni-
versally accepted
1
. For lack of space, we simply go with the assumption that institutions do 
matter. 
We define institutions as commonly known rules used to structure recurrent interaction situa-
tions that are endowed with a sanctioning mechanism whose application is threatened in case 
the rule part is not complied with. Both the rule of law as well as constitutional democracy 
(our two proxies for institutions) are, strictly speaking, not institutions because they are made 
up of dozens or even hundreds of different institutions. In order to keep things simple, we 
propose to call them institutional systems assuming that there is a minimum amount of inter-
nal consistency among the many single institutions. 
The most important trait of the rule of law is that the law is to be applied equally to all per-
sons (isonomia), government leaders included. It is therefore also called government under 
the law. No power used by government is arbitrary, all power is limited. Drawing on Kant 
(1797/1995), laws should normatively fulfill the criterion of universalizability, which has 
been interpreted to mean that the law should be (1) general, i.e., applicable to an unforeseea-
ble number of persons and circumstances, (2) abstract, i.e., not prescribing a certain behavior 
but simply proscribing a finite number of actions, (3) certain, (anyone interested in discover-
ing whether a certain behavior will be legal can do so with a fairly high chance of being cor-
rect and can furthermore expect that today’s rules will also be tomorrow’s rules) and (4) justi-
fiable in rational discourse between any persons
2
. 
Hayek (1960) has argued that the rule of law would necessarily imply a market economy (i.e. 
secure private property rights and the freedom of contract), since decisions by the government 
about who is to produce what in what quantities cannot be subsumed under general rules but 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., McArthur & Sachs (2001) responding to Acemoglu (2001). 
2 A number of institutional provisions typically support the rule of law. Among the most important ones are the separation of 
powers, the prohibition of retroactive legislation, the prohibition of expropriation without just compensation, habeas corpus, 
and other procedural devices such as protection of confidence, the principle of the least disruptive intervention, the principle 
of proportionality, and the like. 
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imply the arbitrary discrimination between persons. Individual liberty is exempt from arbi-
trary interference by government – or other powerful groups – only if it is secured by an ef-
fectively enforced rule of law. Logically, a rule-of-law constitution does not imply that the 
political system will be democratic. That is why we deal separately with constitutional de-
mocracy. 
The concept of constitutionalism was developed primarily by settlers in the British colonies of 
North America. It links the rule of law with the notion of a written constitution in which the 
basic procedures that government is to use are laid down. Constitutionalism is thus a norma-
tive concept not to be confused with the de facto constitution used by any society, which has 
achieved a minimum amount of order to produce and finance public goods. 
A constitution can be defined as the rules based on which a society makes its decisions con-
cerning the provision and financing of public goods. Democracies are called constitutional if 
the domains to which majoritarian procedures may be applied are limited. A democratic con-
stitution contains specific procedures concerning the choice (and the substitution) of those 
who are to make decisions concerning the provision of public goods and who have the power 
to tax even those who are not in favor of a specific bundle of public goods to be provided. 
Market economies are based on a specific concept concerning the role of the individual: the 
individual is the only “unit” that can think and act responsibly and that is capable of pursuing 
goals responsibly. This position is often subsumed under the heading of ‘methodological in-
dividualism’. Market economies are further based on the presumption of (individual) freedom 
in the sense of “a condition … in which all are allowed to use their knowledge for their pur-
poses, restrained only by rules of just conduct of universal application …” ((Hayek 1973). 
These concepts form the basis for guaranteeing private autonomy, which in the economic 
sphere translates into the freedom to contract. The freedom to contract only makes sense if 
private property is secure and widely respected. The freedom to contract can furthermore only 
enhance overall welfare if contracts voluntarily entered into are subsequently adhered to. We 
have thus arrived at Hume’s three fundamental laws of culture: “the stability of possession, of 
its transference by consent, and the performance of promises” (Hume 1740/1990). Function-
ally, the provisions hitherto mentioned could be said to solve the problem of who has the 
competence to decide the use of factors and goods in a market economy. 
The coordination of individual decisions that will most likely not be compatible with each 
other ex ante, is brought about by competition and the price system. If the questions concern-
ing competence are answered in the way just outlined, competition cannot be used as an in-
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strument to achieve specific goals defined by a central authority, but must be modeled as an 
open process whose specific results are systematically unpredictable. This trait is best cap-
tured by the title of Hayek’s seminal paper, “Competition as a discovery procedure”3. This 
understanding of competition also points to the fact that competition helps market actors to 
discover new knowledge, e.g. in the form of technical progress. If innovations are successful, 
they will most likely draw some demand away from competing suppliers, which may lead to a 
certain devaluation of their property rights. The existence – and acceptance – of such pecuni-
ary externalities is a necessary condition for sustained economic growth. 
But the functions of competition do not stop here. If a similar product is offered by more than 
one supplier or if there is even the possibility of new entrants into the market, the probability 
of substitution gives buyers more power over suppliers. The permanent threat of suppliers to 
be negatively sanctioned by the other market-side, including the threat of being forced out of 
the market entirely, produces positive incentives for suppliers. When property rights enable 
entrepreneurs to appropriate the profits from their economic activities, entrepreneurs have 
every reason to behave innovatively. 
Empirically, there is little doubt that a rule of law is correlated with high income levels. The 
relationship from democracy to income and growth is less clear. In fact, a debate concerning 
the more plausible direction of causality (from democracy to growth or from growth to de-
mocracy) was kicked off by Lipset (1959) and has not been settled until today
4
. What is clear, 
however, is that different countries realize vastly different levels of both the rule of law as 
well as of constitutional democracy. 
Representatives of political economy have recently proposed a number of explanations based 
on the power of the ruling elite
5
. According to these approaches, both institutional systems are 
the consequence of the (relative) power that the ruling class enjoys. Various versions of this 
approach exist: Barzel (1997) has, e.g., argued that strong elites will more readily enter into 
institutional arrangements that constrain governments if they are strong. Only strong regimes 
are able to reap the additional benefits accruing from the increased levels of credibility that 
follow from these institutional systems. Voigt (1999) has argued that government strength as 
well as the number of veto players is crucial for institutional development: if some groups 
have the capacity to prevent a cooperation rent from being produced, then these groups will 
                                                 
3 Hayek (1978). 
4 Sunde (2006) is a survey of the main arguments, while Acemoglu et al. (2007) represents the most recent argument against 
a causal effect from growth to democracy. 
5 See for example Acemoglu & Robinson (2006). 
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become part of a “factual social contract”. The higher the number of these groups, the more 
general will the rules be – in other words: the higher the likelihood to observe the rule of law. 
Bargaining for fundamental institutional change with the current ruling elite presupposes the 
ability of groups to act collectively. It seems plausible to suppose that it is easier for organized 
groups than for unorganized individuals to act collectively because organized groups have al-
ready solved the problem of collective action. Olson (1965) has shown that many potential in-
terest groups never manage to become effective interest groups because they are unable to 
solve the problem of collective action, which is basically a free rider problem
6
. Robert Put-
nam (1993) argues that the performance of democratic institutions does not only hinge upon 
their formal set-up but also upon civic traditions. His argument could be read as being in di-
rect opposition to Olson's: the larger the number of voluntary associations, the higher the de-
gree of civicness and thus the performance of democratic institutions
7
. 
We hypothesize the capacity to act collectively (which is called social capital or civil society 
there) to have an impact on the institutional systems realized. But social capital (or civil socie-
ty) is for its part the (collective) result of individual behavior. We conjecture that the quality 
as well as the quantity of social capital that can be found anywhere is determined, or at least 
heavily influenced, by the values and norms prevalent in a society. 
The political economy approach of endogenizing institutional systems can also be thought of 
as a “top down” approach. This can be complemented by a “bottom up” approach which 
draws directly on values and norms held by individuals. Since this approach is rather novel, 
we describe it in a little more detail here. 
Values have been defined as “… conceptions of the desirable, influencing selective behavior” 
(Darity 2007). A cluster of values will also be called a value-system. Norms for conduct can 
be distinguished from values:  
                                                 
6 In his Rise and Decline of Nations, he argues that within stable regimes, ever more latent interest groups will manage to be-
come manifest interest groups (Olson 1982). Ever more interest groups will be successful in their rent seeking endeavors 
which will lead to stagflation, rigidities and reduced economic growth. Olson is not directly concerned with the rule of law 
but his analysis bears direct implications on our topic: the larger the number of organized interest groups, the higher the 
probability that the rule of law will suffer due to privileges granted to specific groups. As long as interest groups are not in-
clusive of the interests of all citizens (or "super-encompassing" as Olson later (McGuire and Olson 1996) wrote), their exist-
ence has to be evaluated negatively. By focusing on the intended consequences of collective action, Olson arrives at the con-
clusion that interest groups are a threat to the rule of law. 
7 Not every organization will have such beneficial effects, however: only horizontally organized associations will foster co-
operation and trust. Putnam's argument is based on the concept of Civil Society which can be traced back to Ferguson (1988) 
and Tocqueville (1840/1945). Its adherents claim that a balance of power between government on the one side and a number 
of voluntary associations on the other would be possible (for an overview, see Gellner (1994). Although Putnam does not 
deal with the consequences of civil associations' activities on the possibility to sustain a rule of law-constitution, a causal re-
lationship can easily be established: the larger the number of associations, the higher the chance that a relevant number will 
protest if government tries to renege upon the constitution. 
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“Values are not the same as norms for conduct. … Values are standards of desirability 
that are more independent of specific situations. The same value may be a point of refer-
ence for a great many specific norms; a particular norm may represent the simultaneous 
application of several separable values” (Darity 2007) 
The values and norms prevalent in a society are an important determinant of the running cost 
of institutional systems. Remember that institutions are endowed with the threat of sanction in 
case of non-compliance with the rule component. If sanctioning relies exclusively on the state 
(the police, prosecutors etc.) and is not complemented by enforcement from within society, 
running institutional systems is a lot more costly than if most (or even all) enforcement is 
done without having to rely on the visible hand of the state. The cost of running institutional 
systems will, in turn, be crucial for their sustainability over time. 
Formulated in terms of a hypothesis: 
Institutional systems largely compatible with the prevalent values and norms of a so-
ciety are more likely to survive than institutional systems largely incompatible with 
the prevalent values and norms. 
This implies that – at least in the long run – there would be a close correspondence between 
values and norms on the one hand and institutional systems on the other (since institutional 
systems incompatible with the prevalent values and norms are likely to disappear). 
Yet, it would be naïve to attribute prevalent institutional systems exclusively to values and 
norms. Actors commanding power can incur heavy costs to keep institutional systems alive 
although they are incompatible with the prevalent values and norms. The conjecture is, hence, 
that the political economy approach and the values and norms approach are not mutually ex-
clusive but that they both play a role. Economic development depends both on values and 
norms conducive to it (both directly and indirectly) and on those preconditions usually con-
sidered within political economy approaches. 
There is a plethora of potentially relevant political economy factors and instruments to sup-
press individual freedom and, hence, to prevent values and norms held by individuals to trans-
late into behavior: the military, the police, the capacity to restrict access to necessary re-
sources and so on. To keep the theory simple, we propose to follow Hayek (1973) and argue 
that economic development will be faster in situations “… in which all are allowed to use 
their knowledge for their purposes, restrained only by rules of just conduct of universal appli-
cation …”. Economic development depends on the degree of freedom that individual actors 
experience. Formulated as a hypothesis: 
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Economic development is conjectured to be fastest when favorable values and norms 
are complemented by a high degree of freedom secured via the institutional system. 
It would, of course, be interesting to inquire more deeply into the functional relationship be-
tween these two causes. This will, however, not be pursued here. Instead, we propose to dig a 
bit deeper into the question of which values and norms have positive effects on economic de-
velopment (both directly and indirectly). 
The fundamental hypothesis underlying our “list of favorable values and norms” is that eco-
nomic systems that are based on individual liberty have proven to provide the greatest chance 
to enhance individual wealth. The list names some of the attitudes that seem to be either nec-
essary for or favorable to growth in an economic system based on individual liberty. These at-
titudes would have to be backed by a value-system and its corresponding norms:
8
 
(1) It is the individual actor who is responsible for decision-making, for carrying out 
the decisions and for reaching – or not reaching – his goals.  
If success in life is, however, perceived of as being largely out of the individual's control and 
seen as being determined by God, destiny or some organic entity, we would not expect a mar-
ket economy that is based on private autonomy and that depends on entrepreneurial spirit to 
develop. The view of the individual who is responsible for the actions committed is a neces-
sary prerequisite for the establishment of private property rights because conceptually, it is 
them that grant the individual actor the chance to incorporate the benefits arising as a conse-
quence of her actions as well as attribute to her the responsibility to bear the costs.
9
 It is con-
jectured that the view of the individual as being largely responsible for his own fate displays a 
direct as well as an indirect effect: individuals with such norms will try to be better off eco-
nomically (direct effect) but will also be actively involved in establishing institutions granting 
them the individual freedom that they strive for. In a similar manner, Casson (1993) points out 
the importance of an “atomistic morality” for long-run economic development, emphasizing 
individual rights rather than social obligations. 
(2) Individuals who are doing exceptionally well economically are perceived as role 
models rather than being looked at enviously.  
                                                 
8 In a slightly different form, the following list first appeared in Voigt (1993). Some theory on this can also be found in Cas-
son (1993). 
9 Hofstede (1997) describes individualistic societies as “societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is 
expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family.” 
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This implies that the perceived inequality of economic outcomes is accepted as long as it is 
legally attained. This is not to imply that inequality either of property or of income is neces-
sarily a prerequisite for a market economy and economic growth
10
. It is conjectured that such 
norms display a positive direct effect whereas the indirect effect appears more uncertain: ac-
cepting large inequality could mean that individuals do not actively try to establish rules treat-
ing everybody equally, in other words, this norm could be a hindrance for the establishment of 
the rule of law. 
(3) Individuals are geographically and socially mobile.  
Geographic mobility is a favorable attitude because it enables the mobile factors to combine 
their inputs with other – immobile – factors. High geographical mobility ensures the possibil-
ity of putting the factors to their most valued use. In order to enhance market systems, this at-
titude must also be shared by those who are immobile, i.e. those at the ‘recipient end’. If they 
share a militant aversion against strangers – for example because they constitute a source of 
competition on the labor-market possibly leading to lower wages – potential economic growth 
will not be realized.  
Social mobility includes upward as well as downward mobility. It is favorable to market sys-
tems if people moving up the social ladder are not looked at enviously but are rather per-
ceived as role models. Downward social mobility should ideally not be accompanied by stig-
matizing those who have moved down the social ladder. 
(4) Individuals do not share a militant aversion against anything unknown.  
Market economies thrive on the basis of competition and competition means that innovative 
behavior is rewarded. But innovations can also occur with regard to political institutions. It is, 
hence, argued that values and norms trying to conserve the status quo are not conducive to 
economic development. It is conjectured that there is a direct effect as well as an indirect ef-
fect
11
. The direct effect is, e.g., expected to work via the propensity to act as a “consumption 
pioneer” whereas the indirect effect materializes because such societies are not only likely to 
experiment with political institutions but also to find those that are more conducive to aggre-
gate welfare. 
(5) Equal treatment of all persons.  
                                                 
10 Hofstede (1997) introduces the dimension “Confucian dynamism” that bears resemblance with these norms. What he has in 
mind is the degree to which a society encourages (and rewards) group members for good performance. 
11 Hofstede (1997) introduces a dimension that he calls “uncertainty avoidance” which depicts the extent to which individuals 
follow norms that reduce uncertainty. This dimension is very similar to what we have in mind. 
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Traditionally, many societies have made important distinctions between natives and foreign-
ers, between believers and infidels, between men and women. The higher the degree to which 
such unequal treatment is backed up by corresponding values und norms, the lower the chanc-
es for economic development as this unequal treatment implies that human capital is misallo-
cated or not used at all. Again, we would expect both a direct and an indirect effect: the direct 
effect will work through the more efficient allocation of talent whereas the indirect effect is 
conjectured to work via better political institutions making the efficient allocation of human 
capital easier. 
 (6) Refusal to accept hierarchies  
This norm is conjectured to be important for the way people interact in society. It can relate to 
all sorts of hierarchies, including firms but also the state. If hierarchies – and the orders issued 
by them – are accepted without discussion, this would seem to make survival for autocrats 
easier. It is, hence, conjectured that a high propensity will most likely be connected with un-
democratic political institutions. The direct effect is not as clear-cut: on the one hand, a cer-
tain degree of accepting superiors’ decisions is necessary for firms to function effectively. On 
the other hand, hierarchies require new ideas and proposals for their development. At the ex-
treme, one could think of values and norms not accepting any hierarchies whatsoever. This 
could imply that firms would be far below optimum size and would, hence, have a negative 
direct effect
12
. 
(8) Individuals share some 'lesser virtues' such as being honest, being on time, not 
cheating on each other etc.  
If a person can reasonably expect that another person unknown to her will e.g. stick to his 
promises, this will greatly decrease the costs of transacting thus making exchange less com-
plicated and less costly
13
. Other values and norms conducive to economic development in-
clude thriftiness, diligence and tidiness. All these virtues should display a direct effect. A cer-
tain degree of thriftiness is a necessary condition for economic development, without it, no 
investment is possible. A high degree of thriftiness can therefore also be interpreted as a for-
ward-looking attitude or future-orientation. 
Of course, some of the attitudes described as favorable to an economic system based on de-
centralized co-ordination are not backed up by corresponding norms in societies that have 
                                                 
12 Hofstede (1997) introduces the dimension “power distance” closely resembling the aspects discussed here. 
13 See e.g. Casson (1993). 
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long been coordinated in this way. It seems to be essential, however, that the people who do 
share the above-mentioned attitudes are not hindered actively by those parts of the population 
who do not share them. In other words: it might not be necessary that the listed attitudes are 
actively backed up by corresponding norms (and values) but that there are no norms that pun-
ish those who share them. Thus, if there are umbrella-norms which secure that people who do 
behave according to some of the above-mentioned attitudes will be sanctioned because they 
break some traditional norm, prospects for economic growth are predicted to be pretty slim. 
3 Possibilities to Put the Theory to an Empirical Test 
We are interested in the determinants of long-run economic development. Our conjecture is 
that it is not primarily elites that determine development but that the values and norms held by 
substantial groups of society also play an important role. In order to test this hypothesis, it 
would be ideal to have indicators for the values and norms held in various countries a long 
time ago, say around 1900. In this section, we discuss possibilities to put the theory to an em-
pirical test. Due to lack of available data, only a fraction of the possibilities discussed can be 
pursued in this work. 
Since the value-system offers the individual a reference-system that helps her to determine the 
things she does and helps her to order things in an otherwise unordered world, it is unlikely 
that a person will frequently change parts of her value-system or even the entire system. In 
other words: values are assumed to be relatively time-invariant. They should be primarily de-
termined during a person's childhood
14
. Indicators for the prevalent values in a society would 
therefore have to be found in the values that children are taught. We think that a society's 
fairy-tales that have often endured over decades or even centuries would be the most reliable 
indicator because they have come to reflect the shared value-system of a society. Different 
from fairy-tales, newly released children’s books might also reflect the aspirations and dispo-
sitions of their authors and might therefore, especially in totalitarian states, reflect more the 
values of the nomenclature than those of the people. Unfortunately, we will not be able to 
draw extensively on fairy-tales as an indicator in this paper as comparative research into fairy-
tales has not compared the values and norms emphasized by various fairy-tales. 
A second indicator reflecting the values shared in a society might be found by analyzing its 
religion. This approach can be traced back to Max Weber who analyzed many religions with 
regard to their ‘economic ethics’ which he understood as “...not the ethical theory of theologi-
                                                 
14 For evidence on this, see Goodnow (1997) and Knafo & Schwartz (2004). 
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cal compendia ... but the practical impulses for action that are based on the psychological 
and pragmatic connections of the religion”15. It might be argued that the economic ethics of 
the respective religions had become largely irrelevant because people had long ceased to be 
religious. Yet, economic ethics can continue to influence the behavior of people long after 
they have ceased to view themselves as religious. 
A mapping between the economic ethics of religions and values and norms would be ideal. 
Additionally, a number of issues ought to be reflected in any indicator: the intensity of reli-
gious beliefs could be important. People never attending any religious ceremonies might be 
less guided by values and norms than people regularly doing so. This could well be reflected 
in their behavior. We are here not only interested in the effect of religions on individual be-
havior but also on collective outcomes. This implies that the ratio of people following a cer-
tain religion should be controlled for. It would, hence, be ideal to use information on the in-
tensity of religious beliefs from some 100 years ago. Unfortunately, we did not find any such 
data for a large number of countries
16
. 
A third possible indicator relies on public opinion polls that contain questions concerning the 
prevalent values. One problem with such surveys is that they might reflect the attitudes and 
dispositions that the interviewees think they should have or that they think the group of people 
that they most identify with would have. Yet, highly professional survey organizations know 
how to deal with these issues and the responses can tell us quite a lot about the values and 
norms that real people hold. Previous work by Granato et al. (1996) has used this approach, 
though with an emphasis on (short-term) growth rather than (long-term) levels of develop-
ment. In a recent work closer to this one, Licht et al. (2007) use survey data collected by 
Schwartz (2004)
17
 to correlate cultural dimensions with “the rule of law, corruption and dem-
ocratic accountability” (p. 659). We expand the framework of Licht et al. (2007) by (1) using 
a greater diversity of value dimensions and (2) employing a more general estimation ap-
proach. 
4 The Estimation Approach  
The main focus of this paper is on long-term development – and not on short-term growth. 
This is why we are interested in explaining income levels rather than growth rates. After all, 
income levels are aggregate growth rates over a very long time. As our assumption is that in-
                                                 
15 Weber (1921/1980). 
16 A number of recent studies have found various effects attributed to religions. For an overview, see McCleary & Barro 
(2006) and Barro & McCleary (2003). 
17 We do not employ the Schwartz data in this study. Evidence by Pryor (2007, 2008) suggests that the World Values Survey 
data and the Schwartz data are similar. 
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stitutions matter, we are interested in isolating their effects from the effects of the other fac-
tors contributing to growth – and income18. 
Hall and Jones (1999) conjecture that “social infrastructure” is crucial to explaining variation 
in total factor productivity (TFP) across countries. Their proxies for social infrastructure in-
clude law and order, bureaucratic quality, risk of government repudiation of contracts, the de-
gree of (perceived) corruption but also the openness of an economy to international trade. 
They are, of course, aware of the possibility that beneficial social infrastructure might for its 
part be the result of high incomes, i.e. of reverse causality. To control for that possibility, they 
rely on an instrumental variables approach using a country’s Latitude as well as the degree to 
which European languages as spoken as native languages as instruments. 
Building on this research, Acemoglu et al. (2001) set out to explain cross-country differences 
in income levels by differences in institutional quality. They too tackle the problem of reverse 
causality with an instrumental variables approach, arguing that settler mortality rates in the 
colonies of the 17
th
 to 19
th
 centuries explain differences in institution observed today. This 
approach enables them to isolate a statistically significant and meaningful effect of institu-
tional quality on income levels. 
Our analysis adapts the central idea of these two central works, but with several modifica-
tions. Firstly, we explicitly allow both Social Capital (CIVIL) and Values and Norms (VN) to 
influence per capita income (GDP). This implies that we are now dealing with four instead of 
Hall and Jones’ two simultaneous structural equations: the first determines GDP, the second 
determines institutional quality, the third determines Social Capital, the fourth determines 
Values and Norms. Considering any of the three equations separately would lead to serious 
endogeneity problems, which is why we estimate them simultaneously
19
. The system of equa-
tions we consider is then: 
   (     )                                           (1) 
                                          (2) 
                                          (3)  
                                          (4) 
                                                 
18 Alternatively, we could use the Solow residual as explained variable. The Solow residual is the fraction of output that can-
not be explained by the endowment with capital and labor. The advantage of such an approach would be that we can better 
isolate the effects of institutions given more “shallow” predictors such as capital and labor. We nevertheless decide not to 
proceed with the Solow residual as (1) it imposes rather strong assumptions on cross-country depreciation rates and (2) is not 
readily available for multiple years. 
19 This is in contrast to an approach with separate estimations (Andonova et al. 2007). 
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where i indexes countries, t indexes years,     (     ) is the logarithm of per capita income, 
       is an indicator of the strength of the rule of law and democracy        , is an indicator 
for social capital,      is a proxy for values and norms,. Although we differentiate between 
different years, this is strictly speaking not a panel analysis, as our proxies for Values and 
Norms are measured through a new sample at each point in time (i.e. wave). 
Three stage least squares estimation allows us to control for the endogeneity inherent in this 
system of equations. In the first stage, instrumented values for all endogenous variables are 
predicted using the vector of exogenous variables   . In the second stage, a consistent covari-
ance matrix of the respective equation disturbances is retrieved. In the third stage, a general-
ized least squares (GLS) estimation is performed for the whole system using the instrumented 
values from stage one and the covariance matrix from stage 2. Identification requires that the 
number of instruments be at least as large as the number of endogenous variables. The in-
strument vector    includes regional and time dummies to account for unobserved heterogenei-
ty. Furthermore, we consider including a set of variables that have been suggested in the insti-
tutions and growth literature as instruments, all of which have in common that they represents 
some geographic or deep-rooted cultural trait of a country that is assumed to be exogenous 
and not related to the error term in the above equation. Providing concrete theories regarding 
the transmission channels from these instruments to the endogenous variables might allow us 
to identify distinct sets of instruments for each equation. This is however beyond the scope of 
this work. Thus, we choose to exploratively look for the set of instruments that maximizes the 
Bayesian model selection criterion, which has been argued to be superior to other convention-
al model selection criteria (Raftery 1995). Note that this multi-equation approach allows us to 
differentiate between direct effects of      (  ) and indirect effects mediated either by 
       (    ) or     (    ) . 
Our estimation Approach (including the exploratory search for an instrument set) will be run 
separately for various indicators proxying the dimensions of values and norms mentioned in 
section 2.  
5 Data and Estimation Results 
We now turn to describe the data used. The dependent variable is GDP per capita. As a meas-
ure for the strength of rule of law and the quality of democracy, we propose to use an indica-
tor which combines Freedom House’s political rights index and civil liberties index. Given 
the theoretical discussion above, we conjecture that countries that are characterized by both a 
strong rule of law and a high quality of democratic institutions should be countries with high 
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per capita income. Thus, it seems fitting to measure institutional quality via this composite 
variable
20
. The civil liberties index measures the extent to which freedoms of expression and 
belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy are given in 
a country without interference from the state. The political rights index measures the extent to 
which people can participate freely in the political process. For missing values, this variable is 
additionally complemented by the PolityIV indicator for constitutional democracy. Hadenius 
& Teorell (2005a) show that this combined index performs better in terms of reliability and 
validity than the respective component variables. 
The potential instruments that we identified from the existing literature include indices for 
ethnic, religious and linguistic fractionalization (Mauro 1995), a dummy that indicates wheth-
er in the predominant language of a country, it is allowed to drop the pronoun (Licht et al. 
2007), a dummy for common law legal origin (La Porta et al. 1999), the malaria transmission 
index (McArthur and Sachs 2001), the 20 year lagged value of GDP per capita. See Table 1 for 
detailed descriptions and sources for these variables.  
Our primary source for proxies for value and norms is the World Values Survey (WVS) that 
has been carried out in five waves to date since 1980. Face-to-face interviews have been con-
ducted with representative samples of up to 82 countries and each interview covers up to 350 
questions
21
. The WVS collects responses regarding individual beliefs and attitudes towards 
matters of politics, economy, society, religion and ethics (Inglehart et al. 2005).  
The WV does not cover our list of favorable values and norms in its entirety. This is why we 
choose to draw on the GLOBE study on culture, leadership and organization
22
 to cover the 
missing parts of the list. GLOBE is an acronym derived from “Global Leadership and Organi-
zational Behavior Effectiveness Research Program”. As the name indicates, the participants of 
the research project are interested in the consequences of different values and norms for firm 
behavior, in particular different leadership models. But some of the nine dimensions that they 
work with mirror our list of favorable values and norms rather closely, so that their data might 
be meaningfully applied to the central question of this paper. The GLOBE data are based on 
questionnaire responses of 17,300 middle managers in 951 firms and 62 societies. 
                                                 
20 Composite indicators of institutional quality and rule of law indicators in particular have recently come under heavy attack 
recently, see, e.g., Arndt & Oman (2006), Kurtz & Schrank (2007b, 2007a) or Thomas (2007)). Voigt (2008) discusses some 
of the issues involved in the attempts to make institutions measurable. For lack of a better measure, we continue to use this 
one, despite its various shortcomings. 
21 For details, see World Values Study Group (1999). 
22 House et al. (2004). 
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The GLOBE data systematically distinguish societal practice (“as is”) and societal values 
(“should be”) in all nine dimensions covered by the survey, on a scale from 1 to 7. Interesting-
ly, the “as is” and the “should be” dimensions are negatively correlated respectively. Hofstede 
(2006) argues that this is basically due to a measurement problem in the GLOBE survey ques-
tionnaire. “As is” value are inherently hard to assess for individuals, and furthermore, the sur-
vey questions for the “as is” dimensions were overly abstract. This leads Hofstede to conclude 
that the “as is” dimension actually reflects “should be” assessments, mostly by criticizing the 
respective society (hence the negative correlation). To circumvent this problem, we utilize on-
ly the “should be” variable. 
Potentially, the focus on the middle-management of only three branches constitutes a problem 
since these persons might not be representative of their societies, resulting in sample selection 
bias. However, correlations with both objective data as well as with other surveys (such as the 
World Values Survey) indicate that this is not a serious problem
23
. 
For each of the seven categories of Values and Norms
24
, we identify multiple potentially suit-
able variables from the WVS and GLOBE and perform factor analysis to calculate weighted 
averages
25
. This approach puts emphasis on the exploratory nature of our analysis
26
.  
We now present the operationalizations of the seven groups of Values and Norms identified in 
Section 2, reporting the respective estimation results in parallel. Note that WVS data is avail-
able for five waves since 1980, a fact that we exploit to estimate with pooled cross-sections in 
order to increase sample size. For the estimations that include GLOBE variables, we estimate 
with data for 2005 with regard to the time-variant variables. Unfortunately, the restricted 
sample size for the GLOBE (54 countries) data does not provide sufficient degrees of freedom 
for 3SLS estimation so that we can only present equation by equation OLS estimations. Thus, 
we will focus our interpretations mainly on the WVS results. 
For each value dimension, we present one 3SLS specification and the corresponding OLS es-
timation. The first broad result to notice is that in most specifications, we find evidence for a 
positive and significant association between our Rule of law variable and per capita income. 
Second, higher Social Capital is also positively and significantly associated with higher per 
capita income in virtually all specifications. 
                                                 
23 See Gupta et al. (2004). 
24 True, in section 2, more attitudes were discussed. Unfortunately, we were not able to find any variables proxying for geo-
graphic and/or social mobility such that the number of empirically tested attitudes is reduced. 
25 For a different approach, see Granato et al. (1996). 
26 Andonova (2007) also use factor analysis, but in their work, its purpose is to identify a common factor underlying the dif-
ferent dimensions of cultural values. 
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(1) Individual responsible for achieving goals 
The World Values Survey (WVS)
27
 contains two variables indicating to which degree popula-
tions in various countries share this norm. The first one (question V95) asks respondents to 
assess on a scale “how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way 
your life turns out”. The second one (question V252) asks to assess one’s position on a scale 
between “Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves” and “The 
state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”. Factor analysis 
yields a weighted average of the two, which we call Individual responsibility and choice 
(WVS).  
The GLOBE project contains a dimension entitled Performance Orientation which refers to 
the extent to which society encourages and rewards individual group members for perfor-
mance improvement, innovation and excellence.  
Our estimation results show that, although a simple OLS analysis suggests a positive and sig-
nificant direct effect of the variable Individual responsibility and choice (Table 3, column 1, 
equation 1), this effect vanishes when we account for the endogeneity in the system (column 
2) or when we use the GLOBE variable Performance orientation (Table 3, column 1). We do, 
however, find that Individual responsibility and choice significantly impacts per capita in-
come indirectly via both rule of law and social capital (Table 4, column 1). This is in line with 
our conjecture that, for an effective rule of law, individuals need to acknowledge responsibil-
ity for their fate and that individuals believing in individual responsibility will strive to estab-
lish according institutions. 
We find that Individual responsibility and choice significantly and positively impacts both the 
rule of law (column 2, equation 2) and social capital (column 2, equation 3). In particular the 
former effect is sizable: A one standard deviation increase in Individual responsibility and 
choice is associated with a rise in rule of law by almost 2 (rule of law ranges from 0 to 10). 
Furthermore, we find evidence for a positive feedback loop: Both rule of law and social capi-
tal for their part positively influence Individual responsibility and choice (column 2, equation 
4). 
(2) Inequality Accepted 
                                                 
27 We aggregate the WVS individual level data over each country. 
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Here, we rely exclusively on two variables drawn from the WVS, namely V125 (Secretary 
Fairness
28
) and V250 (Incomes should be made more equal
29
). Using factor analysis, we 
combine these variables in a common factor Inequality acceptance. 
We find that Inequality acceptance exhibits a significant and positive direct impact on per 
capita income once we control for endogeneity (Table 3, column 4, equation 1): A one stand-
ard deviation increase in Inequality acceptance is associated with rise in per capita income of 
almost 1%. This is in line with our conjecture that some acceptance of justifiable inequalities 
is necessary for a market economy to flourish. 
We also conjectured that there might be a negative indirect effect in that individuals who ac-
cept large inequalities might also favor institutions that cultivate inefficient inequalities such 
as those implied by rent-seeking. Indeed, we find that Inequality acceptance indirectly nega-
tively affects per capita income via social capital (Table 4, column 2): Higher Inequality ac-
ceptance leads to lower social capital, ultimately also lowering per capita income. There is al-
so a positive and significant indirect effect via rule of law, indicating that higher Inequality 
acceptance actually increases the effectiveness of the rule of law. We conclude that, if there 
are any negative indirect effects of Inequality acceptance, they are rather mediated by social 
capital than by the rule of law. 
 (3) No Aversion Against Unknown 
GLOBE defines uncertainty avoidance as “the extent to which members of collectives seek or-
derliness, consistency, structure, formalized procedures, and laws to cover situations in their 
daily lives” (Sully de Luque and Javidan 2004). The dimension Uncertainty Avoidance 
(GLOBE) was inspired by similar constructs, e.g. Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance Index.  
The conjecture is that lower aversion against anything unknown fosters innovation, which 
would then be conducive to economic development. The indirect effects of uncertainty avoid-
ance are somewhat more difficult to grasp: if societies are more willing to accept uncertainty, 
the number of laws and regulations could be lower than in societies having a harder time to 
tolerate uncertainty. Ex ante, the effect of this is, however, unpredictable: on the one hand, 
this could mean that there are less laws and regulations constraining entrepreneurial behavior 
and innovation. On the other, if laws and regulations make the environment less uncertain und 
                                                 
28 “Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns $50 a week 
more than she does. The better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opin-
ion, is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other?” (World Values Study Group 1999). 
29 Here, respondents were asked to choose on a scale between “Incomes should be made more equal” and “There should be 
greater incentives for individual effort.” (World Values Study Group 1999). 
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more predictable, this could also spur additional entrepreneurial activity. A first look at the 
bivariate scatterplot surely suggests that lower uncertainty avoidance is associated with higher 
per capita income (Figure 7). 
In the WVS, questions V69 to V82 ask respondents to choose from a list any group of people 
that they would not like to have as their neighbor. Those groups include “People with a crimi-
nal record”, “Heavy drinkers”, “Muslims”, People who have AIDS” and so on. Our variable 
Uncertainty Avoidance (WVS) counts the number of groups that each respondent mentions: 
The more groups are mentioned, the higher that respondent’s uncertainty avoidance. Note that 
both the WVS and the GLOBE variable inversely measure the concept that we are interested 
in. A first bivariate look at the data indicates a negative correlation between this variable and 
per capita income (Figure 3). 
For the WVS variable Uncertainty Avoidance, the equation by equation OLS estimation sug-
gests a significant and negative effect on per capita income (Table 3, column 5, equation 1). 
However, the significance vanishes once we account for the inter-relationships suggested in 
our statistical model (column 6, equation 1). This indicates that there is no direct effect of this 
value dimension on per capita income. Again, we find a significant indirect impact via the 
rule of law and social capital. More uncertainty avoidance is associated with weaker rule of 
law (column 6, equation 2), which also manifests in a significantly negative indirect effect on 
per capita income (Table 4, column 3). This implies that more uncertainty leads to a weaker 
effectiveness of the rule of law with regard to economic development, which is in line with 
our conjecture that uncertainty avoidance should lead to less institutional innovation and more 
inefficient regulations. The second finding is a little more puzzling: One might expect that 
more Uncertainty Avoidance leads to more social capital, with individuals utilizing the im-
plied social networks as devices to reduce uncertainty. This is a transmission channel that has 
been suggested in the trade literature (Rauch 2001) and that is somewhat at odds with our 
findings here. All of these findings are also compatible with the pure correlational evidence 
provided by the GLOBE indicator (Table 5, column 3). 
 (4) Equality of Treatment 
Equality of treatment refers to the equality before the law tout court. Encompassing (objec-
tive) indicators for this do not seem to be available.  
The WVS contains two corresponding variables. The first (V130) asks respondents whether 
they agree to the statement “When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than wom-
en”. The second one states “Men make better political leaders than women do” (V118). 
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Again, we produce a weighted average of these responses using factor analysis (with higher 
values corresponding to less egalitarianism).  
The GLOBE project contains the dimension Gender Egalitarianism that proxies for one im-
portant, if not the most important, dimension with regard to the equality of treatment. (Emrich 
et al. 2004) define it as reflecting “societies’ beliefs about whether members’ biological sex 
should determine the roles that they play in their homes, business organizations, and commu-
nities.” 
Again, we find that a pure equation by equation OLS analysis (Table 3, column 8, column 7, 
equation 1) would mistakenly suggest a significant and positive
30
 impact of this values dimen-
sion, as the significance of this effect vanishes when controlling for endogeneity (column 9, 
equation 1). Yet again, we find evidence for a significant indirect effect: Gender Egalitarian-
ism positively influences per capita income via both the rule of law and social capital (Table 
4, column 4). This finding conforms to our conjecture that more Gender Egalitarianism 
should results in more egalitarian political institutions, ultimately improving the rule of law. 
This is partly corroborated by our estimations with the GLOBE indicator (Table 5, column 7), 
which find a positive association between Gender Egalitarianism and per capita income 
(equation 1) and the rule of law (equation 2) respectively.  
 (5) Propensity to Accept Hierarchies 
The propensity to accept hierarchies has been conjectured to be detrimental to economic de-
velopment, primarily due to its expected indirect effect of a higher willingness to accept insti-
tutions not conducive to development. As a proxy for this, we rely on the dimension Power 
Distance found in the GLOBE project and defined as “the degree to which members of an or-
ganization or society expect and agree that power should be shared unequally” (Carl et al. 
2004). 
Question V127 from the WVS asks respondents whether “one should follow instructions of 
one’s superiors (at work) even when one does not fully agree with them”, we call this one Hi-
erarchy acceptance (WVS).  
For the WVS variable, we find that, regardless of estimating our system of equations with 
OLS or 3SLS, there is no evidence for a direct effect of Hierarchy acceptance on per capita 
income (Table 3, columns 9-10, equation 1). We do observe evidence for an indirect effect, 
one that furthermore diverges between rule of law and social capital. On the one hand, Hier-
                                                 
30 For the WVS variable, Gender egalitarianism is measured inversely. 
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archy acceptance positively affects per capita income via the rule of law (Table 4, column 5), 
implying that, instead of weakening democratic political institutions, Hierarchy acceptance 
rather strengthens the functioning of the rule of law, maybe through better effectiveness of 
government bureaucracies. On the other hand, Hierarchy acceptance negatively affects per 
capita income via social capital (Table 4, column 5), which we could take to mean that the 
functioning of civil society organizations is rather weakened by strong Hierarchy acceptance. 
These findings are not corroborated when using the GLOBE variable (Table 5, column 6), 
where we do not find any significant effects of Hierarchy acceptance, but neither are our 
findings contradicted. 
 (7) Shared Lesser Virtues 
Virtues such as honesty and thriftiness are conjectured to keep transaction costs low which 
should have positive effects on economic development. Unfortunately, it is not easy to find 
indicators that cover these secondary virtues in their entirety. Among the nine dimensions 
contained in the GLOBE project, one dimension does, however, reflect part of the conjecture 
that we have in mind. This is Future orientation, which is defined as “the extent to which 
members of a society or an organization believe that their current actions will influence their 
future, focus on investment in their future, believe that they will have a future that matters, be-
lieve in planning for developing their future, and look far into the future for assessing the ef-
fects of their current actions” (Ashkanasy et al. 2004). Without future orientation, savings and 
thus investment might be inefficiently low in an uncertain world. Since investments are one 
key to economic development, we argue that high values of future orientation should have an 
impact on the economic development of a society. 
Because there is only a GLOBE indicator for this value dimension, we can only (tentatively) 
interpret equation by equation OLS in this case. We find no evidence that Future orientation 
is directly associated with per capita income (equation 1) or rule of law (equation 2), but a 
significant negative correlation with social capital (equation 3). A sweeping interpretation of 
such a finding would be that for the functioning of civil society, actions with a focus on the 
present are more important and that when individuals care more about the future, they care 
less about present-oriented civil society matters. 
6 Conclusions and Outlook 
It has become somewhat of a commonplace to claim that institutions matter for economic de-
velopment. The endogeneity of institutions is often mentioned but not explicitly inquired into. 
In this paper, we develop a number of hypotheses how values and norms could impact upon 
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some of the institutions conjectured to be relevant for economic development. Drawing on a 
simultaneous equations approach, we examine the causal influence of various values and 
norms on economic performance.  
When we control for the various feedbacks implied by a system of equations in which rule of 
law, civil society and value dimensions can be endogenous, we find that, for the most part, 
values and norms do not affect economic development directly (with the exception of Ine-
quality acceptance). Simultaneously, we find for all value dimensions a significant impact on 
per capita income via both rule of law and social capital. We can thus broadly conclude that 
the functioning of the rule of law and civil society hinge upon the prevailing values and norms 
in a country. This finding is consistent with the theoretical conjecture that the effect of formal 
institutions always depends on the prevailing informal institutions (Voigt 2009). It is also in 
line with the observation that mere transplantation of legal institutions into low-income coun-
tries produces varying results (Berkowitz et al. 2003). 
Importantly, we find that the indirect effect of values on per capita income is positive 
throughout: Inequality acceptance and Hierarchy acceptance, though exhibiting a positive 
impact via rule of law, negatively affect the impact of civil society on per capita income.  
Are there any policy conclusions we can draw from these results? One definite policy impli-
cation is that policy makers engaging in legal transplantation need to be very wary about ex-
isting informal institutions, as they will shape the performance of the rule of law. While we do 
not propose that values and norms can be molded in the short term by policymakers to 
achieve desired results, it would be interesting to delve deeper into the medium- to long-term 
determinants of value development and change and investigate which values are more endog-
enous than others. 
Finally, some outlook. What we have not looked at here are interactions between different 
value dimensions: Are there are any inter-relationships in the way they affect the impact of 
rule of law and social capital on per capita income? Additional theoretical underpinning but 
also more analysis on the transmission channels is desirable, as this will allow us to test more 
specific hypotheses. We simply do not know enough about the specific transmission channels 
(and possibly interactions) to arrive at any final conclusion, especially with regard to policy 
implications. Note also that we have not exploited any individual level variation in the survey 
data, which might reveal patterns that are not visible at the aggregate level. Such an approach 
would also potentially allow us to differentiate between individual and societal levels of sanc-
tions against rule-breaking behavior. 
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7 Tables 
Table 1: Variables used (with descriptive statistics) 
Name Source and Description Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
       
GDP Log GDP per capita 215 1.509 1.446 -1.900 3.859 
Rule of law (Freedom 
House/Imputed Polity) 
Index of rule of law and democratic quality, composed of indices by Freedom House and 
Polity (Hadenius and Teorell 2005b; Marshall and Jaggers 2004; House 2005). 215 7.754 2.708 0 10 
       
Individual responsibility and choice 
(WVS) 
See 5 for detailed description. 
177 0 1 -2.273 2.000 
Inequality acceptance (WVS) See 5 for detailed description. 119 0 1 -2.540 2.474 
Uncertainty avoidance (WVS) See 5 for detailed description. 151 0 1 -2.095 2.963 
Gender egalitarianism  (WVS) See 5 for detailed description. 122 0 1 -1.678 2.676 
Hierarchy acceptance (WVS) See 5 for detailed description. 111 0 1 -2.297 2.391 
       
Performance orientation (GLOBE) See 5 for detailed description. 54 0 1 -2.436 1.977 
Uncertainty avoidance (GLOBE) See 5 for detailed description. 54 0 1 -2.390 1.621 
Gender egalitarianism  (GLOBE) See 5 for detailed description. 54 0 1 -3.026 1.405 
Power distance (GLOBE) See 5 for detailed description. 54 0 1 -2.084 2.496 
Future orientation (GLOBE) See 5 for detailed description. 54 0 1 -2.920 1.772 
       
Absolute Distance from equator Distance from equator, normalized to a scale from 0 to 1. 148 0.433 0.173 0.014 0.711 
Ethnic fractionalization 
Index of ethnic fractionalization. Probability that two randomly selected people from a given 
society will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group (Alesina et al. 2003). 148 0.293 0.228 0.002 0.850 
Linguistic fractionalization 
Index of linguistic fractionalization. Probability that two randomly selected people from a 
given society will not belong to the same linguistic group (Alesina et al. 2003). 147 0.268 0.263 0.002 0.865 
Religious fractionalization 
Index of religious fractionalization. Probability that two randomly selected people from a 
given society will not belong to the same religious group (Alesina et al. 2003). 148 0.446 0.246 0.003 0.860 
Pronoun drop 
Indicates whether in the dominant language of a country, it is allowed to drop the pronoun 
(Licht et al. 2007). 137 0.533 0.501 0 1 
Legal origin (common law) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country belongs to the common-law tradition, 0 otherwise 
(La Porta et al. 1999). 148 0.250 0.434 0 1 
Malaria transmission index  Malaria Transmission Index in 1994 (McArthur and Sachs 2001). 148 0.057 0.180 0 1 
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Table 2: Pairwise correlations of value dimensions 
 
Performance orientation 
(GLOBE) 
Uncertainty avoidance 
(GLOBE) 
Gender egalitarianism 
(GLOBE) 
Hierarchy acceptance 
(GLOBE) 
Future orientation 
(GLOBE) 
Individual responsibility and choice (WVS) 0.3063* -0.4740* 0.4896* -0.1567 -0.3859* 
Inequality acceptance (WVS) -0.1053 0.2324* -0.3646* 0.3935* -0.0273 
Uncertainty avoidance (WVS) -0.1419 0.5708* -0.5834* 0.2745* 0.4167* 
Gender egalitarianism (WVS) -0.1316 0.6620* -0.7388* 0.3036* 0.4384* 
Contribution to public good (WVS) -0.0414 -0.4010* 0.1404 0.2084 -0.2551 
Political action for public good (WVS) -0.3198* -0.2660 0.2113 0.0130 -0.4180* 
Hierarchy acceptance (WVS) 0.0640 0.2388* -0.2352* -0.2348* 0.0884 
*indicates 5% significance.      
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Table 3: Estimations for World Values Survey variables 
 Individual responsibility and 
choice 
Inequality acceptance Uncertainty avoidance Gender egalitarianism Hierarchy acceptance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS 3SLS OLS 3SLS OLS 3SLS OLS 3SLS OLS 3SLS 
   (     ) (1)           
       0.246*** 0.437*** 0.248*** 0.0545 0.206*** 0.676*** 0.127*** 0.391*** 0.274*** 0.203*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0476) (0.0466) (0.0967) (0.0387) (0.127) (0.0422) (0.0945) (0.0420) (0.0763) 
     0.234*** -0.170 0.0342 0.964*** -0.451*** -0.0251 -0.579*** 0.168 -0.0630 -0.451 
 (0.0858) (0.180) (0.0939) (0.172) (0.0863) (0.228) (0.121) (0.236) (0.0970) (0.260) 
        0.470*** 0.740*** 1.152*** 2.629*** 0.512*** -0.551** 0.398*** 0.740*** 1.017*** 1.752*** 
 (0.0930) (0.166) (0.204) (0.365) (0.144) (0.254) (0.0925) (0.120) (0.176) (0.370) 
       (2) 
  
        
        1.231*** -0.171 2.657*** 3.888*** 1.816*** 2.409*** 0.475** -0.509** 2.351*** 4.282*** 
 (0.209) (0.368) (0.323) (0.250) (0.267) (0.143) (0.196) (0.223) (0.334) (0.312) 
     0.375 1.932*** -0.656*** 1.182*** -0.965*** -1.824*** -1.642*** -2.468*** -0.370* 1.419*** 
 (0.209) (0.337) (0.177) (0.310) (0.165) (0.102) (0.216) (0.127) (0.220) (0.542) 
        (3) 
  
        
       0.135*** -0.0336 0.138*** 0.246*** 0.131*** 0.404*** 0.0990** -0.107 0.134*** 0.222*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0356) (0.0168) (0.0161) (0.0193) (0.0281) (0.0408) (0.0895) (0.0190) (0.0152) 
     0.411*** 0.895*** 0.0335 -0.371*** -0.00580 0.706*** -0.358*** -0.826*** 0.00136 -0.451*** 
 (0.0627) (0.0706) (0.0426) (0.0678) (0.0493) (0.0777) (0.116) (0.207) (0.0531) (0.107) 
     (4)           
       0.0483 0.177*** -0.162*** 0.301*** -0.194*** -0.535*** -0.199*** -0.370*** -0.0693 0.198*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0300) (0.0436) (0.0809) (0.0332) (0.0314) (0.0262) (0.0195) (0.0411) (0.0613) 
        0.482*** 0.819*** 0.158 -1.491*** -0.0161 1.242*** -0.208*** -0.333*** 0.00448 -1.116*** 
 (0.0735) (0.0650) (0.201) (0.277) (0.137) (0.122) (0.0673) (0.0803) (0.174) (0.250) 
 
  
        
Instruments  
Malaria trans-
mission index 
Absolute Dis-
tance from equa-
tor 
 
Linguistic frac-
tionalization 
Pronoun drop 
Legal origin 
(common law) 
 
Religious fracti-
onalization 
Pronoun drop 
 
Ling. Fract., Rel. 
fract., Malaria 
transm. index, 
Legal origin 
(common law), 
Absolute Dis-
tance from equa-
tor 
 
Religious frac-
tionalization, 
Legal origin 
(common law), 
Absolute Dis-
tance from equa-
tor, 20year lag of 
GDP per capita 
Observations 177 177 119 119 151 151 122 122 111 111 
Standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimations include regional dummies and year dummies as additional controls and a constant (not 
reported). 
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Table 4: Indirect effects for World Values Survey variables 
 Indirect effect of… 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Individual responsibility and 
choice 
Inequality acceptance Uncertainty avoidance Gender egalitarianism Hierarchy acceptance 
 based on estimation (2) based on estimation (4) based on estimation (6) based on estimation (8) based on estimation (10) 
Via…      
       (    ) 0.843*** 0.064*** -1.232*** -0.964*** 0.288*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
        (    ) 0.662*** -0.974*** -0.389*** -0.611*** -0.789*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
P-values in parentheses refer to an F test for joint significance of the two relevant coefficients, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: Estimations for GLOBE variables 
 Performance orientation Uncertainty avoidance Gender egalitarianism Hierarchy acceptance Future orientation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS 3SLS OLS 3SLS OLS 3SLS OLS 3SLS OLS 3SLS 
   (     ) (1)           
       0.118**  0.104**  0.0944  0.123**  0.133**  
 (0.0555)  (0.0481)  (0.0541)  (0.0560)  (0.0548)  
     -0.130  -0.516***  0.342**  0.00525  -0.217  
 (0.128)  (0.130)  (0.146)  (0.112)  (0.138)  
        0.605**  0.488**  0.475  0.610**  0.540**  
 (0.253)  (0.221)  (0.247)  (0.264)  (0.253)  
       (2)           
        2.417***  1.852***  1.570***  2.222***  2.359***  
 (0.428)  (0.545)  (0.435)  (0.440)  (0.505)  
     0.279  -0.504  1.037***  -0.291  0.0137  
 (0.277)  (0.356)  (0.284)  (0.287)  (0.328)  
        (3)           
       0.159***  0.0997***  0.130***  0.150***  0.127***  
 (0.0282)  (0.0293)  (0.0359)  (0.0297)  (0.0272)  
     -0.109  -0.291***  0.120  -0.0783  -0.245***  
 (0.0702)  (0.0736)  (0.0901)  (0.0746)  (0.0678)  
     (4)           
       0.0698  -0.0751  0.200***  -0.0678  0.00251  
 (0.0694)  (0.0530)  (0.0548)  (0.0669)  (0.0599)  
        -0.413  -0.806***  0.280  -0.270  -0.832***  
 (0.267)  (0.204)  (0.210)  (0.257)  (0.230)  
           
Observations 54  54  54  54  54  
Standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimations include regional dummies as additional controls and a constant (not reported). 
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8 Figures 
Figure 1: Individual responsibility and choice (WVS) 
 
Figure 2: Inequality acceptance (WVS) 
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Figure 3: Uncertainty avoidance (WVS) 
 
Figure 4: Gender egalitarianism (WVS) 
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Figure 5: Hierarchy acceptance (WVS) 
 
Figure 6: Performance orientation (GLOBE) 
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Figure 7: Uncertainty avoidance (GLOBE) 
 
 
Figure 8: Gender egalitarianism (GLOBE) 
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Figure 9: Hierarchy acceptance (GLOBE) 
 
 
Figure 10: Future orientation (GLOBE) 
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Abstract 
Gravity models of international trade try to explain (bilateral) trade as a function of 
the trading partners’ respective market size and their geographical distance. Recently, 
institutional variables have been included into such models, aiming to add institutional 
differences as explanatory factors. In this paper, we follow up on this literature by 
adding specific informal institutions – uncertainty avoidance, universalism, patriotism 
– to the analysis. We find evidence that specific informal institutions matter for bilat-
eral trade, but the effect of exporting country and importing country informal institu-
tions are not symmetrical. Furthermore, we find evidence that, simultaneously high 
levels of uncertainty avoidance (or patriotism) and formal contract enforcement quali-
ty, are associated with lower bilateral trade, implying that in such instances, cross-
border exchange is replaced with domestic exchange. 
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1 Introduction 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) is concerned with the incentive effects of dif-
ferent rules and their enforcement mechanisms on individual behavior. International 
trade is composed of transactions between actors from different systems of institutions. 
It has been quite some time that NIE has observed a certain blindness of international 
economics towards the problem of territoriality in international transactions 
(Schmidtchen 1993; Rodrik 2000; Schmidtchen and Schmidt-Trenz 2006). This implies 
that studies in international economics tend to treat cross-border transactions as within-
border transactions, ignoring potential institutional effects.  
However, “because of the absence of a world state, the property rights of economic 
agents involved in international trade are often incompatibly defined and insufficiently 
protected” (Schmidtchen and Schmidt-Trenz 2006). Rodrik argues that “[i]nternational 
law provides at best partial protection against incomplete contracts, and international 
norms and customs are hardly up to the task either” (Rodrik 2000). In this work, we 
will test whether there are informal norms that are actually “up to the task”. 
Recently, first attempts to incorporate informal institutions in explaining bilateral trade 
flows have been put forward. Mutual trust has been found to significantly influence the 
volume of bilateral trade flows in a sample of EU15 countries (Guiso et al. 2009). Fur-
thermore, measures of cultural distance turned out to be significantly associated with bi-
lateral trade (Linders et al. 2005; De Groot et al. 2004), though these results are present-
ed void of theoretical underpinnings. 
Our contribution to this literature is to focus on specific informal constraints rather than 
aggregate cultural differences or mutual trust (Voigt 2009). Previous approaches focus 
on institutional distance analogous to geographical distance to explain bilateral trade 
volumes. We suggest departing from this narrow gravity approach as it doesn’t allow 
inferences regarding the effects of specific institutions.  
Using aggregated data from the World Values Survey to measure specific exporting and 
importing country informal institutions, we find that bilateral trade is (1) negatively af-
fected by importer uncertainty avoidance, (2) positively affected by very high levels of 
exporter universalism, (3) negatively affected by both exporter and importer patriotism. 
We also find that several interactions with formal contract enforcement quality.  
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the standard 
gravity approach to international trade, its institutional extensions and specific informal 
institutions that we think might be relevant. In Section 3, we present the used dataset 
and methodology, followed by the estimation results in Section 4. In Section 5, we close 
with potential caveats and policy implications.  
2 Theory 
2.1 The gravity approach and the New Institutional Economics 
In international economics, the gravity approach uses the notion of physical gravitation-
al pull between two countries to explain the volume of bilateral trade: (1) The more 
economic mass the two trading countries incorporate in terms of GDP and (2) the lower 
the geographical distance between these countries, the more trade does this approach 
expect between these countries (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006; Deardorff 1998; Frankel 
and Rose 2002).  
Approaching bilateral trade from the viewpoint of the New Institutional Economics im-
plies that we focus on the incentive effect (be they constraining or enabling) of legal and 
informal rules. Recent studies have accordingly augmented the standard gravity ap-
proach with measures of institutional quality and similarity (De Groot et al. 2004), argu-
ing that institutions of similar quality imply familiarity between cross-border exchange 
partners (Aulakh and Gençtürk 2008), ultimately leading to lowered transaction costs. 
This approach was then extended to include so-called cultural distance, arguing that the 
closer the cultures of two potential trading partners are, the more likely it is that they 
will understand each other and perceive situations similarly (Linders et al. 2005). 
By contrast, we are interested in the effects of specific informal constraints on bilateral 
trade. Though the concept of cultural distance is more in line with the classical gravity 
approach, it does not allow for inference with regard to specific institutional effects. 
What is more, the concept of cultural distance cannot differentiate between a situation in 
which an informal institution (that is conducive to cross-border exchange) is strong in 
both countries and a situation in which that institution is weak in both countries. The 
latter case should ceteris paribus be associated with less exchange between countries 
than the former case. Thus, we are much more interested in potential effects of specific 
informal institutions. 
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Trade between individuals from two countries involves a cross-border contract and 
transaction, with both individuals subject to two distinct sets of institutions. This in-
cludes formal and informal institutions, the former being different legal systems, espe-
cially concerning contract enforcement, the latter being characterized by different val-
ues and norms. What distinguishes informal institutions from formal ones is that sanc-
tioning in the case of observed non-compliance with the embodied rule does not occur 
on the state level, but rather through other members of society or even internally in the 
mind of the rule-breaker. Previous literature has put forward a fine-grained taxonomy of 
informal institution (Kiwit and Voigt 1995), but for our purposes, it suffices to define 
informal institutions as institutions that are not enforced by the state. 
In the following sections, we will be considering formal and informal institutions poten-
tially relevant for cross-border exchange. In order to keep the formulation of our hy-
potheses tractable, we will phrase them from the perspective of the exporting country.  
2.2 Formal contract enforcement 
“[…] international exchange is insecure. Shipments may be hijacked.  Bribes may be 
extorted. Contracts may not be enforced.” (Anderson and Marcouiller 2002) 
Because transaction across state borders involves actors from two distinct legal systems, 
international trade is characterized by problems of contract enforcement that domestic 
trade is not: If there is breach of contract, (1) which side’s legal rules apply (2) how 
should enforcement be administered in a foreign country? In the NIE literature, this 
problem that is rooted in national sovereignty has been coined constitutional uncertainty 
(Schmidtchen 1993; Schmidtchen and Schmidt-Trenz 2006). Higher constitutional un-
certainty leads to higher transaction costs for cross-border transactions.  
One specific aspect that certainly feeds into the more general problem of constitutional 
uncertainty is the quality of contract enforcement (Rodrik 2000). If an exporter can 
choose between two identical trading partners from two different countries, he will ce-
teris paribus prefer to do business with the person from the country with better contract 
enforcement because the expected transaction costs are lower. Previous theoretical liter-
ature has shown that imperfect contract enforcement in the importing country is equiva-
lent to a tariff (Anderson and Young 2006), in particular for industries in which rela-
tionship-specific investments matter a lot for intermediate inputs (Nunn 2007). Given 
these arguments, our conjecture is as follows. 
 59 
 
Hypothesis 1: The stronger the institutions of contract enforcement in either 
country, the higher the volume of bilateral trade. 
2.3 Potentially relevant informal institutions 
Because of the above mentioned constitutional uncertainty that is inherent in cross-
border exchange, even good formal contract enforcement in either country might some-
times not suffice to ensure that all efficient transactions are realized. Here, there is a po-
tential role for informal institutions to facilitate trade. Reversely, informal institutions 
might be able to account for missing trade when formal institutions are strong.  
In this section, we discuss several informal institutions that might potentially affect the 
incentives for cross-border exchange. Several dimensions of norms and values have 
been proposed to be potentially relevant informal constraints for economic outcomes 
(Park and Voigt 2008; Voigt 1993): (1) The individual actor is responsible for achieving 
his goals, (2) successful individuals are perceived as role models, (3) individuals are so-
cially and geographically mobile, (4) individuals are to a certain degree open towards 
unknown things, (5) individuals believe in equal treatment of all persons, (6) individuals 
believe in communal involvement, (7) attitude towards hierarchies. 
We expect dimensions (4) and (5) in particular to be complementary to strong contract 
enforcement institutions, as they would tend to lower the potential transaction costs of 
cross-border exchange. In addition, we include the institution of patriotism, which 
should be especially relevant for international trade.  
First, we consider the institution of uncertainty avoidance (which is the opposite end of 
dimension 4). This institution comprises procedures and norms at the individual and 
firm-level to reduce uncertainty (Cyert and March 1992). It has been argued that the in-
stitution of uncertainty avoidance helps agents cope with the anxiety associated with 
uncertainty in general (Sully de Luque and Javidan 2004; Hofstede 1980). Economic 
exchange is fraught with uncertainties regarding payment, fulfillment and enforcement. 
Thus, when individuals in a society are characterized by high levels of uncertainty 
avoidance, transaction costs are higher, ceteris paribus, because more resources have to 
be put into insuring against potential risks. At the same time, individuals with high un-
certainty avoidance are less open towards foreigners, including potential trading part-
ners from other cultures. A cross-border transaction is doubly associated with uncertain-
ty, as there is (1) uncertainty with regard to the transaction itself and (2) 
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uncertainty with regard to the formal enforcement institutions of the other country. We 
thus expect high levels of aggregate uncertainty avoidance to be associated with low 
levels of bilateral trade with another country. 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the level of uncertainty avoidance in either country, 
the lower the volume of bilateral trade. 
Another informal institution that we think is relevant is universalism (Mungiu-Pippidi 
2006; Biggart and Delbridge 2004)
1
. This informal institution proscribes that equal 
treatment should apply to anyone regardless of group affiliation. In a very broad fash-
ion, North argues that highly developed societies are characterized by a so-called open 
access social order, which inter alia fosters impersonal exchange (North et al. 2006). 
Thus, when individuals follow the norm that all persons should be treated equally, they 
will treat potential trading partners from other countries just like potential trading part-
ners from their respective country. The more individuals in a society follow this norm, 
the lower we expect cross-border transaction costs to be, as foreign trading partners are 
not viewed with any more suspicion than domestic trading partners.  
Hypothesis 3: The more individuals in either country follow the norm universal-
ism, the higher the volume of bilateral trade. 
In the context of this work, another informal institution has been identified to be poten-
tially relevant: patriotism (de Jong 2009). Patriotism implies the rule that domestic 
products and services are to be preferred over foreign ones. In the context of equity in-
vestment, patriotism has been shown to be a significant factor (Morse and Shive 2011). 
When individuals express strong patriotic tendencies, they will less likely be inclined to 
engage in cross-border transactions, as patriotism by definition implies a relative prefer-
ence for domestic exchange partners. Some studies have also hypothesized indirect ef-
fects of patriotism on trade via protectionist preferences (O'Rourke et al. 2001; Mayda 
and Rodrik 2005).  
Hypothesis 4: The more individuals in either country follow the norm patriot-
ism, the lower the volume of bilateral trade. 
2.4 On the inter-relationship between formal and informal institutions 
So far, we have merely discussed potential effects of either formal or informal institu-
tions on trade. However, as Douglass North has pointed out, a country’s 
                                                 
1 This concept is closely related but distinct from the concept of fairness. 
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institutional system consists of both formal and informal constraints (North 1990). If we 
accept this premise, then the effect of informal institutions on the incentives for cross-
border exchange should also depend on existing formal institutions. 
Logically (and purely abstractly), one can determine four different ways in which for-
mal and informal institutions interact: Their effect on behavior can be (1) complemen-
tary, (2) substituting, (3) conflicting or (4) neutral (Kiwit and Voigt 1995)
2
. This differ-
entiation helps us construct theoretical conjectures regarding the potential inter-
relationship between formal and informal institutions. 
In our context, formal and informal institutions are conflicting when one of them is 
conducive to cross-border exchange, while the other discourages it.  
One could envision a situation in which both strong formal contract enforcement and 
strong uncertainty avoidance are present. By itself, strong uncertainty avoidance is an 
impediment to cross-border exchange. At the same time, strong contract enforcement is 
conducive to trade. This could imply that some transactions will be realized that would 
otherwise not have been considered.  
Hypothesis 5: The effect of uncertainty avoidance on trade will be weaker the 
stronger contract enforcement in either country. 
Another relevant situation would be given when there are strong formal contract en-
forcement institutions in both countries and strong informal institutions of patriotism in 
either country. Strong patriotism in either country deters cross-border exchange. How-
ever, strong contract enforcement institutions in the two exchange partners’ countries 
might enable some transactions that would otherwise not have been realized. 
Hypothesis 6: The effect of patriotism on trade will be weaker the stronger con-
tract enforcement in either country.  
Reversely, complementarity between formal and informal institutions is on hand when 
their incentive effects are both conducive to international transactions and reinforce 
each other. This is the case when strong formal contract enforcement is coupled with the 
institution of universalism. By itself, the former will already ensure that a lot of cross-
border exchanges are realized. But in conjunction with a strong prevalence of universal-
ism in either country, even more exchanges will be realized. 
                                                 
2 This distinction is much more exact than simply referring to a “clash” (Feige 1997) when formal and informal insti-
tutions are not in coherence. 
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Hypothesis 7: The effect of universalism on trade will be higher the stronger 
contract enforcement in either country.  
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Pooled cross-section approach 
In order to test our hypotheses, we utilize a straightforward extension of the standard 
dyadic gravity equation (Rose 2005): 
 
  (      )                                   
 
Estimation will be carried out with pooled ordinary least squares. The dependent varia-
ble is   (      ), the log of exports from country i to country j at time t (in current US 
dollars). We construct this variable from the Correlates of War dyadic trade dataset 
(Barbieri et al. 2008, 2009). 
The vector            contains explanatory variables from the standard gravity ap-
proach: 
  (          ), where GDP is real gross domestic product in constant 1990 dollars 
(Division 2009), 
      , which is a time-constant measure for the geodesic distance between countries i 
and j (Mayer and Zignago 2006). 
The vector         contains (1) proxies for the quality of formal contract enforcement, 
(2) proxies for the informal institution in the exporting or importing country and (3) all 
two- and three-way interactions of these variables, including the squared informal insti-
tution. We estimate this equation separately for each dimension of informal institutions 
(uncertainty avoidance, universalism, patriotism). Furthermore note that, for each of 
those informal institutions, we estimate two separate equations: one for exporting coun-
try informal institutions, one for importing country informal institutions. This is neces-
sary because WVS data are available for a limited cross-section of countries. Investigat-
ing both exporter and importer informal institutions in one equation requires data to be 
available for both countries, which would severely reduce sample size and introduce se-
lection problems.  
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A more detailed description of our estimation approach is now
3
: 
 
  (      )     
         (          )                                               
            
             
           
  
     (            )      (            )       
 
A straightforward implication is that – with the exception of      and      – the estimat-
ed coefficients can no longer be directly interpreted as (unconditional) marginal effects. 
In order to arrive at inferences regarding the effect of the institutional variables, we 
need to calculate marginal effects conditional on specific values of the respective other 
covariates. 
Because our unit of observation is the dyad (country pair), we have non-independent 
observations, which in turn leads to biased standard errors. In order to counter this, we 
employ a full set of time-varying exporter and importer dummies plus a full set of year 
dummies
4
. By controlling for this broad set of fixed effects, we can safely neglect in-
cluding any further control variables, as most of those controls’ variation is already 
covered by our fixed effects. Furthermore, we adjust standard errors to account for clus-
tering at the dyad level. 
Our proxy for the strength of formal contract enforcement in the importing (exporting) 
country is         (       ). For this, we employ the ICRG indicator for quality of 
government (Teorell et al. 2010). This is the mean value of several subjective measures 
provided by the International County Risk Guide: Corruption, Law and Order and Bu-
reaucratic Quality. Each of these variables covers aspects that are relevant for the quali-
ty of contract enforcement. The ICRG indicator is highly correlated with other potential 
measures, like the World Bank rule of law indicator or the Heritage Foundation’s indi-
cator for protection of property rights, but available for a broader time 
                                                 
3 This is the equation for importing country informal institutions. For the exporting country, we substitute       for 
     . 
4 The first best approach would be to year-varying exporter and importer dummies (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006), but 
due to the limited availability of our informal institutional variables, this is not feasible. Instead, we opt to vary the 
country dummies by wave of World Values Survey, which amounts to the five waves: 1981-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-
1998, 1999-2004 and 2005-2008. 
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range. Naturally, the most straightforward and objective measure for contract enforce-
ment would be the check collection variable from the Courts project (Djankov et al. 
2003), which is unfortunately not available as time-series. Note also that the ICRG indi-
cator is a much broader measure than for example the Djankov indicator. Potential prob-
lems of using such broad measures have recently been discussed (Voigt 2009). 
In order to operationalize the concept of informal institutions, we employ data from the 
World Values Survey (WVS), an extensive survey that has been carried out for repre-
sentative samples in up to 96 countries since 1981. 
To construct an importing (exporting) country’s index of uncertainty avoidance 
         (        ), we utilize a set of questions from the WVS which ask re-
spondents to identify from various listed groups (e.g. people with a criminal record, 
homosexuals etc.) those groups that they would not like to have as neighbors. We as-
sume that the more such groups were mentioned by the respondents, the more individu-
als are bound by the institution of uncertainty avoidance. Calculating the mean over all 
mentioned groups results in a variable that lies between 0 and 1, with higher values in-
dicating stronger uncertainty avoidance. In turn, this mean is averaged over all individu-
als of a country-year to result in our aggregate measures of uncertainty avoidance. 
In order to arrive at an index of universalism        (      ), we consider two re-
sponses from the WVS, both of which measure some distinct aspect of that institution: 
(1) of two otherwise identical secretaries, the more productive one should be paid a 
higher wage, (2) larger income inequalities are needed for their incentive effect. Using 
factor analysis, we construct a weighted average of the two, invert the resulting variable 
and calculate the country mean to obtain our aggregate index of universalism. 
Our measure for patriotism        is derived from two WVS questions: (1) How proud 
are you of your nationality? (2) Are you willing to fight for your country? Using factor 
analysis, we calculate a weighted average. Again, aggregation to the country-year level 
is achieved by averaging.  
Descriptive statistics for the variables employed in this study are in Table 6, pairwise 
correlations can be found in Table 7. 
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4 Estimation results 
The presentation of our estimation results will proceed in two steps: First, we consider 
average effects, i.e. marginal effects (expressed as elasticities) holding constant other 
covariates at their respective means. In order to identify potential non-linearities and in-
teractions, we will secondly consider several conditional effects plots. We will restrict 
our interpretation to parts of the respective distribution above the 50
th
 percentile. This is 
justified as we are interested in the effects of institutions when they actually matter.  
In Table 8, we present the estimated average effects. “Average” means that we hold con-
stant the values of respective other institutional variables at their means. For instance, 
the marginal effect of any importing country informal institution in the above statistical 
model is:  
   (      )
      
                                           
In order to be able to draw inferences regarding the effect of      , have to evaluate this 
expression at specific values of      ,         and        . In Table 8, we present 
the effects when inserting the respective mean. 
First of all, we can see that the standard gravity explanatory variables,   (          ) 
and       , are estimated to have a significant impact, with the expected signs: Ceteris 
paribus, more economic mass (geographic distance) is associated with more (less) bilat-
eral trade. 
4.1 Contract enforcement quality 
All equations include our proxies for exporting country and importing country contract 
enforcement quality. For the former, there is a robust picture: At the mean, higher ex-
porting country enforcement quality is associated with more bilateral trade. For import-
ing country formal institutions, we do not receive a consistent pattern. On balance, we 
find some evidence for hypothesis 1. 
4.2 Uncertainty avoidance 
At the mean, we find that neither exporting nor importing country uncertainty avoidance 
is significantly associated with trade levels (Table 8, columns 1 and 2). In order to assess 
whether this result is true for all values of uncertainty avoidance, we will look at condi-
tional effects plots. In Figure 11, we have plotted the estimated elasticity of trade with re-
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spect to exporter uncertainty avoidance for varying levels of uncertainty avoidance. We 
find that the estimated effect of exporter uncertainty avoidance on trade is positive and 
sizable, rising above 1 for very high values of uncertainty avoidance. However, this ef-
fect is estimated with considerable error, as the confidence interval includes zero. 
For a possible explanation, consider the argument that, in societies with high uncertain-
ty avoidance, it might actually encourage risky behavior aimed at reducing ambiguities 
associated with uncertainty (Hofstede et al. 2008). This argument is in line with our ob-
servation that an increase in uncertainty avoidance is associated with more trade for 
high values of uncertainty avoidance.  
Reversely, we find that importing country uncertainty avoidance is negatively associat-
ed with trade (Figure 12). From an importer’s perspective, this makes sense as highly un-
certainty avoiding individuals will trade even less if uncertainty avoidance rises. The ef-
fect is very sizeable, as the estimated elasticity almost reaches -4 for very high values of 
uncertainty avoidance.  
On balance, we find that hypothesis 2 can neither be rejected nor confirmed. Rather, our 
results point out that the effect of uncertainty avoidance on trade differs between export-
ing countries and importing countries, although the negative effect of importer uncer-
tainty avoidance would seem to be stronger than the positive effect of exporter uncer-
tainty avoidance.  
Next, we consider interactions between the effect of uncertainty avoidance and contract 
enforcement quality. In Figure 17, we can see that the effect of exporter uncertainty 
avoidance does not differ for varying levels of contract enforcement quality. We do find 
some evidence for an interaction between exporter uncertainty avoidance and importer 
contract enforcement quality (Figure 18): The stronger contract enforcement quality in 
the importing country, the weaker the positive effect of exporter uncertainty avoidance. 
Remember that we ascribed the positive sign of this effect to an ambiguity reduction 
tendency of societies with high uncertainty avoidance. This interaction is in line with 
that, as better contract enforcement quality in the importing country reduces the need to 
reduce ambiguities springing from uncertainty. 
Turning to importing country uncertainty avoidance (Figure 20), we can see that higher 
importing country contract enforcement quality leads to a stronger negative effect of 
importer uncertainty avoidance and very sizably so, with elasticities larger than -4 for 
very high levels of uncertainty avoidance. This is contrary to what we expected as ex-
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pressed in hypothesis 5. A possible explanation is that, when importer uncertainty 
avoidance and importer contract enforcement quality are both strong, cross-border ex-
change is replaced by domestic exchange, thus leading to the observation of lower bilat-
eral trade. This makes intuitive sense, as good quality of contract enforcement pertains 
primarily to domestic contracts.  
4.3 Universalism 
In Table 8 (columns 3 and 4), we find that, at the mean, universalism negatively affects 
bilateral trade. This is counter to hypothesis 3 and will be analyzed in more details in 
conditional effects plots.  
In Figure 13, we plot the effect of exporter universalism on trade. We find that the effect 
starts out slightly negative for values below the 70
th
 percentile, is insignificant above 
that and turns significantly positive for very high values of the distribution (> 90
th
 per-
centile). This implies that only very strong exporter universalism can enhance trade. 
Even when it does, the effect is under-proportional, as it never exceeds -1.  
The effect of importing country universalism is plotted in Figure 14. Here, we find that 
the effect of universalism on trade is negative, which we cannot explain but might not 
have to, as the estimated errors are very large.   
On balance, we find that there is weak evidence for hypothesis 3, as the results only per-
tain to very high levels of universalism. 
Regarding interactions, we find that the positive effect of exporter universalism does not 
differ meaningfully for varying levels of importer contract enforcement quality (Figure 
22), but with exporter contract enforcement quality (Figure 21), we do find an interesting 
interaction: The effect of universalism on trade is strictly positive for low enforcement 
quality and strictly negative for strong enforcement quality. We can interpret this find-
ing as evidence that universalism and contract enforcement are in a substitutive rather 
than a complementary relationship: For weak contract enforcement, universalism makes 
possible that would otherwise not have been realized. For strong contract enforcement, 
universalism has a very small negative effect on trade, mostly smaller than -0.5, imply-
ing it isn’t very relevant. Thus, hypothesis 7 has to be reversed. For importer universal-
ism, we do not find any meaningful interaction with contract enforcement quality. 
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4.4 Patriotism 
Looking at the effects of patriotism, we find that the effects of exporter patriotism and 
importer patriotism are actually very similar (Figure 15 and Figure 16): Stronger patriot-
ism is significantly associated with lower levels of trade. This effect is stronger the 
higher the level of patriotism. Note that the magnitude of the effect is larger for import-
ing country patriotism. This is in line with hypothesis 4. 
The only meaningful interaction we can find here is between importing country patriot-
ism and importing country enforcement quality (Figure 28). Here, we can see that the 
negative effect of importer patriotism is much more pronounced for strong importing 
country contract enforcement. For weak contract enforcement, the effect of patriotism is 
constantly close to zero. On the face of it, this is counter-intuitive and not in line with 
hypothesis 6. However, we can apply the same logic as with uncertainty avoidance: 
High levels of patriotism in conjunction with strong contract enforcement quality are 
conducive to domestic trade, apparently so much that domestic trade is substituted for 
international trade.  
5 Conclusions and Outlook 
In this paper, we have shown that some measures for specific informal institutional con-
straints are significantly associated with bilateral trade volumes. Additionally, we could 
find evidence for complementarities between formal and informal constraints. Let us 
close with some potential problems of our analysis, ways to address them and potential 
policy implications.  
One potential (empirical) problem might be selection bias: Bilateral trade data is availa-
ble for around 250,000 dyad-years, the number of observations in our analysis lies be-
low 10,000 for the most part. This is due to the fact that (1) the World Values Survey 
data are only available for a limited number of countries. One possible way to address 
in future this would be out of sample prediction of missing values for informal institu-
tions. 
What about reverse causality? Even though it has been argued that informal institutions 
are very slow to change and might thus be considered to be strictly exogenous 
(Williamson 2000), one might argue that cross-border exchange transfers values and 
norms across borders to some extent. In future research, we will address this with some 
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form of instrumental variables approach, although previous research on formal institu-
tions has shown that endogeneity is not prevalent (Ranjan and Lee 2007). 
One set of informal institutions that has been mentioned in the theoretical literature but 
which we have not been able to include here is social networks (Andersen 2008). One 
problem that agents face in cross-border transactions is hold-up: Usually, at least one of 
the parties involved in the potential trade is required to incur substantial prior costs be-
fore the actual bargaining takes place. Because these prior costs are usually rather spe-
cific, a hold-up is likely to occur, with the other side trying to exploit their improved 
bargaining position. Anticipating this, agents are less likely to enter transactions that re-
quire prior investments, leading to a lower than optimal number of transactions 
(Williamson 1979). Andersen points to the informal institution of social networks to re-
solve hold-up. When potential trading partners from different countries are part of one 
social network, this network might provide for informal contract enforcement in the 
presence of hold-up problems. Thus, informal contract enforcement by a social network 
can be either in complementary or in substitutive relation to existing formal institutions 
of contract enforcement: the former when formal contract enforcement is strong, the lat-
ter when formal contract enforcement is weak. Furthermore, social networks might pro-
vide for risk diversification mechanisms especially relevant in cross-border transactions. 
On balance, the theoretical literature suggests that, the more social networks there are 
between individuals of two countries, the more transactions we should expect across the 
borders of these two countries. One big step for future research in this area is definitely 
to come up with cross-country measure for the number and strength of social networks 
across borders (Baghdadi and Cheptea 2008; Petropoulou 2005).  
Another set of informal institutions that we have not considered in this work is religious 
institutions. In future work, we would like to include religiosity as well as specific reli-
gious norms in our analysis of bilateral trade (Lewer and Van den Berg 2007).  
What policy implications can we draw from our empirical results? First and foremost, 
our results are descriptive ones: We describe whether and in which way informal insti-
tutions matter for bilateral trade. As for normative implications, one could suggest that 
in cases where trade could function well given the formal institutional environment, but 
is hampered by informal institutions such as patriotism or uncertainty avoidance, the use 
of international trade intermediaries might help.  
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6 Tables 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics (pooled cross-section) 
Variable Observations Mean Median SD Min Max 
  (          ) 10509 17.846 17.887 1.421 12.862 21.487 
       10509 8.602 8.791 0.810 4.088 9.892 
       
        10509 0.707 0.722 0.208 0.160 1.000 
        10509 0.566 0.556 0.213 0.060 1.000 
       
         10509 0.325 0.294 0.120 0.076 0.822 
         8458 0.407 0.397 0.152 0.076 0.822 
       
       9353 0.058 0.079 0.290 -0.774 0.798 
       8076 0.001 0.001 0.321 -0.774 0.798 
       
       8664 -0.014 0.025 0.329 -1.253 0.674 
       7443 0.031 0.099 0.453 -1.253 0.674 
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Table 7: Pairwise correlations (with p-values) 
   (          )                        
     
         -0.2813 -0.1326 -0.4267 0.0943 
 0 0 0 0 
         -0.3623 0.006 0.0129 -0.4721 
 0 0.5788 0.2372 0 
       0.1576 0.1033 0.2077 0.0054 
 0 0 0 0.5996 
       0.1161 -0.0448 -0.0158 0.2864 
 0 0.0001 0.1562 0 
       -0.1314 0.1427 -0.1323 0.0638 
 0 0 0 0 
       -0.3128 -0.0879 0.0391 -0.2909 
 0 0 0.0007 0 
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Table 8: Average marginal effects of informal institutions on bilateral trade 
  Dependent variable:   (      ) 
Vector Variable Uncertainty avoidance Universalism Patriotism 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
           
  (          ) 0.964*** 1.136*** 0.837*** 1.060*** 0.851*** 1.023*** 
 (0.0572) (0.0620) (0.0598) (0.0618) (0.0602) (0.0614) 
       -0.991*** -0.948*** -1.073*** -0.897*** -0.910*** -0.922*** 
 (0.0434) (0.0461) (0.0455) (0.0475) (0.0451) (0.0474) 
        
        0.880** 0.743*** 1.439*** 1.057*** 0.765*** 1.173*** 
 (0.366) (0.230) (0.240) (0.226) (0.212) (0.222) 
        0.285 -0.916** 0.801*** -0.556** 0.757*** -0.924*** 
 (0.221) (0.386) (0.227) (0.283) (0.225) (0.239) 
         0.164      
 (0.264)      
          0.343     
  (0.249)     
         -0.115***    
   (0.0127)    
          -0.000689*   
    (0.000370)   
           0.0253***  
     (0.00274)  
            -0.0326*** 
      (0.00599) 
        
Observations 10,509 8,458 9,353 8,076 8,664 7,443 
R-squared 0.674 0.644 0.682 0.631 0.662 0.617 
Estimation was carried out with Ordinary Least Squares. For the vector           , reported numbers are simple coefficients. For the vector        , reported numbers are average conditional elastici-
ties holding constant all other covariates at their respective means. Dyad cluster adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. All specifications include full sets of time-varying 
exporter and importer dummies as well as year dummies. 
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7 Figures1 
Figure 11: The effect of exporter uncertainty avoidance on trade 
 
Figure 12: The effect of importer uncertainty avoidance on trade 
  
                                                 
1 Figures 1 through 6 also plot the 99% confidence interval. 
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Figure 13: The effect of exporter universalism on trade 
 
 
Figure 14: The effect of importer universalism on trade 
 
 
-.
5
0
.5
1
1
.5
e
s
ti
m
a
te
d
 e
la
s
ti
c
it
y
40 60 80 100
percentiles of a_wvs_ineq1
-1
.5
-1
-.
5
0
e
s
ti
m
a
te
d
 e
la
s
ti
c
it
y
40 60 80 100
percentiles of b_wvs_ineq1
 75 
 
Figure 15: The effect of exporter patriotism on trade 
 
 
Figure 16: The effect of importer patriotism on trade 
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Figure 17: Interaction between exporter uncertainty avoidance and exporter contract enforcement 
quality 
 
 
Figure 18: Interaction between exporter uncertainty avoidance and importer contract enforcement 
quality 
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Figure 19: Interaction between importer uncertainty avoidance and exporter contract enforcement 
quality 
 
 
Figure 20: Interaction between importer uncertainty avoidance and importer contract enforcement 
quality 
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Figure 21: Interaction between exporter universalism and exporter contract enforcement quality 
 
Figure 22: Interaction between exporter universalism and importer contract enforcement quality 
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Figure 23: Interaction between importer universalism and exporter contract enforcement quality 
 
Figure 24: Interaction between importer universalism and importer contract enforcement quality 
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Figure 25: Interaction between exporter patriotism and exporter contract enforcement quality 
 
Figure 26: Interaction between exporter patriotism and importer contract enforcement quality 
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Figure 27: Interaction between importer patriotism and exporter contract enforcement quality 
 
Figure 28: Interaction between importer patriotism and importer contract enforcement quality 
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Does Arbitration Blossom when State Courts are Bad? 
1 Introduction 
Most economists, even those who are very critical of the state, have traditionally 
agreed that one of the classical functions of the state is to provide an impartial ju-
diciary that has the function not only to punish criminal behavior, but also to offer 
impartial third-party dispute resolution to parties who quarrel about the interpreta-
tion of contracts voluntarily entered into. This conventional wisdom can be traced 
back at least to Adam Smith (1776). In a seminal paper, Landes and Posner (1979) 
challenged that wisdom: they separate the private-good aspect of adjudication (the 
decision of the particular case at hand) from the public-good aspect of adjudica-
tion (the development of law via its interpretation) and conclude that private pro-
vision of adjudication is possible as long as the private-good aspect prevailed. 
Over the last couple of decades, the notion of alternative dispute resolution 
(“ADR”) has received quite a boost. Based on the publicity that ADR receives, 
one gets the impression that ever more conflicts are adjudicated by non-state 
courts.1 A couple of questions immediately suggest themselves: Is this a real trend 
that can be substantiated by hard numbers? If so, what are the reasons for the rise 
of ADR? In countries in which ADR is strong, is it strong across the board or con-
fined to specific sectors, the size of the conflicting firms, the likelihood of contin-
ued interaction, etc.? And: Is ADR particularly strong where the state judiciary is 
particularly weak, e.g. because it takes too much time, the judiciary is perceived 
as corrupt or as dependent on other branches of government, etc.? 
Answers to these questions might be highly policy-relevant: From previous re-
search (Feld and Voigt 2003, 2006), it is known that the quality of the judiciary 
and in particular its factual independence are crucial for the growth prospects of a 
country. If it is impossible to substantially improve the quality of the state judici-
ary within a short period of time, then the creation of the preconditions for suc-
cessful ADR might be a viable policy alternative. 
We conjecture that ADR is in high demand when state dispute resolution (SDR) is 
bad and test this conjecture in a cross-country setting. Until now, most empirical 
studies dealing with ADR have been case studies dealing with single countries.2 
                                                 
1 Reliable numbers are, however, awfully hard to get. Serious estimates of the percentage of interna-
tional contracts containing a mandatory arbitration clause range between 20 and 95% (see Voigt 
2008a for precise references). 
2  To name just a few: Hendley et al. (2000) and Frye and Zhuravskaya (2000) deal with non-state dis-
pute resolution in Russia. McMillan and Woodruff (2000) analyze the relationship between the 
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This paper adds to the literature by dealing with the interdependencies between 
SDR and ADR on a cross-country level for the first time. It turns out that the low-
er the perceived quality of SDR, the less frequently conflicting firms resort to 
SDR. Turning away from SDR occurs particularly often when the courts are not 
perceived as fair und impartial, as honest or uncorrupt, and as consistent in their 
decisions. Second, in states that have created the preconditions for non-state dis-
pute resolution, businesspeople resort significantly less often to state courts. We 
interpret this result as evidence in favor of the substitution hypothesis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next Section presents a number 
of theoretical arguments on possible relationships between SDR and ADR. Our 
approach to empirically assess the relative importance of ADR is described in 
Section 3. The estimation approach and the results are presented in Section 4. Sec-
tion 5 concludes and discusses possible questions for future research. 
2 Some Theory 
2.1 Defining Various Forms of Dispute Resolution 
We propose to analytically separate state dispute resolution from non-state dispute 
resolution. SDR takes place if a dispute is resolved by a state servant in this ca-
pacity3 relying on the power of the state to enforce its decisions even against the 
will of those concerned and by threatening the use of force. There are many forms 
of dispute resolution not carried out by the state: arbitration, mediation, concilia-
tion, and so forth. In order to emphasize the dichotomy between disputes resolved 
by the state and disputes resolved by other mechanisms, all other mechanisms will 
be referred to as non-SDR here. 
In non-SDR, binding decisions can also be produced by experts who are not law-
yers4. Conflicting parties sometimes prefer “issue experts” when they believe that 
the traditions in their trade are important, but complex and hard for non-experts to 
comprehend. 
                                                                                                                                                        
quality of public- and private-order dispute resolution in Vietnam, Russia, the Ukraine, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Poland. Galanter and Krishnan (2004) is a careful study of Indian “people’s courts” 
(Lok Adalats). Barfield (2006) describes the relationship between state courts and ADR in contem-
porary northern Afghanistan. Henrysson and Joireman (2007) emphasize the cost of informal 
property rights adjudication in Kenya. Schönfelder (2007) analyzes the unexpectedly low use of 
non-state dispute resolution in Bulgaria and Croatia. 
3  State judges who serve as arbitrators over the weekend are, hence, not counted as producing SDR. 
4  We implicitly assume that the outcome of non-SDR is consistently applied by courts. Niblett (2009) 
analyzes the case of inconsistent contract enforcement. 
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2.2 A Matter of Choice 
Imagine a person interested in exchanging some fairly complex goods with anoth-
er person in his home country.5 If they are located in a country with a highly de-
veloped institutional system, one would suppose they negotiate a contract that 
they fix in writing, probably relying on the help of lawyers. Both parties might as-
sume that in case of a conflict, after some bilateral negotiation period, the natural 
thing is to turn to a state court for conflict resolution.6 Yet, state courts might be 
corrupt, subject to direct government influence, very slow, or very costly. Unreli-
able state courts are thus equivalent to high transaction costs7. Our actors will thus 
seek alternatives with lower transaction costs. Representatives of the New Institu-
tional Economics have identified quite a few mechanisms that are used to econo-
mize on transactions costs: (1) the actors could (unilaterally) invest in their reputa-
tion – and make the loss of it very costly; (2) they could (bilaterally) exchange 
hostages to make the contract self-enforcing; (3) they could decide to set up a 
common firm (i.e. internalize the transaction); (4) they could decide to search for 
a more reliable (trilateral) conflict resolution, or (5) they could realize that trans-
action costs outweigh expected rents of the deal and forego an exchange altogeth-
er. 
Here, we are interested in their choice between SDR and non-SDR (i.e., the 
choice between the default mechanism and option (4)). But it is important to keep 
in mind that there are more choices. Option (5) is likely to be most detrimental to 
the development of an economy, the attractiveness of option (3) depends on cor-
porate law, finance, the characteristics of the exchanged goods, the recurrence of 
the contractual relationship etc. To simplify the argument, here we will deal only 
with the choice between SDR and Non-SDR. The simple conjecture to be devel-
oped is that if the expected utility connected with non-SDR is higher than the ex-
pected utility of SDR, then actors will favor non-SDR over SDR. Their choice 
                                                 
5  We hence refrain from analyzing international arbitration, which would imply additional complexi-
ty. 
6  Williamson (1985, 20, 32): “Most studies of exchange assume that efficacious rules of law regarding 
contract disputes are in place and are applied by the courts in an informed, sophisticated, and low-
cost way … the facts, however, disclose otherwise. Most disputes, including many that under cur-
rent rules could be brought to a court, are resolved by avoidance, self-help and the like … (And) 
because the efficacy of court ordering is problematic, contract execution falls heavily on (govern-
ance structures).” 
7  See e.g. Gennaioli (2008) for a model in which judicial idiosyncrasies lead to welfare losses. A more 
general treatment of the effects of inefficiencies in judicial procedures can be found in Djankov et 
al. (2003). 
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will thus hinge upon quality and costs of both SDR and non-SDR.8 The next sub-
section lists a number of factors conjectured to determine the (perceived) quality 
of SDR. For the moment, we assume that both the expected utility of non-SDR 
and the number of transactions are exogenously fixed. This implies that the lower 
the quality of SDR, the higher the expected demand for non-SDR. The first hy-
pothesis to be developed hence assumes that SDR and non-SDR are substitutes for 
each other.9 Later subsections deal with the preconditions and incentives for sup-
plying non-SDR. 
2.3 State Dispute Resolution and Non-SDR as Substitutes 
Suppose that the quality and costs of non-SDR are exogenously given. Then the 
choice between SDR and non-SDR is determined by the quality and costs of SDR. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the following aspects determine the choice be-
tween SDR and non-SDR: 
(1) The number of procedural steps that need to be complied with in order to 
produce a binding decision (“procedural formalism”).10 If these require-
ments are perceived as redundant and not contributing to the quality of judi-
cial decision-making, but are time-consuming and costly nevertheless, non-
SDR might appear relatively more attractive. But if procedural formalism is 
perceived as important in producing fair and reliable decisions, non-SDR 
might not be an attractive alternative. 
(2) The perceived expertise of SDR judges; if state judges are perceived as 
highly qualified and having understanding for the necessities of actors who 
compete in the market, this will contribute to the quality of SDR. SDR judg-
es are experts in legal procedures but not necessarily in the specific issues 
being disputed. The more specialized the judges of a country, the higher 
their expertise can be expected to be. An indirect but straightforward way to 
                                                 
8  For simplicity, we assume that the parties to a bilateral contract either both prefer SDR or both pre-
fer non-SDR. It could, of course, very well be that one prefers SDR and the other non-SDR. To 
keep things simple, we will not deal with this possibility. 
9  In microeconomics, substitutes are conventionally described via their price quantity relations (posi-
tive cross price elasticity). Here we assume that lower quality implies higher prices. If the quality of 
SDR falls, its implicit price rises, and we would expect more people to choose non-SDR. Comple-
ments can be described in a similar fashion: If the quality of SDR falls, its implicit price rises. This 
would lead to reduced demand in non-SDR. 
10  Djankov et al. (2003) interpret a high degree of procedural formalism as indicating the attempt of 
government to remain in charge of the outcomes produced by the judiciary. Hayo and Voigt (2008) 
argue that a high degree of procedural formalism can also be interpreted as an attempt to make the 
judges play by the rules, which would, in turn, increase legal certainty. 
 90 
 
take this into account is to use the number of highest courts a country has as 
a proxy for the degree of specialization among the judges of the country.11 
(3) The perceived level of corruption within the judiciary. Corruption among 
judges means that the higher willingness to pay for a decision might domi-
nate other criteria, such as having complied with a contract. Contracts hence 
become relatively meaningless in such an environment. If partners are inter-
ested in the contents of their contract and corruption within the state judici-
ary is perceived as high, then non-SDR appears relatively more attractive. 
(4) The perceived degree of judicial independence; lack of corruption in the ju-
diciary refers to independence from the conflicting parties whereas inde-
pendence refers to the absence of pressure by members of the other gov-
ernment branches. Judicial independence appears particularly relevant in 
cases in which the government has a stake. If the judiciary’s independence 
from the other branches of government is perceived as low, then non-SDR is 
relatively more attractive. 
(5) The perceived degree of judicial accountability; judges are supposed to im-
plement legislation. If the judicial system of a country is able to create 
mechanisms that make judges implement the law, then judicial decision-
making is expected to be predictable. Being able to form expectations that 
have a high chance of turning out to be correct is important in business. A 
high degree of accountability is thus presumed to make SDR more attrac-
tive.12 
(6) The monetary costs of using SDR; the lower the monetary costs of SDR, the 
more attractive is SDR, ceteris paribus. 
(7) The time costs of using SDR; time is frequently of the essence in business, 
so arriving at final decisions fast can be a big asset in favor of SDR.13 
Some of these factors reinforce each other: if judicial corruption is low, then one 
would, e.g., expect accountability or predictability to be rather high. Other factors 
need to be traded off against each other: a high degree of procedural formalism or 
                                                 
11  For a more detailed discussion and empirical test, see Voigt (2011). An alternative tack on this issue 
could be to have a look at the career pattern of SDR judges: if they are made judges very early in 
life, the chances that they have gathered some of their own experience with having to compete on 
the market (e.g. as lawyers) appear to be lower than if they are appointed later in life. Yet another 
alternative could be to take explicit account of the number of “issue experts” represented at special 
chambers of state courts. In Germany, e.g., so-called Wirtschaftskammern (“economic chambers”) are 
primarily staffed with issue experts. 
12  Yet, a case getting to court is sufficient evidence for incompatible expectations of the conflicting 
parties. 
13  As soon as a case is with a court, the party expecting to lose might have incentives to slow down 
the process. Whether and to what degree this is possible depends inter alia on procedural law. 
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accountability is likely to be costly in terms of both money and time. A number of 
implications follow from these observations: the expected utility from the use of 
SDR also depends on the kind of exchange the interacting partners want to carry 
out. If it is highly complex and expensive, the expertise of the judges might be 
key. If, on the other hand, it is the exchange of a commodity, speed and monetary 
costs might be weighted more heavily. This means that it appears desirable to take 
into account (i) the sector of the parties, (ii) the size of the contract in monetary 
terms, but possibly also for (iii) the size of the interacting firms. It further means 
that it is desirable, though not feasible, to keep the determinants of SDR quality 
apart and not to lump them into one overall indicator.14 
We argue that the perceived quality of SDR is determined by these variables. 
Formulated as hypothesis #1a: The lower the perceived quality of SDR, the more 
frequently will non-SDR be used, ceteris paribus. 
This formulation assumes a given quality of non-SDR. Yet, the frequency with 
which non-SDR is used will also depend on its perceived quality. Prima facie, the 
perceived quality of non-SDR is expected to be determined by exactly the same 
factors. Formulated as hypothesis #1b: Under an exogenously given quality of 
SDR, the number of transactions structured under non-SDR will be higher, the 
higher the perceived quality of non-SDR. 
Djankov et al. (2003) interpret a high degree of procedural formalism as equiva-
lent to a high degree of interventionism of the sovereign into judicial decision-
making. A high degree of formalism should, hence, make SDR less attractive. 
They further find that civil-law countries systematically have a higher degree of 
formalism than common-law countries. In combination, these two statements can 
be formulated as hypothesis #2: C.p., use of non-SDR will be more frequent in civ-
il-law than in common-law countries. 
Now suppose that many potential contractors perceive the degree of procedural 
formalism implemented in SDR as too high. It is straightforward to assume that in 
such a situation, entrepreneurs will try to satisfy the demand for less formal con-
flict resolution. Yet, conflicting parties might still be interested in getting an en-
forceable award. Decisions by arbitration organizations are frequently enforceable 
via state courts. This is not the case with regard to other forms of non-SDR, hence 
  
                                                 
14  Lumping might, however, be necessary out of more pragmatic econometric reasons: given that the 
number of observations is limited, an overall indicator helps save degrees of freedom. Moreover, to 
the degree that variables reinforce each other, using an overall indicator might dispense with the 
problem of multicollinearity. 
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 our emphasis on this more fine-grained delineation.15 Before non-state courts can 
issue decisions that are enforceable even in state courts, the state needs to create 
the respective preconditions. 
The procedural law needs to allow for the possibility to have non-state courts de-
cide upon conflicts. Most likely, the procedural law will contain a number of min-
imum requirements that need to be met before enforceable awards can be issued. 
They can refer to necessary procedures, the qualifications of arbitrators, and so 
forth. If arbitral awards are not automatically enforceable, the resources needed in 
order to make them enforceable need to be taken into account (these include costs 
in terms of time and money but also the probability of finally getting the award).16 
States can signal their general attitude toward non-SDR by ratifying a number of 
international conventions or passing domestic arbitration legislation. These are the 
U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(the New York Convention) that makes awards issued by foreign non-SDR courts 
enforceable in their countries. Further, the Convention on the International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) gives private investors who be-
lieve that a member state has not complied with its contractual obligations the 
possibility of a trial against that state. Members thus explicitly choose to have 
their behavior monitored by third parties. Contracting states to ICSID are required 
by the Convention to enforce ICSID arbitral awards as res judicata in their own 
territory. Finally, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) agreed on a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in 
1985. As of November 2007, more than 51 states had passed legislation based on 
the Model Law.17 Given that the contracting parties are already familiar with the 
Model Law, transaction costs of relying on non-SDR within these states – in par-
ticular with regard to international transactions – should be lower than in states 
that do not have explicit legislation dealing with arbitration or countries that have 
arbitration legislation that is not based on the Model Law of UNCITRAL. 
                                                 
15  The possibility that weak states might not even secure the enforcement of SDR decisions only rein-
forces the complementarity consideration. 
16  There is a long discussion whether ADR can work even in the absence of the explicit backing by 
the state judicial system. Landes and Posner (1979, 247f.) argue that non-SDR depends on the en-
forceability of awards with state courts, whereas Benson (1988, 656f.) argues that non-SDR func-
tioned in the US even before 1920, when a law of the State of New York made arbitration awards 
enforceable in front of state courts. Benson emphasizes that, historically, the threat of terminating 
business relationships has been sufficient to ensure compliance with arbitral awards. 
17  To be exact: 51 states plus the Hong Kong and the Macau regions of China, Scotland and Bermuda 
as part of the U.K., and 6 U.S. states 
(http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.ht
ml). 
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Formulated as hypothesis #3: The more of these conventions states have ratified, 
the more frequently should non-SDR be used in their countries, c.p. 
In the last subsection, the hypothesis that the use of non-SDR should be more fre-
quent in civil-law countries was advanced. In light of the considerations devel-
oped here, this hypothesis needs to be reformulated. Assuming that civil-law 
countries have chosen a high degree of procedural formalism not only in SDR but 
also in non-SDR, the modified hypothesis #2(mod) is: C.p., there will be no sig-
nificant difference in the use of non-SDR between civil-law and common-law 
countries. 
3 Estimation Approach and Data Description 
To test whether low quality SDR is correlated with high use of non-SDR, a meas-
ure for the use of non-SDR is needed as dependent variable. On the right hand 
side, a measure for the quality of SDR (i.e. its implicit price) is necessary. Given 
other potentially relevant covariates in the Z-vector, the relationship we would 
like to investigate looks like this: 
 ,nonSDR SDRi i iQuant f Qual Z  (1) 
Unfortunately, we will not be able to estimate this equation, because we are not 
aware of any measure for the quantity of non-SDR across countries. Ascertaining 
this number is close to impossible: Often, dispute resolution does not take place 
within formal organizations, but conflicts are settled by village elders or clergy 
and no statistics are kept at all. But even numbers from formal arbitration organi-
zations are extremely difficult to obtain. In many countries, it is not only one or-
ganization that offers non-SDR services, but a number of them; identifying a 
complete picture is thus difficult. Most of the organizations offering non-SDR do 
not publish statistics; some might not even keep any. Definitions of what exactly 
constitutes “arbitration” greatly vary between countries, further increasing the dif-
ficulty of comparing. 
Because reliable objective data are unavailable, subjective data are used here in-
stead. The Investment Climate Surveys of the World Bank have been carried out 
in some 50 countries and are based on the answers of more than 30,000 entrepre-
neurs. One variable contains information on the percentage of payment disputes 
that companies resolve by court action. The exact wording of the question is: 
“Over the last 2 years, what percent of your establishment's disputes over pay-
ments were resolved by court action?”  
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For a number of reasons, this can only be a crude approximation of the left-hand-
side variable of interest. In particular, we do not know what particular means 
those who did not resolve their payment disputes via courts used. Additionally, we 
only have the percentage and not the absolute numbers, implying that a direct test 
of the two competing views is impossible. Because the sample distribution of this 
variable is skewed toward 100, we recode it into a binary variable NonSDRij, tak-
ing on value one if firm i in country j states to have settled all of its payment dis-
putes out of court, and value zero otherwise. Then, we can specify:  
   1| , SDR nonSDRij ij j ij j ij jP NonSDR Z M F Qual Qual Z M        (2) 
for Nj ...1  countries and jni ...1  firms within those countries
18. The probabil-
ity that a firm will prefer to settle its payment disputes outside of court is thus a 
non-linear function F of firm-level characteristics Zij and country-level controls 
Mj. We assign F to be the normal cumulative distribution function and estimate 
the relationship with maximum likelihood. 
We now move to the data we use for the right-hand-side (RHS) variables. Note 
that some of our RHS variables are measured at the firm-level, denoted by a dou-
ble index ij, and some are measured at the country-level, denoted by a single in-
dex j. 
Concerning the quality of SDR, SDRijQual , we employ both a subjective and an ob-
jective indicator of SDR quality. We begin with the subjective indicator generated 
as part of the Investment Climate Surveys of the World Bank.  
ijConfidence : More than 30,000 entrepreneurs around the world were asked what 
level of confidence they had in their judiciary system. More precisely, the variable 
used here reflects the degree to which firms agree with the statement “I am confi-
dent that the judicial system will enforce my contractual and property rights in 
business disputes”, ranging from 1 (fully disagree) to 6 (fully agree).19  
                                                 
18   Note the inherently hierarchical nature of our data: Firm level observations are nested within indus-
tries within countries. To account for this, we can estimate multi-level regressions which allow for 
some country- and industry-level randomness in intercepts and coefficients. The results are not af-
fected by this, however. 
19  We have to assume that respondents do not consider non-SDR part of “the judicial system”. The 
survey that the World Economic Forum carries out annually contains a related variable that has, 
however, a different emphasis. The variable “Efficiency of the legal framework” asks for consent to 
the statement “The legal framework in your country for private businesses to settle disputes and 
challenge the legality of government actions and/or regulations.” Whereas the World Bank variable 
is interested in private law disputes, the focus of this variable is on disputes regarding public law. 
Assuming that the state as an actor in domestic affairs is not ready to opt out of SDR, low levels of 
consent to this statement should not lead to higher use of non-SDR. 
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Our objective indicator is taken from the LexMundi project by Simeon Djankov 
and co-authors (Djankov et al., 2003): jChecks  inversely
20 measures the average 
number of days it takes in a county to collect on a bounced check. Using this vari-
able is especially fitting as our dependent variable, percentage of disputes re-
solved out of court, is concerned with disputes over payment issues.  
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any indicators proxying for the quality of non-
SDR. This implies that no coefficient for the nonSDRjQual  variable can be estimated. 
Devising such an indicator is definitely a desideratum. 
We move on to the presentation of our control variables. The choice between SDR 
and non-SDR could also be influenced by (1) state support for non-SDR, (2) the 
factual supply of formal non-SDR, and (3) the knowledge that dispute resolution 
other than SDR exists. We propose to control for state support by a synthetic vari-
able composed of three dummy variables, namely (i) ratification of the New York 
Convention, (ii) having passed UNCITRAL model law domestically, and (iii) 
membership in ICSID.21 The composite indicator jArbitration  can accordingly 
take on values between 0 and 3.22 
Legal origins ( jCommonLaw ) are taken into account in order to be able to test 
hypotheses 2 and 2mod empirically. 
It cannot be excluded that autocrats prefer to keep as many things as possible un-
der their control, including conflict resolution. We hence also control for a coun-
try’s democracy ranking jPolityIV , drawing on the Polity IV indicator that ranks 
countries between -10 (perfect autocracy) and 10 (perfect democracy). 
The factual supply of non-SDR is almost as difficult to ascertain as its factual use. 
Non-SDR will primarily be offered by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
or alternatively by business associations. We thus assume that the potential supply 
of non-SDR increases in the number of NGOs and business associations, respec-
tively. For lack of a better proxy, the number of existing NGOs ( jNGO ) and the 
number of existing business associations ( jBA ) in a country are thus used as con-
trols for non-SDR supply. 
                                                 
20  In order to avoid confusion, we invert this variable, so that higher values are associated with higher 
quality of SDR, as with the first indicator. 
21  Of course, this variable mainly captures state support for arbitration of conflicts in international 
transactions. We thus have to assume a strong correlation with the latent state support for arbitra-
tion in any transaction. 
22  Potential users need not necessarily perceive a state’s promise to make non-SDR possible by ratify-
ing these conventions as a credible commitment. Such complications will, however, not be dealt 
with here. 
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Finally, firms – and others – can demand non-SDR only if they are aware of this 
tool to resolve disputes. Differences in the available information about the supply 
of non-SDR thus need to be controlled for. We do this by controlling for  
(1) a dummy for Central and Eastern Europe ( jCEE ); based on the assumption 
that the state used to be omnipresent in this region until two decades ago, non-
SDR is expected to be used less than in other regions;  
(2) the degree of an economy’s openness, proxied by the Frankel & Romer trade 
instrument ( jerFrankelRom ), 
(3) a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm has holdings or operations in other coun-
tries and 0 otherwise (Internationalij) and 
(4) firm size ( ijFirmSize ), which is a categorical variable taking on values from 1 
(small) to 3 (large). The larger a firm is and the more international contacts the 
firm has, the more likely it is that it has already faced and considered the option of 
opting out of the national law. However, regarding Internationalij and FirmSizeij, 
large and internationally operating firms are also more likely to be politically in-
fluential and well connected. If these connections enable the firm to get a favora-
ble hearing in state courts, it could be more likely to resort to SDR. There is thus 
no clear cut hypothesis regarding Internationalij. We partly control for this trans-
mission mechanism by including Stateij, the percentage of the firm owned by the 
state. 
In addition, we control for per capita income ( jGDP ). Given that high-income 
countries generally enjoy high-quality SDR, we expect this variable to have a 
negative coefficient.  
We also control for the degree of a firm’s informality ( ijInformality ). Informal 
firms are not registered and therefore refrain from drawing on the formal institu-
tions supplied in their country. Informality can have many reasons such as the dif-
ficulty of becoming formal, a high degree of regulation, high tax rates, and so 
forth. But the informality option is also associated with costs, namely unrealized 
economies of scale, not being able to rely on “official” financing, and so on. In 
our context, deficient quality of SDR should not by itself be a reason to remain in-
formal because entrepreneurs can decide to play by the substantive legislation of 
their country and then opt in favor of non-SDR in case of a conflict. Connecting 
the degree of observed informality with the reliance on SDR thus allows us to dis-
entangle the reasons for non-SDR: if both the substance of the rules and their en-
forcement are perceived as weak, then we would expect firms to remain informal 
altogether (low level of non-SDR). If only the enforcement is weak – but the sub-
stantive rules are adequate – then we should expect to see a low level of infor-
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mality coupled with a high level of non-SDR. A negative effect of informality on 
non-SDR could then be interpreted as evidence for such a transmission channel. 
Table 9 contains the descriptive statistics on the relevant variables used here. Their 
exact definitions as well as their sources can be found in Appendix 2. 
4 Estimation Results and Possible Interpretations 
In Table 11, we regress NonSDRij on our two indicators for SDR quality, various 
firm-level characteristics, country-level controls and industry dummies.23 The ef-
fects we report are conditional marginal effects holding constant the other covari-
ates at their respective means because the simple estimated coefficients are not 
meaningful by themselves in probit estimations24. In columns (1) through (8), we 
include country controls one by one while including all country controls at once in 
column (9).  
We find a statistically significant (mean conditional) effect of both our subjective, 
firm-level indicator Confidenceij and our objective, country-level indicator 
Checksj on NonSDRij in all six specifications. This provides evidence that, ceteris 
paribus, both firm-level perceived SDR quality as well as aggregate SDR quality 
are associated with a higher probability of a firm choosing to settle payment dis-
putes out of court. These results indicate a complementary relationship between 
state dispute resolution and non-state dispute resolution, rather than the substitu-
tive relationship we had hypothesized (hypothesis #1a).  
We can thus conclude that firms turn to alternative dispute resolution not to es-
cape bad state dispute resolution but rather to “fill gaps” in otherwise satisfactory 
state dispute resolution. The question of non-SDR vs. SDR is thus not a simple 
matter of choice. 
The marginal effect of Confidenceij lies between 1% and 1.6%, implying that a 
firm with full confidence in the judicial system is 5 to 8% more likely than a firm 
with no confidence at all to engage in alternative dispute resolution. The marginal 
effect of Checksj lies between 0.018% and 0.035%, implying that a change of one 
standard deviation in a country’s SDR quality (which is 260) is associated with a 
4.7 to 9.1% higher probability of a firm choosing non-SDR.  
                                                 
23  Adding country dummies results in near-perfect collinearity between country dummies and coun-
try-level controls, which is why we only include industry dummies. 
24  To prevent the misrepresentation of countries from which there was an above (below) average 
number of responses, the observations were weighed by the number of firms per country. Further, 
by controlling for clustering within individual countries, we relax the otherwise required assumption 
of independence of observations within and across countries. 
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Because the reported conditional marginal effects hold constant the respective 
other indicators of SDR quality, it is useful to plot the marginal effect for different 
values of these other variables25. This allows us to draw inferences regarding in-
teractions.  
In Figure 29, we can see that – holding constant all other covariates – there is some 
interaction between Confidenceij and Checksj: The marginal effect of Confidenceij 
on the probability of non-SDR use is higher the lower the value of country level 
SDR quality Checksj, implying that the gap-filling function of non-SDR is more 
pronounced when SDR quality is lower. This difference is however rather small 
for the most part of the distribution of Checksj. 
Looking at the firm-level controls, we can see that the effect of ijInformality  is 
robustly estimated to be insignificant. Thus, we cannot find evidence in favor of 
the transmission channel conjectured above. For ijFirmSize , we observe a signifi-
cantly negative and sizable effect: Large firms ( 3ijFirmSize  ) are characterized 
by up to 26% lower probability of using non-SDR than small firms (
1ijFirmSize  ). We can thus support the notion that non-SDR is more relevant for 
smaller firms. However, we find that marginal effect of Confidenceij on non-SDR 
is 2% higher for large firms than for small firms (Figure 30). Thus, for large firms, 
the gap-filling function of non-SDR seems to be more important. 
In order to test hypothesis #2 and hypothesis #3, we add jCommonLaw  (columns 
1 and 9) and jnArbitratio  (Table 11, columns 2 and 9) to the model. We find a 
significantly positive effect of jCommonLaw : Firms in common law countries are 
characterized by a 21 to 22 % higher probability of using non-SDR than firms in 
civil law countries. Hypothesis #2 is thus rejected. The picture is different for Ar-
bitrationj, for which we do not find any statistically significant effect. The number 
of ratified arbitration conventions does not seem to matter for the firm-level set-
tlement decision.  
Looking at the remaining firm level controls, we observe a significant and nega-
tive effect of both Stateij and Internationalij. A one standard deviation change in 
the percentage that a firm is owned by the state is associated with a (0.13 to 0.19% 
* 20%) 2.6 to 3.8% lower probability of non-SDR. Firms with holdings in other 
countries are characterized by a 4.5 to 6% lower probability of preferring non-
SDR. The same result cannot be obtained when considering the openness of the 
economy as a whole: FrankelRomerj is not significantly associated with the prob-
ability of firms using non-SDR (Table 11, columns 8 and 9). However, we do find 
                                                 
25  These plots are based on estimation (9). This is the specification with the highest Pseudo-R2 and 
the most conservative estimate of the marginal effect. 
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that firms in Central and Eastern European countries are characterized by an 18 to 
20% lower probability of non-SDR (Table 11, columns 7 and 9). All these results 
(with the exception of FrankelRomerj) are in line with the conjecture that large 
firms with more international contacts and government ties are less likely to en-
gage in non-SDR. 
Let us move on to the remaining country controls: We do not find any indication 
that the country level democracy score PolityIVij is related to firm-level use of 
non-SDR (Table 11, columns 3 and 9). This leads us to conclude that, ceteris pari-
bus, the firm level calculus on whether to use non-SDR does not depend on 
whether the country it is located in is democratic or not. 
Interestingly, our proxies for the factual supply of non-SDR (NGOj and BAj) do 
not exhibit any robust significant effect on the probability of non-SDR (Table 11, 
columns 4, 5 and 9), implying either that non-SDR demand dominates supply 
(firms who choose to settle disputes out of court will find a way to do so) or that 
there might be a problem with the validity of these proxies in measuring non-SDR 
supply. 
Contrary to our expectations, there does not seem to be a significant effect of per 
capita income on the probability of non-SDR use (Table 11, columns 6 and 9). This 
might be due to the other country-level covariates already capturing most of the 
relevant variation in SDR quality, corroborated by the rather high bivariate corre-
lations between GDPj and other country controls (Table 10). 
5 Conclusions and Outlook 
What policy recommendations can be drawn from our results? The preferences of 
the more than 30,000 business people that are the basis of these results seem to 
indicate that higher perceived quality of SDR leads to higher use of non-SDR. The 
reverse causal direction (higher use of non-SDR leads to higher SDR quality) 
seems very unlikely and would have to be addressed by an instrumental variables 
approach.  
In line with the subjective results, we also observe that objective, country-level 
SDR quality is associated with a higher probability of non-SDR use. These results 
imply that, objectively, SDR and non-SDR act as complements. 
Based on the observation that legal procedures in civil law countries are character-
ized by a higher degree of formalism (Djankov et al 2003), we conjectured that 
firms in common law countries are less likely to settle disputes out of court than 
firms in civil law countries. Our results reject this conjecture. 
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Finally, we put forward the hypothesis that state support for non-SDR should be 
associated with more non-SDR use. Indeed, our data show that state support is not 
associated with the probability of firms using non-SDR. It is rather firms’ con-
nectedness with the state that can explain a great deal in firm level non-SDR vari-
ation. 
Drawing policy conclusions will only be possible if concrete information on the 
effects of an intensive use of non-SDR on (1) the number of contracts concluded 
(direct effect) and on (2) changes in SDR (indirect effect) is available.  
Sometimes, creating the preconditions for non-SDR has been suggested as a sort 
of “quick fix” for a low-quality SDR because such reforms would have a quick ef-
fect without implying huge government expenditure. Our results indicate that this 
is not an option, as non-SDR and SDR complement each other. 
A report by the Center for Democracy and Governance (1998, 6) observes: “ADR 
systems tend to achieve efficient settlements at the expense of consistent and uni-
form practice”, which implies a trade-off between the private good and the public 
good aspect of adjudication that we began this paper with. A functioning “shadow 
of the law” presupposes consistent decision-making at state courts. This can in-
crease the number of contracts and, hence, the degree of the division of labor real-
ized, without an increase in conflicts taken either to SDR or non-SDR, because 
actors can form expectations on likely court decisions – and can thus refrain from 
factually going to court. 
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Tables 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N min max mean p50 sd 
       
NonSDRij 10,172 0 1 0.636 1 0.481 
Confidenceij 10,172 1 6 3.572 4 1.486 
Checksj 10,172 0 943 697.587 803 260.497 
Informalityij 10,172 0 100 17.431 0 25.838 
FirmSizeij 10,172 1 3 1.912 2 0.788 
Stateij 10,172 0 100 4.410 0 19.814 
Internationalij 10,172 0 1 0.103 0 0.304 
CommonLawj 10,172 0 1 0.039 0 0.194 
Arbitrationj 10,172 1 3 2.289 2 0.692 
PolityIVj 10,172 2.25 10 7.918 8.25 2.130 
NGOj 10,172 5.838 8.258 7.194 7.255 0.556 
BAj 10,172 2 5,279 230.371 71 750.746 
GDPj  10,172 0.784 27.882 4.599 3.183 5.817 
CEEj 10,172 0 1 0.352 0 0.478 
FrankelRomerj 10,172 -1 3.52 1.367 1.98 1.749 
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Table 10: Pairwise correlations 
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NonSDRij 1.000               
                
Confidenceij 0.015 1.000              
 0.121               
Checksj 0.199 0.061 1.000             
 0.000 0.000              
Informalityij 0.113 -0.100 0.100 1.000            
 0.000 0.000 0.000             
FirmSizeij -0.160 0.094 0.088 -0.045 1.000           
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000            
Stateij -0.167 0.033 -0.076 -0.086 0.161 1.000          
 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000           
Internationalij -0.064 0.019 -0.003 -0.018 0.207 -0.017 1.000         
 0.000 0.061 0.789 0.069 0.000 0.080          
CommonLawj 0.075 0.061 0.071 -0.094 -0.012 -0.037 0.034 1.000        
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.215 0.000 0.001         
Arbitrationj -0.062 0.010 0.110 -0.129 -0.065 0.030 -0.001 0.168 1.000       
 0.000 0.295 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.905 0.000        
PolityIVj -0.076 0.086 -0.195 -0.097 -0.100 0.028 0.033 0.112 0.248 1.000      
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000       
NGOj -0.132 0.098 -0.178 -0.054 -0.012 0.025 0.009 0.016 0.111 0.556 1.000     
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.215 0.012 0.367 0.101 0.000 0.000      
BAj 0.010 0.113 0.140 -0.034 -0.054 -0.031 -0.023 -0.016 0.119 0.167 0.376 1.000    
 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.022 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.000     
GDPj  -0.029 0.153 0.070 -0.162 -0.100 -0.040 0.038 0.462 0.251 0.416 0.514 0.581 1.000   
 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
CEEj -0.351 -0.090 -0.449 -0.199 -0.046 0.249 -0.050 -0.149 0.052 0.141 0.134 -0.170 -0.133 1.000  
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
FrankelRomerj 0.110 -0.002 -0.031 0.056 -0.096 -0.113 0.033 0.217 0.285 0.504 0.180 0.157 0.249 -0.348 1.000 
 0.000 0.853 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Reported numbers are respective pairwise correlations with corresponding p-values below. 
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Table 11: Probit estimations (conditional marginal effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Confidenceij 
0.0138** 0.0142** 0.0135** 0.0157** 0.0143** 0.0134** 0.00962* 0.0142** 0.00966* 
(0.00475) (0.00493) (0.00409) (0.00448) (0.00475) (0.00481) (0.00471) (0.00446) (0.00447) 
Checksj 
0.000326** 0.000345** 0.000345** 0.000312** 0.000332** 0.000326** 0.000182** 0.000342** 0.000177** 
(5.56e-05) (5.39e-05) (6.25e-05) (5.33e-05) (5.86e-05) (5.84e-05) (5.11e-05) (6.66e-05) (6.54e-05) 
Informalityij 
0.000283 0.000208 0.000244 0.000291 0.000227 0.000264 4.35e-05 0.000180 0.000239 
(0.000416) (0.000376) (0.000392) (0.000393) (0.000412) (0.000405) (0.000335) (0.000419) (0.000207) 
FirmSizeij 
-0.127** -0.128** -0.127** -0.127** -0.127** -0.127** -0.124** -0.125** -0.124** 
(0.0174) (0.0180) (0.0175) (0.0179) (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0172) (0.0163) (0.0189) 
Stateij 
-0.00176** -0.00180** -0.00179** -0.00185** -0.00181** -0.00175** -0.00132** -0.00174** -0.00136** 
(0.000203) (0.000203) (0.000222) (0.000210) (0.000210) (0.000218) (0.000244) (0.000233) (0.000230) 
Internationalij 
-0.0469** -0.0447** -0.0463** -0.0439** -0.0443** -0.0454** -0.0543** -0.0467** -0.0595** 
(0.0160) (0.0163) (0.0159) (0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0154) (0.0158) (0.0145) 
CommonLawj 
0.208**        0.222** 
(0.0555)        (0.0859) 
Arbitrationj 
 -0.0232       -0.0240 
 (0.0210)       (0.0162) 
PolityIVj 
  0.00666      0.0223 
  (0.00957)      (0.0116) 
NGOj 
   -0.0429     -0.0776* 
   (0.0267)     (0.0389) 
BAj 
    1.79e-07    1.31e-05 
    (7.96e-06)    (1.82e-05) 
GDPj  
     0.00212   -0.00382 
     (0.00242)   (0.00572) 
CEEj 
      -0.179**  -0.198** 
      (0.0504)  (0.0617) 
FrankelRomerj 
       0.0113 -0.0125 
       (0.0136) (0.0171) 
Dummies included industry industry industry industry industry industry industry industry industry 
Observations 10,172 10,172 10,172 10,172 10,172 10,172 10,172 10,172 10,172 
Pseudo R
2
 0.140 0.139 0.139 0.140 0.138 0.139 0.149 0.139 0.154 
**, *: Statistically significant at 1%, 5% level. Maximum likelihood estimation with probit link function (using number of firms per country as weights). Reported numbers are 
conditional marginal effects holding constant all other covariates at their means, country cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 12: Detailed descriptions of variables used 
Variable name Level Description Source 
NonSDRij Firm Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm settles its payment disputes outside of court. 
World Bank (2002, 2006); Enterprise 
Surveys. 
Confidenceij Firm 
Agreement with the statement “I am confident that the judicial system will enforce my contractual and 
property rights in business disputes.” 
World Bank (2002, 2006); Enterprise 
Surveys. 
Checksj Country Inverse number of calendar days from the moment a plaintiff files a lawsuit in court until payment. Courts (2005) 
Informalityij Firm Percentage of sales reported by business for tax purposes. 
World Bank (2002, 2006); Enterprise 
Surveys. 
FirmSizeij Firm Number of workers in the firm, classified into small (< 20), medium (20-99) and large (> 100). 
World Bank (2002, 2006); Enterprise 
Surveys. 
Stateij Firm Percentage of firm owned by government. 
World Bank (2002, 2006); Enterprise 
Surveys. 
Internationalij Firm Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has operations in other countries. 
World Bank (2002, 2006); Enterprise 
Surveys. 
CommonLawj Country Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country belongs to the common-law tradition, 0 otherwise. LLSV (1999) and CIA (2005). 
Arbitrationj Country 
The sum of 3 indicator variables: (1) New York Convention, equal to 1 if a country has ratified, 0 oth-
erwise; (2) 1 if a country has passed legislation based on UNCITRAL model law domestically, 0 oth-
erwise; (3) 1 if a country has ratified the ICSID convention, 0 otherwise;  
(1): www.newyorkconvention.org 
(2): www.uncitral.org 
(3): www.worldbank.org/icsid 
PolityIVj Country Level of democracy with -10 = “perfect” autocracy and 10 = perfect democracy. Polity IV Dataset 
NGOj Country Number of international non-governmental organizations active in a country in 2003 (in logarithms). Pamela Paxton, Ohio State University. 
BAj Country Number of business associations in a country. (Jac C. Heckelman, 2000) 
GDPj  Country Per capita GDP in 2003 (unit: thousands).  
CEEj Country 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is in transition, 0 otherwise. All countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe plus Cambodia and Syria are coded 1. 
 
FrankelRomerj Country Frankel-Rome trade instrument: geography-fitted real openness vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Frankel Romer 1999 
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Figure 29: Interaction between Confidenceij & Checksj 
 
Figure 30: Interaction between Confidenceij & FirmSizeij 
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Figure 31:  
 
Figure 32 
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Figure 33 
 
Figure 34 
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Abstract 
This study aims to investigate the relationship between the religiously-induced internalized values 
of individuals and their specific attitudes regarding accepting corruption. Based on the premises of 
the New Institutional Economics, we propose that individual level institutions with regard to cor-
ruption and religion are associated given the societal institutional context. We use data collected by 
the World Values Survey on 139,826 individuals in 78 countries with 979 regions surveyed in 13 
different years. Our results show that although there is a positive and statistically significant effect 
of religiosity on the acceptance of corruption on the individual level, such effect is small in magni-
tude. We find that there is a threshold value of religiosity below which religiosity does not lesser 
but rather augment acceptance of corruption. Our interpretation for this result is simple; individuals 
with very low religiosity are generally less bounded by religious norms. Thus, religious norms that 
are opposed to corruption are also less binding, resulting in a higher propensity of them accepting 
corruption. Religiosity does lower acceptance of corruption only when it exceeds a certain level of 
religiosity for a specific individual. We also find that the effect of religiosity on acceptance of cor-
ruption does not systematically diverge between individuals of different religious denominations. 
As for the societal level, our results show that the more accepted corruption is at the societal level, 
the less of a mitigating effect religiosity has on individual acceptance of corruption.  
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Introduction 
Although, according to Bhattarai (2009), corruption has no universally accepted definition up till now, in-
ternational organizations have reached a consensus about the grave negative effects of corruption on both 
global and local levels. The World Bank classifies corruption as “the single greatest obstacle to economic 
and social development” (Duasa, 2008), while Transparency international identifies corruption in its mis-
sion statement as “one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. It undermines good govern-
ment, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sec-
tor and private sector development and particularly hurts the poor” (Transparency International, 2011). In 
a world economy that was worth USD 30 trillion in 2001-2002, The World Bank estimates that about 
USD 1 trillion in bribes are paid out each year globally (World Bank, 2004). Transparency International, 
which publishes an annual report on global corruption, calculated in 2004 the amount lost due to bribery 
in public procurement worldwide, which amounted to at least USD 400 billion per year (Transparency In-
ternational, 2006).  
This study aims to investigate the relationship between the religiously-induced internalized values of in-
dividuals and their specific attitudes regarding accepting corruption. Based on the premises of the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE), we propose that individual level institutions with regard to corruption and 
religion are associated given the societal institutional context. We use data collected by the World Values 
Survey (WVS) on 139,826 individuals in 78 countries with 979 regions surveyed in 13 different years. 
Our results show that although there is a positive and statistically significant effect of religiosity on the 
acceptance of corruption on the individual level, such effect is small in magnitude. Interestingly, we find 
that there is a threshold value of religiosity below which religiosity does not lesser but rather augment ac-
ceptance of corruption. Our interpretation for this result is simple; individuals with very low religiosity 
are generally less bounded by religious norms. Thus, religious norms that are opposed to corruption are 
also less binding, resulting in a higher propensity of them accepting corruption. Religiosity does lower 
acceptance of corruption only when it exceeds a certain level of religiosity for a specific individual. We 
also find that the effect of religiosity on acceptance of corruption does not systematically diverge between 
individuals of different religious denominations. As for the societal level, our results show that the more 
accepted corruption is at the societal level, the less of a mitigating effect religiosity has on individual ac-
ceptance of corruption.  
This study is divided into six sections. The next section provides a multi-disciplinary literature review on 
religiosity and corruption while section three presents the theoretical basis for this study as well as our 
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hypotheses. This is followed by a description of our methodology in section four, the empirical results in 
section five and conclusions in section six. 
Literature Review 
There are two previous studies that analyze attitudes toward corruption and religiosity on an individual 
level. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003, hereafter GSZ) aim to investigate the effect of religion on 
people’s economic attitudes, while controlling for country-fixed effects. GSZ use data collected by the 
World Values Survey (WVS) through three waves of surveys (1981-1984, 1990-1993 and 1995-1997) 
which covered 66 countries. GSZ employ three distinct measures of religiosity simultaneously in each es-
timation: 
  “Raised religiously”, which takes on value one in case the respondent answered positively to the 
question “Were you brought up religiously at home?’’. 
 “Currently religious”, which takes on value one in case the respondent states to have attended re-
ligious services (apart from weddings, funerals and christenings) at least once a year.  
 “Actively religious”, which takes on value one in case the respondent states to have attended reli-
gious services (apart from weddings, funerals and christenings) at least once a week.  
As for the dependent variables, GSZ categorize economic attitudes in question into six categories; atti-
tudes toward cooperation, women, government, thriftiness, the market economy and its fairness, and legal 
rules. For the latter category, GSZ base their measurements on a specific question which asks the re-
spondents if they think that certain illegal acts are justifiable or not using a scale between 1(never justifia-
ble) and 10 (always justifiable). The illegal acts in question are; claiming government benefits to which 
the respondent is not entitled, avoiding paying fare on public transport, tax frauds, buying stolen goods 
and accepting bribes. OLS regression results measuring the effect of religiosity on acceptance of bribery 
mostly find negative effects, regardless of whether they include all religious denominations or estimate 
separately for each denomination. However, as some of these estimated effects are not statistically signif-
icant, GSZ conclude that no inference is possible concerning which religion might be better for economic 
outcomes. 
The second study that we build upon is Gatti, Paternostro & Rigolini (2003, GPR hereafter). While the 
study of GSZ is broader than ours with respect to the explained variables, the study of GRR investigates a 
wider range of social effects on attitudes toward corruption. GRR also use data from the WVS, although 
with a much smaller sample size than GSZ and us, as the analysis mainly focuses on the WVS third wave. 
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Effects of religiosity are captured by including denomination dummies and a dummy for regular church 
attendance. GRR find that regular church attendance is negatively associated with acceptance of corrup-
tion. They also find that Catholic (Jewish) respondents are characterized by a higher (lower) acceptance 
of corruption. 
Our study differs from those of GSZ and GRR on several levels: (1) We focus on the relationship between 
attitudes toward corruption and religiosity from an NIE perspective. (2) We use a larger sample, as we are 
able to include the latest wave of WVS survey responses. (3) We use a synthetic religiosity index instead 
of three dummy indicators or just a dummy for church attendance. (4) We treat attitudes toward corrup-
tion as binary indicator, due to a very skewed distribution.  
Attempts to build a theoretical model to analyze corruption’s causes and consequences are numerous (for 
example, Nas, Price and Weber, 1986; Caiden, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Khanafiah and Situng-
kir, 2004; Mishra, 2006a and 2006b; Khan, 2006; Guerrero and Rodríguez-Oreggia, 2008; and Matei and 
Matei, 2009). The aforementioned studies are not only based on economic perspectives but are also on 
other fields of specialization, including finance, public administration, sociology and political science. 
However, economists were generally interested in modeling the relation between corruption and econom-
ic development in specific, as in the works of Macrae, 1982; Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; Barreto, 2000; Mau-
ro, 2002; Barreto and Alm, 2003; Antunes and Cavalcanti, 2003; Basu, 2006; Djumashev, 2006; Mocan, 
2007; and Ebben and De Vaal, 2009. As for the empirical research, a growing number of studies investi-
gates the causes and effects of corruption across countries (see, for example, Mauro, 1995; Ades and Di 
Tella, 1997; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997; Wei, 1997; Mauro, 1998; Brunetti and Weder, 1998; 
Lambsdorff, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Treisman, 1999; Jain, 2001; Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003; Dreher 
and Herzfeld, 2005; Serra, 2006; Carraro et al., 2006; and Mutascu, 2010). These studies have searched 
for empirical regularities between corruption and a variety of economic and non-economic determinants. 
Nevertheless, there is no commonly agreed-upon theory on which to base an empirical model of the caus-
es of corruption on (Alt and Lassen, 2003).  
Corruption was only recently incorporated in the interests of sociologists through their examination of so-
cial deviance (Naumova, 2009). It is interesting to note that Durkheim’s (1893) De la division du travail 
social which initiated the anthropologic and sociological inquiry of social deviance recognized the func-
tional significance of religion as it is repeatedly stated alongside morality and law as one of the principal 
social facts (Wallwork, 1984). According to Stack and Kposowa (2006), literature on the impact of reli-
gion on deviant attitudes and behavior succeeds in establishing a significant negative relation between the 
individual level of religiosity and the possibility of deviant behavior. Baier and Wright (2001) conduct a 
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meta-analysis of 60 studies related to this specific relation and find that the mean reported effect size is r 
= −0.12, demonstrating that the greater the religiosity the less likely individuals are to engage in criminal 
activity. The same cannot be said regarding the relation between religion and corruption in sociological 
studies. Marquette (2010) asserts that the influence of religion on attitudes towards moral issues related to 
corruption is not clear as many other factors come into the formation of these attitudes such as gender, 
age, education level and the nature of religion and religious community involved. This claim is supported 
by the study of Hirschi and Stark (1969) where the relation between church attendance and delinquent at-
titudes and behavior is investigated. They find that attendance at church does not influence either actual 
delinquent acts or attitudes towards delinquency, even amongst respondents who believe in a literal hell 
and devil.  
The results of the latter study contradict with those of Tittle and Welch (1983) where the demographics 
and the religious affiliations of residents of several US states are surveyed. The authors find that there is 
little to no difference between religious and non-religious respondents regarding behavior that is con-
demned by society as a whole, such as major theft, assault and tax evasion. However, significant differ-
ences are found when it comes to behavior that is not widely condemned by society, such as pot smoking 
and not standing for the national anthem. This implies that the deterrent impact of religion on attitudes 
concerning corrupt behavior positively correlates with the intensity of social condemnation of such be-
havior. As Tittle and Welch’s study examines the relation between religiosity and attitudes towards tax 
fraud, it is noticeable that, according to Stack and Kposowa (2006), only few sociological studies did 
tackle this relation (Grasmick, Bursik, and Cochran, 1991; Grasmick, Kinsey, and Cochran, 1991; Patee, 
Milner, and Welch, 1994; and Welch, Tittle, and Patee 1991). A negative relation between religiosity, 
mostly represented through church attendance, and tax cheating was established in all of the aforemen-
tioned studies. However, the scope of the aforementioned studies is limited to USA only. Focusing on ex-
amining the same relationship between religiosity and tax fraud, Stack and Kposowa (2006) try to expand 
this scope by analyzing data on 45,728 individuals in 36 nations from the WVS’s second wave which 
took place during 1990-1993. Moreover, the authors investigate the “moral communities” hypothesis 
where a strong moral community may be expected to reduce the deviant attitudes and behavior of its indi-
viduals despite the individuals’ religiosity level. In other words, in such moral community, persons with 
relatively low levels of religiosity may be influenced by the attitudes and behavior of the highly religious 
persons in their community. Their results show that the higher the individual’s level of religiosity, the 
lower her acceptability of tax fraud. Results on the moral community’s hypothesis were mixed. However, 
in a separate analysis of individual nations, the existence of a “moral community” (majority of the popu-
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lation is identified with a religious group) explains 39 percent of the variation in the presence or absence 
of the relationship between expected religiosity and acceptability of tax fraud.  
This is followed by Beets (2007), which presents two suppositions about the benefits of recruiting the 
support of religion and its adherents in the fight against corruption. The first states that faithful followers 
of a certain religion will abstain from corruption because of the inherent theft, dishonesty, illegality, and 
mistreatment of others that it implies. The second assumption is that those who are not faithful adherents 
of religions have a high propensity to engage in corruption because of an absence of religious guidance. 
These two postulations are strongly supported by several studies from different fields even such as Treis-
man (2000), Brunetti and Weder (2003), Herzfeld and Weiss (2003), Braun and Di Tella (2004), Kunico-
va and Rose Ackerman (2005), Lederman, et al. (2005), and Mutascu (2010). North and Gwin (2006) ar-
gue that a religious society is expected to be relatively more moral than a nonreligious one. Therefore, it 
is assumed that in countries where religion plays an essential role in the lives of most people, civic em-
ployees, as well as others, are likely to obtain their ethical framework at least partly from their religion, 
directly influencing their tendency to commit corruption. Religion is said to provide its followers with a 
common language of ethics and, some of which can be interpreted as being of significant importance to 
fighting corruption. However, as Marquette (2010) argues, a logical fallacy may exist in this argument 
since it presupposes that all religions emphasize the same moral codes. Moreover, a considerable body of 
literature proposes that followers of different religions – or even sects of a religion – hold divergent opin-
ions on what constitutes morality (see, for example, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2003; Al-Marhubi, 
2004; Durkheim, 1915; Weber, 2010 and Jagodzinski, 2009). Nevertheless, Luxmoore (1999) rebuts this 
claim by assuming that since certain values such as fairness and honesty are basic teachings of most - if 
not all - religions, such religions under consideration can therefore be used as an antidote for corruption. 
In Table 16, we document how some of the main sources of the major world religions stress the immorali-
ty of theft and bribery. 
Conversely, in a clear contradiction of the aforementioned assumptions, Marquette (2010) points out that 
“many of the most corrupt countries in the world (according to Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index) also rank high in terms of religiosity (using indicators such as those used by the Pew 
Global Attitudes Project)”. This apparent contradiction can be explained through taking into consideration 
two main arguments: first, in countries where a high level of both religiosity and corruption exists, other 
endogenous factors maybe affecting them both. An example of such endogenous factors may be the case 
where a corrupt theocratic leadership exists in a certain country. Investigating such kinds of endogenous 
factors is beyond the scope of most literature related to the religion-corruption nexus. However, some 
control variables related to the political and social environment in sampled countries are taken into con-
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sideration in such literature. Second, the level of religiosity might not be the only important explanatory 
factor when investigating its relation with the perceived corruption levels but also the type of religion. For 
that reason, various studies use the type of religion as an explanatory variable and find its effect signifi-
cant on the corruption level in the sampled countries (see, for example, La Porta et al., 1999; Treismann, 
2000; Paldam, 2001; Beets, 2007; Shabbir and Anwar, 2007; Samanta and Pleskov, 2009; and Mutascu, 
2010). Still, other studies find an insignificant relation between the public level of adherence of a certain 
religion in a country and its perceived level of corruption (e.g. North and Gwin, 2006; and Flavin and Le-
det, 2008). Flavin and Ledet (2008) use survey-based data to check if religiosity has a significant effect 
on the level of governmental corruption in the US states during the period 1990-2002. Although the au-
thors use three different measures of religiosity, which are religious belief, belonging, and behavior, they 
find little systematic relationship between any of these measures of religiosity and corruption.  
As for economic literature in specific, several studies investigated the relation between religion and cor-
ruption (see, for example, La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2001; Bonaglia et al., 2001; 
Chang and Golden, 2004). Treisman (2000) shows that religion reduces corruption because it aids in or-
ganizing civil society and makes citizens more likely to monitor elites. Devettere (2002) points out that 
the most effective way to combat global corruption is through giving high attention to virtue ethics. 
Paldham (2001) assumes that religion may limit the effects of this global problem and finds that the per-
centage of Protestants in a country is negatively related to corruption level. North and Gwin (2006) use a 
country-aggregated level data to assess whether religion affects the levels of rule of law and corruption. 
The authors use data on the sampled countries’ largest religious group in the years 1900 and 2000 as a 
proxy of religiosity. Their results show that the proposed effect of religion on corruption and rule of law 
is inconsistent since it significantly differs depending on the year of religious status data being used. Ac-
cording to Flavin and Ledet (2008), there is a scholarly debate over the appropriate measurement of relig-
iosity. They explain this partly due to “…disagreements among scholars about how best to quantify reli-
gion and an individual’s underlying “level” of religious belief and devotion when referring to the different 
ways in which religiosity can be assessed”. Religion was assessed through examining the “dominant reli-
gion” or “the religion of majority” in a certain country. However, a basic logical fallacy exists in most of 
these studies by assuming that, since an individual belongs to a certain religion, her behavior is bound by 
rules of that religion. The level of adherence to a religion is not investigated which can significantly im-
pact the overall conclusion.  
From the above, we can deduce that, although the theory supporting the negative relation between reli-
gion and corruption may seem more valid and logical, the results of the considerable body of empirical 
literature tackling this relation remain controversial and inconclusive. Marquette (2010) states that “that 
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the evidence for a causal relationship between religion (or types of religion) and either higher or lower 
levels of corruption is in no way convincing”. The reason behind this conviction, as the author argues, is 
that the data -on religion- used in the majority of these studies are aggregated at the country level. There-
fore, such studies are clueless with regards to questions such as: (1) the influence of religion on attitude 
formation, (2) how individuals’ attitudes towards corruption are formed and (3) what are the possible 
lines of actions that the religion(s) permit its followers in order to change corrupt behavior. In order to 
avoid these pitfalls, the data on religion used through this study will be based on a survey-based dataset, 
collected by the World Values Survey.  
Regarding the first question, we hypothesize that religion forms an essential component of the individu-
al’s morality in countries with high rates of religiosity. As for the second question, we hypothesize that 
religions, in general, endorse honesty and suppress corruption. Therefore, as the degree of religiosity in-
creases on the individual level in a certain society, individuals’ general attitudes towards corruption con-
form more and more with this religion’s fundamental teachings towards such kind of ill behavior. It is of 
difficulty to fully assess the specific attitudes of every religion towards corruption. Therefore, we test the 
effect of religiosity on corruption with and without taking into consideration the type of religion under in-
vestigation. This allows us to assess whether religiosity generically affects corruption or adherence to a 
certain religion is the main influencer on corruption level in any given country. As for the third unan-
swered question, it is essential to point out that the lines of actions endorsed by a certain religion against 
corruption are not practiced in vacuum. In other words, legal and political institutions play a major role in 
controlling citizens’ attitudes towards corruption through offering lines of acceptable attitudes and actions 
against corruption (e.g. whistle-blowing) and limiting or suppressing other unwanted attitudes and actions 
(e.g. citizens’ vigilante behavior against corrupted officials). Therefore, the legal and political environ-
ments of the sampled countries are taken into consideration. Following the tradition of New Institutional 
Economics (North, 1990), we argue that individual incentives and attitudes regarding corruption are af-
fected not only by the legal system, i.e. formal institutions, but also by the morals and values prevalent in 
a society, i.e. informal institutions. Consequently, individuals who are constantly exposed to a certain re-
ligion will – to a significant extent – adopt its prescribed system of beliefs and values (i.e. informal rules) 
which then structure their perceived constraints regarding corrupt transactions. 
Theoretical Background  
Defining what ‘religion’ is remains a highly controversial issue for anthropologists, sociologists, and his-
torians (as well as economists!). Various definitions for religion are offered by a multitude of social scien-
tists, including Tylor (1871), Durkheim (1915), Frazer (1922), Radin (1957), Wallace (1966), Geertz 
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(1973), Ortner (1978) and Lechner (2000). Kirkland (1976) points out that this definitional problem was 
of such dire importance that the journal of the scientific study of religion conducted a special symposium 
under the title “The Problem of Attempting to Define Religion” (1962-63). Nevertheless, one of the inter-
section points among most of the proposed definitions is that religion consists of a specific set of moral 
guidelines and behavioral patterns that adherents subscribe to (see, for example, Merriam-Webster online 
dictionary, 2011; Dictionary.com Unabridged, 2011; American Heritage Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage, 2009; Collins English Dictionary, 2003). Religion plays a significant role in shaping the prevalent 
morals and values of individuals in a given society, depending on these individuals’ adherence to the pre-
scribed religious code of conduct. As Iannaccone (1995) states  
“Other institutions hide their attempts to manipulate people’s preferences; religions proudly pro-
claim their role in the transformation of hearts and minds. Other institutions direct behavior 
through coercive force or compensatory payment; religions seek to achieve compliance through 
appeals to what is good and proper (though their normative appeals are often backed up with 
bribes and threats). Other institutions acknowledge the limited character of their claim on individ-
uals; religions pronounce demands of unlimited scope and extraordinary detail”. 
There is a schism between theology and social sciences on the stance of different religions regarding 
stealing and bribery. From a theological point of view, all religious sects investigated through this study 
emphasize through their teachings the immorality of theft and bribery. Table 16 provides a simple survey 
of religious texts tackling stealing and bribery in main sources of these religions. Such a simple inspection 
of religious texts is by its nature non comprehensive as such an exercise goes beyond the scope of this 
study. Nevertheless, Table 16 sheds light on the common teaching of all religions that are avidly against 
stealing and bribery, which are the main ingredients of corruption.  
As it was aforementioned, the effect of religiosity on attitudes concerning corruption remains a debatable 
issue through the empirical literature of sociology and economics. Several theories are proposed to ex-
plain the source of this confusion. Marquette (2010) provides an excellent overview of some of these the-
ories. We summarize the main points of these theories without aspiring to be exhaustive.  
Middleton and Putney (1962) explain that uncertainty is created due to the confusion of the scope of em-
pirical research related to religion and morality. They emphasize that there is often a failure to distinguish 
between two different kinds of ethical standards: the ascetic (i.e. sexual inclinations, gambling) and the 
social (i.e. cheating, theft). As violating social standards are harmful to every actor in a society, they are 
tended to be shared by religious and nonreligious actors alike. However, since violations of ascetic stand-
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ards are usually not directly harmful to the society, nonreligious persons are expected to be more pre-
scribed to these standards than the religious. Accordingly, differences in behavior between the religious 
and the nonreligious are apparent in specific areas only, and are a product of divergence in standards ra-
ther than to a differential upholding of standards.  
The aforementioned study of Tittle and Welch (1983) base its examination of religiosity and delinquency 
on the concepts of ‘normative dissensus’ and ‘perceived conformity’. Normative dissensus refers to the 
condition where disagreement about the undesirability of various behaviors exists, individuals in a given 
society will have few consistent guidelines or behavioral models; they will be lost in uncertainty, which 
may stimulate violations of these specific behaviors. In such conditions, religiously endorsed moral com-
mitments can be of significant effect. The authors hypothesize that the extent to which religiosity affects 
conformity fluctuates directly with (a) general normative dissensus in a given context or (b) with norma-
tive dissensus concerning specific offenses. Consequently, religiosity may help in predicting the conform-
ance to rules specifically prohibited by religious institutions but not to rules only prohibited by society as 
a whole, which actually reflects the effect of normative dissensus. ‘Perceived conformity’ is built on the 
concept that a deviant behavior is directly related to excess amount of exposure to social inputs that are 
favorable to deviance. Consequently, the greater one’s religiosity, the less likely will be her exposure to 
an excess of favorable deviant definitions; hence, the greater the possibility of conformity. The authors 
conclude that “religiosity has the greatest effect on conformity when each of the four contextual condi-
tions prevail: general normative ambiguity, low social integration, generalized perception of low peer 
conformity, and a relatively high proportion of people who are not religious” (Tittle and Welch, 1983, p. 
674). 
Kohlberg (1981) presents a different perspective, claiming that religiosity and moral reasoning are essen-
tially separated since they constitute two different areas of human concern. Although moral decision mak-
ing is mainly influenced by level of cognitive development (e.g. education) and disclosure to socio-moral 
incidents, religious reasoning is based upon revelations by religious authorities and is usually emphasiz-
ing morality in the first place. In other words, moral reasoning provides moral prescriptions while reli-
gious reasoning affirms these moral judgments and views it as meaningful. This claim is apparent in 
Kohlberg’s (1984) theory on stages of moral development, where the author argues that moral reasoning 
has six identifiable developmental stages. Each one of these stages is more suitable for responding to 
moral dilemmas than its predecessor. Kohlberg states that the process of moral development is chiefly 
concerned with justice, and that it continues throughout the individual's lifetime, a notion that spawned 
dialogue on the philosophical implications of such research. As for religion and morality, Kohlberg and 
Power (1981) suggest that a seventh stage should be integrated into the theory under the title “transcen-
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dental morality” or “morality of cosmic orientation” which links religion with moral reasoning. However, 
Kohlberg's difficulties in obtaining empirical evidence for even the sixth stage, lead him to underline the 
speculative nature of this proposed seventh stage (1981). 
   
Figure 1: The effect of religion on beliefs, values and actions related to corruption 
 
 
Source: Jagodzinski (2009), modified by the authors. 
It is noteworthy to state that this study is mainly focusing on investigating the specific link between the 
religiously-induced internalized values and beliefs of individuals on the one hand and their specific atti-
tudes regarding corruption on the other hand (represented by the red rectangle in figure 1), resulting in our 
main hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Higher individual-level religiosity is associated with lower acceptance of corruption. 
We focus our analysis specifically on the micro-level rather than the macro-level. We are not dealing by 
any means with the actual actions of those individuals regarding corruption that are administered through 
their respective societies. The degree of exposure to religion of individuals is thought to be reflected 
through their internalized values and beliefs and is measured through variables that demonstrate their lev-
el of religious adherence. The attitudes and beliefs towards corruption are reflected through the survey re-
spondents’ acceptance of corrupt actions such as accepting bribery and tax fraud. Because our framework 
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explicitly accounts for the micro-macro interaction in values and beliefs, we also propose the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: Higher country-level acceptance of corruption is associated with higher individual-level 
acceptance of corruption. 
Hypothesis 3a: Higher country-level corruption is associated with higher acceptance of corruption. 
Hypothesis 3b: Higher country-level corruption is associated with lower acceptance of corruption. 
Methodology and model specification 
Because our hypotheses relate to individual level incentives and behavior, it is appropriate that we test our 
hypotheses with individual level data. Naturally, experimental data is hard to come by in this context
1
. 
Thus, we resort to survey data taken from the World Values Survey (WVS), which measures values and 
attitudes in representative samples in more than 80 countries around the world (WVS 2010). Index i de-
notes individual surveyed, j denotes country of residence and t denotes year of survey. Our estimation 
sample comprises (up to) 139,826 individuals in 78 countries with 979 regions surveyed in 13 different 
years. 
Acceptance of corruption is measured by WVS responses to the question “Please tell me for each of the 
following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in be-
tween […]. Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.” The responses range from 1 (never 
justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable).  
Because the responses to this variables are very skewed towards 1 (almost 75%), we decide to recode this 
information into a binary format. Our dependent variable Corruptioni takes on value 0 if respondents an-
swered that bribes are never justified, and value 1 otherwise. 
The independent variable of main interest, religiosity, is measured through WVS responses to four ques-
tions. These questions are: (1) “Indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is: Religion?”, 
(2) “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services 
                                                 
1
 Armantier and Boly (2010) provide evidence from a controlled field experiment that religiosity, measured through 
a post-experimental question of how often the subject goes to church, is associated with a lower probability of sub-
jects accepting bribes. 
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these days”, (3) “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are a religious 
person?”, and (4) “How important is God in your life?“. Analogous to the above corruption index, we 
construct a weighted index Religiosityi of these questions, with weights according to the results from a 
factor analysis. In order to control for between denomination differences, we also include dummies for 
the 7 main denominations that the respondent might be affiliated with. 
In order to capture the micro-macro interaction of the theoretical model (hypotheses 2 through 3b), we in-
clude as independent variables both the aggregated country-level mean for Corruptionjt and the country-
level control of corruption measure of the World Bank Governance Indicators, WBCorruptionjt. We esti-
mate  
 
   1 20 1 2Pr 1|i i i jt iCorruption X G Reli Z Zgiosity u        (0.0) 
with maximum likelihood, where G is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, 
1
iZ  is the 
vector containing our individual level controls and 
2
jtZ  is the vector containing our country-level controls.  
Several individual-level control variables are included in 
1
iZ . We control for sex (Malei), age (Agei), edu-
cation (Educationi), marital status (Marriedi) and unemployment status (Unemployedi) of the respondent. 
To control for income-related differences, we include an ordinal variable (Incomei) which is a subjective, 
self-reported assessment of the respondent’s income level. We also control for the respondent’s financial 
satisfaction (Financial_satisfactioni) and generalized trust (Trusti), as low financial satisfaction and low 
trust might be associated with higher acceptance of corruption.  
Unobserved heterogeneity might mean that respondents’ acceptance of corruption and religiosity are af-
fected by the year that the survey was done in and the country or region they live in. There are two dis-
tinct approaches to arrange the vector 
2
jtZ . The first approach is to include a full set of country and year 
dummies. This approach accounts for any level differences there might be between countries in different 
years. The second approach is to include a set of time-varying country-level variables which might be rel-
evant in influencing acceptance of corruption from a macro-level. First of all, this set includes country av-
erages of the individual level variables mentioned above (indexed jt). A country’s colonial history might 
influence its formal and informal institutions, which is why we control for it with a set of according 
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dummies (Colonial_historyXj)
2
. More institutional variables include an indicator for political stability 
(Stabilityjt)
3
, age of democracy (Age_democracyjt), a dummy for a federalist state (Federalismjt). We also 
control for per capita income (GDPjt)
4
. These two approaches for arranging the vector 
2
jtZ  
are mutually 
exclusive as combining both country, region and year dummies with multiple country level variables 
would result in near perfect multicollinearity. Details on all variables can be found in Table 13 and Feh-
ler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.. 
Estimation results 
In Probit estimations, the marginal effect of any explanatory variable is (1) inherently non-linear and (2) 
conditional on values of all other covariates. The main effect of interest, i.e. the marginal effect of religi-
osity on the probability to accept corruption is 
 
 
 1 20 1 2 0
Pr 1i
i i jt
i
Corruption
g Religiosity
Religio
Z
i
Z
s ty
   

  



 (0.0) 
where   ( )
dG
g z z
dz
 . It is immediately apparent that this marginal effect needs to be evaluated at spe-
cific values of  1 2,,i i jtReligiosity Z Z  in order to be interpreted in a meaningful way. We can also see 
that interpretations of interaction effects are possible without explicitly including interaction terms as ex-
planatory variables. 
In Table 15 we present the average marginal effects from our estimations. In order to compute these, we 
insert into equation 1.2 the estimated coefficients and the mean values of all independent variables, in-
cluding the respective variable of interest. This gives us a good first impression of the effects we are in-
terested in. In column 1, we estimate a baseline model without any fixed effects. In columns 2 to 4, we 
successively add country, year and region fixed effects. Finally, in column 5, we drop the country and re-
gion fixed effects while adding a vector of country level control variables. 
  
                                                 
2
 La Porta et. al. (1999), Treisman (2000), and Herzfeld and Weiss (2003) show that former British colonies have 
lower levels of corruption. 
3
 See Park (2003). 
4
 See, for example, van Rijckeghem-Weder, 1997; Ades-Di Tella, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Rauch-Evan, 2000; Pal-
dam, 2002; Sandholtz and Gray, 2003; Tavares, 2003; Dreher et al. 2004; Chang-Golden; 2004; Kunicova-
Ackerman, 2005. 
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The average marginal effect of religiosity (Religiosityij) is estimated to be negative and significantly dif-
ferent from zero in all five specifications. This is in line with hypothesis 1, implying that, at the individual 
level, religiosity can act as a deterrent against corrupt behavior. However, the effect is rather small in size: 
A 1% change in individual religiosity is on average associated with a 0.04% change in individual level 
acceptance of corruption. 
Concerning country level acceptance of corruption (Acceptancej), we find a significantly positive associa-
tion with individual level acceptance. This is in line with hypothesis 2 and shows that, on average, the 
more corruption is accepted in one’s society, the more likely an individual is to accept corruption. Rang-
ing from 1.342 to 1.61, the effect is quite large in size: A 1% higher aggregate acceptance of corruption is 
associated with a higher individual acceptance of corruption of around 1.4%. 
Interestingly, the World Bank country score on control of corruption (CorruptionWBj) is not significantly 
associated with individual acceptance of corruption, suggesting that either (1) whether or not a country 
scores well concerning the World Bank governance variable does not matter for individual level ac-
ceptance of corruption or (2) the two opposing effects conjectured in hypotheses 3a and 3b cancel each 
other out.  
Let us move on to the remaining survey level controls: For Incomeij, Uemployedij, Financial_satisfactionij 
and Trustij, we do not find a significant association with acceptance of corruption. Acceptance of corrup-
tion is found to be significantly higher for individuals that are male, younger, unmarried and less well ed-
ucated, ceteris paribus. There is also some evidence that acceptance of corruption differs between indi-
viduals of different denominations: While Hindu individuals are characterized by lower acceptance of 
corruption than others, Jewish, Orthodox and Catholic individuals are characterized by higher acceptance 
of corruption. Buddhist, Muslim and Protestant individuals do not differ significantly from individuals of 
‘other religions’ denomination.  
We have to keep in mind that these average marginal effects represent mere snapshots of the whole pic-
ture. In order to gain more complete insights into the effects of religiosity, we will also have to investigate 
interaction effects. This is achieved by computing the marginal effect of religiosity in equation 1.2 for 
varying levels in the interacting explanatory variable and plotting the marginal effect. The following 
graphs are based on column 5 of Table 15.  
The first interaction to consider is the interaction of religiosity with itself, i.e. any non-linearities in the ef-
fect of religiosity. In Figure 35 we plot the marginal effect of religiosity (i.e. the estimated elasticity) for 
different percentiles of religiosity, holding constant all other covariates at their respective means. We can 
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clearly see that the effect of religiosity is non-linear: For low values of religiosity (below the 30-
percentile), there is a positive effect. For higher values of religiosity (above the 30-percentile), there is a 
negative effect on the acceptance of corruption. This implies that there is a threshold value of religiosity 
below which religiosity does not lower but rather increase acceptance of corruption. We could interpret 
this as following: For individuals with very low religiosity, religious norms in general are less binding, 
thus, religious norms that are opposed to corruption are also less binding, resulting in a higher probability 
for acceptance of corruption. Only above a certain minimum level of religiosity does religiosity actually 
lower acceptance of corruption. We can also see that the marginal effect of religiosity on acceptance of 
corruption becomes stronger, the higher the level of religiosity. 
We then compare the effect of religiosity between individuals of different religious denominations. In 
Figure 36 we plot the marginal effect of religiosity by religious denomination. Here, we replicate Figure 35 
for different values of religious denomination. It becomes apparent that the effect of religiosity on ac-
ceptance of corruption does not systematically differ between individuals of different religious denomina-
tions. Differences between denominations are strongest for very extreme values of religiosity. For coun-
try-level denomination averages, we do not find any significant interaction in the effect of religiosity 
(graphs not shown), implying that country level differences in religious denomination do not affect how 
religiosity and acceptance of corruption interact at the individual level.  
Next, we ask how the effect of religiosity depends on societal level acceptance of corruption. In Figure 37, 
we plot the marginal effect of religiosity for different deciles of aggregated acceptance of corruption. We 
observe some interaction, but no reversal: the overall trend of the marginal effects curve is the same for 
all deciles of acceptance of corruption (although the curve is almost flat for the 99-percentile). We can see 
that the marginal effect of religiosity is more pronounced for lower aggregated acceptance of corruption 
than for medium to high levels of religiosity. This implies that the more accepted corruption is at the soci-
etal level, the less of a mitigating effect religiosity has on individual acceptance of corruption.  
For all remaining explanatory variables, we do not find any interaction with the effect of religiosity. 
 
Conclusions and outlook 
Although the relevance of institutions for the analysis of human behavior is by now almost indisputable, 
there seems to be little consensus on how informal institutions affect behavior and other institutions: 
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“What is it about informal constraints that gives them such a pervasive influence upon the long-run char-
acter of economies?” (North, 1991, p. 111). 
In this study, we have tried to shed some light onto the relationship between two different informal con-
straints: religiosity and the acceptance of corruption. We find that, although there is a statistically signifi-
cant association, the effect of religiosity on acceptance is very small in magnitude. One explanation for 
this very small effect is that religiosity affects acceptance of corruption through different and opposing 
transmission channels. By promoting intra-group trust instead of inter-group trust (Berggren & Bjornskov 
2011), increased religiosity could indirectly lead to higher acceptance of corruption. At the same time, in-
creased religiosity should also lead individuals to be more strongly bound by anti-corruption religious 
norms. Our exploratory analytical framework can alas not differentiate between these two transmission 
channels. Future research into this matter will have to provide more explicit theoretical models that are 
able to cope with this conceptual problem.  
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Table 13: Description of individual level variables (all taken from World Values Survey) 
Variable Description and source N Mean P50 SD Min Max 
Corruptibility1i 
Weighted average of variables f117 (Justifiable: Someone ac-
cepting a bribe), f114 (Justifiable: Claiming government bene-
fits), f115 (Justifiable: Avoiding a fare on public transport), 
f116 (Justifiable: Cheating on taxes). 
121337 
.027733
1 
-
.349575
2 
1.03732
8 
-
.764152
2 
4.81591
1 
Corruptibility2i Is someone accepting a bribe acceptable? (f117, …) 121337 
.300576
1 
0 
.458510
5 
0 1 
        
Religiosityi 
Weighted average of variables a006 (Religion important in 
life), f028 (How often do you attend religious services?), f034 
(Religious person), f063 (How important is God in your life?). 
121337 
0.18353
42 
0.46579
19 
0.91644
8 
-
2.50431
2 
1.12452
1 
Incomei 
Self-reported household income, on a scale of societal deciles 
(x047; 10 = highest income group). 
121337 
4.53947
3 
4 
2.39999
3 
1 10 
Malei Indicator variable for sex of respondent (x001; 1 = Male). 121337 
0.48964
45 
0 
0.49989
48 
0 1 
Agei Age of respondent (x003). 121337 
40.2220
5 
38 
15.8093
5 
15 99 
Marriedi Marital status of respondent (x007; 1 = Married). 121337 
0.57320
52 
1 
0.49461
4 
0 1 
Uemployedi Employment status of respondent (x028; 1 = unemployed). 121337 
0.10090
9 
0 
0.30120
95 
0 1 
Financial_satisfactioni 
Satisfaction with financial situation of household of respondent 
(c006; 10 = satisfied). 
121337 
5.52186
9 
6 
2.65654
2 
1 10 
Educationi 
Highest educational level attained (x025; 8 = University with 
degree) 
121337 
4.45064
6 
4 2.30359 1 8 
Trusti Most people can be trusted (a165; 1 = yes) 121337 
0.74486
76 
1 
0.43593
74 
0 1 
Denom_Buddhisti 
Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = Bud-
dhist) 
121337 
0.02517
78 
0 
0.15666
55 
0 1 
Denom_Hindii Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = Hindi) 121337 
0.02630
69 
0 
0.16004
7 
0 1 
Denom_Jewishi Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = Jewish) 121337 
0.00387
35 
0 
0.06211
71 
0 1 
Denom_Muslimi 
Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = Mus-
lim) 
121337 
0.22555
36 
0 
0.41794
81 
0 1 
Denom_Orthodoxi 
Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = Ortho-
dox) 
121337 
0.10890
33 
0 
0.31151
91 
0 1 
Denom_Protestanti Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = 121337 0.16443 0 0.37067 0 1 
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Protestant) 46 1 
Denom_Catholici 
Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = Catho-
lic) 
121337 
0.25853
61 
0 
0.43783
19 
0 1 
Denom_Otheri Indicator variable for religious denomination (f025; 1 = Other) 121337 
0.10890
33 
0 
0.31151
91 
0 1 
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Table 14: Description of country level variables 
Variable Description and source N Mean P50 SD Min Max 
Corruptibilityj Country average of Corruptibilityij 121337 
0.303918
4 
0.274840
7 
0.173607
8 
0.012666
7 
1 
CorruptionWBj 
World Bank Governance Indicator “control of corrup-
tion” (2.5 = perfect control; Kaufmann et al. 2009) 
121337 
0.049272
5 
-
0.240635
6 
0.983581
2 
-1.264135 2.38724 
Malej Country average of Maleij 121337 
0.486483
6 
0.495688
1 
0.036747
3 
0.343 
0.568215
9 
Agej Country average of Ageij 121337 40.07693 39.69038 5.033365 28.69082 52.45044 
Marriedj Country average of Marriedij 121337 0.564083 
0.565756
8 
0.125816
2 
0.143426
3 
0.835235
7 
Unemployedj Country average of Unemployedij 121337 
0.103735
9 
0.084179
4 
0.070725
9 
0 
0.367333
3 
Denom_Buddhistj Country average of Denom_Buddhistj 121337 
0.024745
3 
0.000711
5 
0.116159
9 
0 
0.968057
4 
Denom_Hindij Country average of Denom_Hindij 121337 
0.026267
4 
0 
0.120475
7 
0 
0.756121
9 
Denom_Jewishj Country average of Denom_Jewishj 121337 
0.003972
3 
0.000833
3 
0.010763
7 
0 
0.063713
8 
Denom_Muslimj Country average of Denom_Muslimj 121337 
0.220106
1 
0.008285
9 
0.359281
4 
0 
0.988855
9 
Denom_Orthodoxj Country average of Denom_Orthodoxj 121337 0.106979 
0.003146
3 
0.241358
5 
0 
0.922562
1 
Denom_Protestantj Country average of Denom_Protestantj 121337 
0.161808
1 
0.047062
8 
0.231469
5 
0 
0.885034
7 
Denom_Catholicj Country average of Denom_Catholicj 121337 
0.254142
8 
0.095 
0.300709
6 
0 0.944 
Colonial_2j 
Indicator variable for colonial origin (Teorell & Hade-
nius 2005) 
121337 
0.017167
1 
0 
0.129894
2 
0 1 
Colonial_3j 
Indicator variable for colonial origin (Teorell & Hade-
nius 2005) 
121337 
0.156588
7 
0 0.363414 0 1 
Colonial_4j 
Indicator variable for colonial origin (Teorell & Hade-
nius 2005) 
121337 
0.009609
6 
0 
0.097556
8 
0 1 
Colonial_5j 
Indicator variable for colonial origin (Teorell & Hade-
nius 2005) 
121337 
0.221770
8 
0 
0.415439
4 
0 1 
Colonial_6j 
Indicator variable for colonial origin (Teorell & Hade-
nius 2005) 
121337 0.045592 0 
0.208599
5 
0 1 
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Colonial_7j 
Indicator variable for colonial origin (Teorell & Hade-
nius 2005) 
121337 
0.020735
6 
0 
0.142498
6 
0 1 
Colonial_8j 
Indicator variable for colonial origin (Teorell & Hade-
nius 2005) 
121337 
0.011414
5 
0 
0.106227
6 
0 1 
GDPj 
Real GDP per capita (United Nations Statistics Divi-
sion 2009). 
121337 6722.3 2692.564 10104.01 163.3393 40112 
Political_stabilityj 
World Bank Governance Indicator “political stability” 
(2.5 = perfect stability; Kaufmann et al. 2009) 
121337 
-
0.206227
6 
-
0.235429
7 
0.837599
7 
-1.734259 1.55767 
Age_Democracyj 
Age of democracy. Counts the number of interrupted 
years of democracy up to year of observation. Own 
calculation using the revised combined polity score 
(Marshall & Jaggers 2002). 
121337 27.60624 20 21.54908 0 62 
Federalismj 
Indicator variable for federal state (1 = federal; Norris 
2009). 
121337 
0.247294
7 
0 
0.431441
3 
0 1 
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Table 15: Average marginal effects of Probit estimations (Dependent variable: Acceptance of corruption) 
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Religiosityij -0.0373*** -0.0404*** -0.0403*** -0.0468*** -0.0396*** 
 (0.00570) (0.00675) (0.00674) (0.00816) (0.00712) 
Acceptancej 1.405*** 1.478*** 1.610*** 1.342*** 1.467*** 
 (0.136) (0.208) (0.183) (0.114) (0.115) 
CorruptionWBj -0.00830** 0.0214 0.0313 0.0147 0.00117 
 (0.00411) (0.0306) (0.0265) (0.0293) (0.00196) 
Incomeij -0.0229 0.0211 0.0204 -0.00570 0.000606 
 (0.0354) (0.0405) (0.0404) (0.0458) (0.0375) 
Maleij 0.0545*** 0.0512*** 0.0516*** 0.0562*** 0.0482*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0199) (0.0180) 
Ageij -0.366*** -0.368*** -0.366*** -0.424*** -0.363*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0328) (0.0340) (0.0420) (0.0343) 
Marriedij -0.0657*** -0.0681*** -0.0690*** -0.0845*** -0.0719*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0133) (0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0133) 
Uemployedij 0.00231 0.0313* 0.0312 0.0184 0.0255 
 (0.0283) (0.0179) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0191) 
Financial_satisfactionij 0.0177 0.0114 0.0213 0.0172 0.0457** 
 (0.0267) (0.0249) (0.0237) (0.0266) (0.0227) 
Educationij -0.165*** -0.205*** -0.202*** -0.219*** -0.200*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0254) (0.0243) (0.0331) (0.0280) 
Trustij -0.0376 -0.0536 -0.0494 -0.0415 -0.0401 
 (0.0306) (0.0332) (0.0320) (0.0349) (0.0383) 
Denom_Buddhistij -0.175 0.105** 0.105** 0.142*** 0.0887 
 (0.213) (0.0523) (0.0519) (0.0465) (0.0550) 
Denom_Hindiij -0.188** -0.374*** -0.376*** -0.253*** -0.371*** 
 (0.0804) (0.0860) (0.0907) (0.0727) (0.0895) 
Denom_Jewishij 0.351*** 0.313*** 0.304*** 0.263*** 0.270*** 
 (0.0658) (0.0591) (0.0629) (0.0750) (0.0565) 
Denom_Muslimij 0.176 -0.0592 -0.0690 -0.0436 -0.0920 
 (0.134) (0.0737) (0.0720) (0.0654) (0.0796) 
Denom_Orthodoxij 0.106** 0.113** 0.100** 0.0884* 0.0981** 
 (0.0485) (0.0501) (0.0466) (0.0491) (0.0467) 
Denom_Protestantij -0.00892 0.00506 -0.00162 0.0174 -0.0128 
 (0.0617) (0.0593) (0.0623) (0.0648) (0.0592) 
Denom_Catholicij 0.0926** 0.0900*** 0.0906*** 0.125*** 0.0872*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0322) (0.0345) (0.0408) (0.0320) 
Malej     -0.0910 
     (0.359) 
Agej     -0.578** 
     (0.274) 
Marriedj     0.337* 
     (0.181) 
Unemployedj     -0.0757** 
     (0.0327) 
GDPj     -0.0164 
     (0.0255) 
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Political_stabilityj     0.0231 
     (0.0187) 
Age_Democracyj     0.295*** 
     (0.0427) 
Federalismj     -0.0226 
     (0.0209) 
Denom_Buddhistj     -0.0165*** 
     (0.00417) 
Denom_Hindij     -0.0106 
     (0.00746) 
Denom_Jewishj     0.00287 
     (0.00664) 
Denom_Muslimj     0.0251 
     (0.0404) 
Denom_Orthodoxj     0.00109 
     (0.0128) 
Denom_Protestantj     -0.0197 
     (0.0323) 
Denom_Catholicj     0.00284 
     (0.0289) 
      
Fixed effects none country country, year country, year, 
region 
year 
      
Countries 78 78 78 74 73 
Regions 979 979 979 903 893 
Years 13 13 13 13 12 
      
Observations 139,826  139,826  139,826  125,387 121,337 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2211 0.2344 0.2365 0.1474 0.2229 
Estimation with Ordinary Least Squares (with number of respondents per country as weights). Reported numbers are 
estimated elasticities (with respect to a 1% change for continuous variables and a 1 uni t change for dummy varia-
bles). Country cluster robust standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
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Table 16: Selected texts on theft and bribery from main sources of major world religions 
Judaism Judeo-Christian Christianity Islam Buddhism Hinduism 
Maimonides, Mish-
neh Torah, Hilchot 
Gezeilah 1:2 
 It is forbidden to rob 
or to steal even a mi-
nor amount from ei-
ther a Jew or a gen-
tile. 
 
Sefer HaChinuch, 
259  
And it is biblically 
forbidden to steal 
even a minor amount; 
even a gentile - it is 
forbidden to steal 
from him or to cheat 
him. And if you stole 
from him or cheated 
him you must return 
the stolen money or 
object. 
 
Shulchan Aruch 
Choshen Mishpat 
359:1 
It is forbidden to rob 
or to cheat even a 
minor amount from 
either a Jew or a gen-
tile. 
 
 Shulchan Aruch 
(Code of Jewish 
Law) Choshen 
Mishpat 348:2 
Old Testament 
Exodus 20:14-16  
“You shall not steal.“ 
 
Exodus 23:7-9  
“Do not accept a bribe, for a 
bribe blinds those who see 
and twists the words of the 
innocent. 
 
Leviticus 19:10-12 
“‘Do not steal. “‘Do not lie. 
“‘Do not deceive one anoth-
er.  
 
Deuteronomy 5:18-20 
“You shall not steal. 
 
1 Samuel 8:2-4  
But his sons did not follow 
his ways. They turned aside 
after dishonest gain and ac-
cepted bribes and perverted 
justice. 
 
Job 36:17-19  
Be careful that no one entic-
es you by riches; do not let a 
large bribe turn you aside. 
 
Psalm 15:4-5  
who lends money to the 
poor without interest; who 
does not accept a bribe 
against the innocent. Who-
ever does these things will 
New Testament 
Matthew 15:18-20  
For out of the heart come 
evil thoughts—murder, 
adultery, sexual immorali-
ty,theft, false testimony, 
slander. 
 
Matthew 19:17-19 
“Which ones?” he inquired. 
Jesus replied, “‘You shall 
not murder, you shall not 
commit adultery, you shall 
not steal, you shall not give 
false testimony,  
 
Mark 7:20-22  
For it is from within, out of 
a person’s heart, that evil 
thoughts come—sexual 
immorality, theft, murder, 
 
Luke 18:19-21  
You know the command-
ments: ‘You shall not com-
mit adultery, you shall not 
murder, you shall not steal, 
you shall not give false tes-
timony, honor your father 
and mother.’ ” 
 
John 10:9-11 
The thief comes only 
to steal and kill and destroy; 
I have come that they may 
have life, and have it to the 
Qur’an 
Al-Baqara, Chapter #2, 
Verse #188 (Pickthal) 
And eat not up your proper-
ty among yourselves in van-
ity, nor seek by it to gain the 
hearing of the judges that ye 
may knowingly devour a 
portion of the property of 
others wrongfully.  
 
 Al-Maeda, Chapter #5, 
Verse #38 
“As for the thief, both male 
and female, cut off their 
hands. It is the reward of 
their own deeds, an exem-
plary punishment from Al-
lah. Allah is Mighty, Wise.” 
 
  An-Nisa, Chapter #4, 
Verse #161 
“And of their taking usury 
when they were forbidden 
it, and of their devouring 
people's wealth by false pre-
tences, We have prepared 
for those of them who dis-
believe a painful doom. 
  
Hud, Chapter #11 Verse 
#85 
 O my people! Give full 
measure and full weight in 
justice, and wrong not peo-
ple in respect of their goods. 
Second Precepts Of 
Buddhism  
“I undertake the train-
ing rule to abstain 
from taking what is 
not given“ 
  
Buddha’s teaching in  
Aṅguttaranikāya 
“Monks, through re-
peated stealing and 
robbing, one is liable 
to be 
reborn in hell or in the 
animal realm or in the 
realm of hungry 
ghosts. At the very 
least, stealing leads to 
damage and loss of 
property.” 
  
Mahasi Sayadaw in  
Sallekha Sutta 
 “Other people may 
steal or loot what is 
not given by the own-
er.We will avoid do-
ing so” 
 
Dhammika Sutta, v. 
20 
A disciple then know-
ing [the law] should 
refrain from stealing 
anything at any place; 
should not cause an-
The  10 Vedic 
Restraints-
YAMA 3: 
Asteya, Nonsteal-
ing 
Uphold the virtue 
of non stealing, 
neither thieving, 
coveting nor fail-
ing to repay debt. 
Control your de-
sires and live 
within your 
means. Do not use 
borrowed re-
sources for unin-
tended purposes 
or keep them past 
due. Do not gam-
ble or defraud 
others. Do not re-
nege on promises. 
Do not use others' 
name, words, re-
sources or rights 
without permis-
sion and acknowl-
edgment. 
 
 The  10 Vedic 
Restraints-
YAMA 8: Arja-
va, Honesty 
Maintain honesty, 
renouncing decep-
tion and wrongdo-
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Source: (Judism) Student, Gil (2000). Theft from Gentiles. Retrieved November 11, 2011 from: http://www.angelfire.com/mt/talmud/theft.html (Judeo-Christian 
and Christianity) Bible- New International Version, search words „theft“ „steal“ „bribe“, retrieved November 11, 2011 from: http://www.biblegateway.com/, (Is-
lam-Qur‘an) Pickthall, M.M. (1995). The meaning of the glorious Qur’an. New Delhi: Madhur Sandesh Sangam, retrieved November 11, 2011 from: 
http://www.khayma.com/librarians/call2islaam/quran/pickthall/index.html. (Islam-Hadith) Abu-Dawud (n.a.), Sunan Abu-Dawud, Kitab Al-Aqdiyah, Book #24, 
Hadith #3573 and Book #23, Hadith #3534, Retrieved November 11, 2011 from  http://www.yanabi.com/Hadith.aspx?HadithID=143455 and 
http://www.yanabi.com/Hadith.aspx?HadithID=143848 (Buddhism) Wat Palelai Singapore (n.a.). Sila and the five percepts. Retrieved November 11, 2011 from: 
https://sites.google.com/site/watpalelai/buddhism/practices/the-five-precepts.Venerable Mahāsī Sayādaw (2006). A Discourse on the Sallekha Sutta. Bhikkhu Pe-
sala, Association for Insight Meditation. http://www.dhammapath.com/resources/Mahasi_2/A%20Discourse%20on%20the%20Sallekha%20Sutta.pdf (Hindusm) 
Vedic Knowledge online (n.a.), Yamas and Niyamas, retrieved November 11, 2011 from: http://veda.wikidot.com/yama-niyama#toc5
 Anyone who steals 
even a minor amount 
violates the prohibi-
tion of [Leviticus 
19:11] "You shall not 
steal" and is required 
to repay [the amount 
stolen] whether one 
steals from a Jew or a 
gentile. 
never be shaken. 
 
Ecclesiastes 7:6-8 
Extortion turns a wise per-
son into a fool, and a bribe 
corrupts the heart. 
 
 Isaiah 33:14-16 
Those who walk righteously 
and speak what is right, who 
reject gain from extortion 
and keep their hands from 
accepting bribes, who stop 
their ears against plots of 
murder and shut their eyes 
against contemplating evil— 
 
Amos 5:11-13 
For I know how many are 
your offenses and how great 
your sins. There are those 
who oppress the innocent 
and take bribes and deprive 
the poor of justice in the 
courts. 
full. 
 
Romans 2:20-22  
you, then, who teach others, 
do you not teach yourself? 
You who preach 
against stealing, do you 
steal? 
 
Ephesians 4:27-29 
Anyone who has 
been stealing must steal no 
longer, but must work, do-
ing something useful with 
their own hands, that they 
may have something to 
share with those in need.  
 
Revelation 9:20-21  
Nor did they repent of their 
murders, their magic arts, 
their sexual immorality or 
their thefts. 
And do not evil in the earth, 
causing corruption. 
 
Hadith 
Sunan Abu-Dawud, Book 
#24, Hadith #3573 
Narrated Abdullah ibn Amr 
ibn al-As: 
“The Apostle of Allah 
(peace be upon him) cursed 
the one who offers 
bribe as well as one who 
accepts bribe.” 
 
Sunan Abu-Dawud, Book 
#23, Hadith #3534 
 Narrated AbuUmamah: The 
Prophet said: If anyone in-
tercedes for his brother and 
he presents a gift to him for 
it and he accepts it, he ap-
proaches a great door of the 
doors of usury. 
other to steal any-
thing, should not con-
sent to the acts of 
those who steal any-
thing, should avoid 
every kind of theft. 
ing. Act honora-
bly even in hard 
times. Obey the 
laws of your na-
tion and locale. 
Pay your taxes. 
Be straightfor-
ward in business. 
Do an honest 
day's work. Do 
not bribe or accept 
bribes. Do not 
cheat, deceive or 
circumvent to 
achieve an end. 
Be frank with 
yourself. Face and 
accept your faults 
without blaming 
them on others. 
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Figure 35: Marginal effect of religiosity 
 
 
Figure 36: Marginal effect of religiosity by religious denomination 
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Figure 37: Marginal effect of religiosity by acceptance of corruption (country) 
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